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Pax Romana is often seen as an aggressive force, imposing the will of Rome on her empire.  
Perhaps it is because of this that Roman authors are often seen as having a dismissive view 
of peace and an admiration, if not a love, of war.  The only literary area where this has 
been questioned at any length is in verse, most fully by the elegists.  This thesis, therefore, 
focuses on the concept of peace in the philosophy and historiography of late republican 
and early imperial Rome, drawing examples from classical Greece and early Christian texts 
when necessary.  The first section acts as an introduction to the possibility of a more 
positive attitude to peace by examining the most striking negative presentations of war: 
just war theory and civil wars. 
The second section examines the main philosophical schools from the period and argues 
that the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans share pacifistic views that are not merely utopian but 
are grounded in important tenets of their respective philosophies: oikeiosis, 
cosmopolitanism, and the unimportance of material and physical virtues for the Stoics and 
Cynics; divine self-sufficiency, the avoidance of pain, and the importance of friendship for 
the Epicureans.  Some even willingly reject more traditionally Roman values, like gloria, 
because they conflicted with the philosophical antipathy to warfare. 
An examination of the usages of the terms pax and concordia in the historians of the time 
argues that the dominant view, that they were suspicious of peace, is not wholly accurate.  
Sallust and Livy provide numerous examples that suggest a more open attitude to peace 
and, at times, even seem to share some of the pacifistic beliefs of the philosophers.  
Further, even the more militaristic historians can present peace as a state preferable to 
war.   
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When examining classical attitudes towards war and peace it is logical to begin with 
attitudes to war, as it is in this area where the vast majority of previous work has been 
carried out, although this is still surprisingly sparse when compared to the amount of works 
on the technical aspects of war.  However, in order that the progression can be easily made 
from war to peace, the idea of the just war may prove the best starting point.  For the 
concept of just war is often identified as having peculiarly Christian origins1, and sometimes 
thought to have only come into being due to the new conditions that arose from the 
pacifist beliefs of the early Christians and the ethical conflict these beliefs created with the 
military aspects of Roman imperial life.  Therefore, if examples of pre-Christian just war 
theory can be identified, it may be possible to identify a pre-Christian negativity towards 
war.  It may, then, be possible to also assess whether peace is justified in the same way, if 
at all, before examining if the theories of either just war or peace are ever realised or 
considered during the war or peace making decisions.  Having established our ideas of just 
war and just peace, a more specific type of war will be examined, namely, civil war, 
because in the view of the Romans it is most hated form of armed conflict.  Civil war 
inspired such hatred among the Roman populace that the constitution set out at the start 
of the republic was laid aside and Rome became willing to once again accept the power of 
one man over all, as this came to be seen as preferable to the ongoing atrocities of civil 
war.  
Just War and Justification for War 
 
The history of the just war, and particularly just war theory, is often traced back to Saint 
Augustine of Hippo2, although some scholars suggest that its roots are buried slightly 
deeper in antiquity and associate its birth with the work of Cicero.3  ƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “/
know that in the third book of Cicero De Re Publica, unless I am mistaken, he argues that 
war will not be waged by the best city, except in defence of its treaties ŽƌŝƚƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ?scio in 
libro Ciceronis tertio, nisi fallor, de republica disputari nullum bellum suscipi a ciuitate 
                                                          
1
 Guthrie & Quinlan 2007; Elshtain 1992; Myers 1996, 115-130, to name just one recent and two of 
the more prominent works in the area which do not acknowledge the possibility of a pre-Christian just 
war theory. 
2
 All three works above name Augustine as the originator of just war theory. 
3
 August. De civ. D., 22. 6; Brunt 1990, 305-308, & Bellamy 2006. 
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optima, nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute)
4
, so Augustine himself acknowledges the 
contribution that Cicero made to the topic with which he himself was about to engage. The 
fact that Augustine refers to his intellectual predecessors means that he was clearly not the 
first ancient scholar to tackle the moral problems created by war.  More important is the 
fact that Augustine has not mentioned a Christian predecessor but a pagan, who would 
therefore not have set about his task with the same intention or even the same problems 
as Augustine himself.  Cicero and other classical thinkers were not bound by the New 
Testament doctrinĞ ŽĨ  ‘turn the other cheek ?5, and were not trying to consolidate the 
pacifist views of the early Christians with the military reality of their age.  It is necessary, 
therefore, to examine those cases where justification for war is offered by pre-Augustinian 
and more importantly pre-Christian classical writers and to draw attention to the 
consistencies and inconsistencies found therein, as well as to examine the possible reasons 
for these parallels.   
One of the most important elements of Augustinian just war theory is that killing in wars 
must not occur if that death is the result of revenge.  Augustine states one of the real evils 
in war is revengeful cruelty (ulciscendi crudelitas)6, and in De libero arbitrio Augustine 
confirms this when he states that killing under command of law is only exempt from sin 
when committed without ire, desire, joy or in revenge.  However in these passages 
Augustine is referring to jus in bello rather than jus ad bellum (to use twentieth century 
terms)7, but if the reader was faŵŝůŝĂƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ ?ƐũƵƐƚǁĂƌ
theory8 ? ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ďĞ ĨĂŝƌ ƚŽ ĂƐƐƵŵĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ũƵƐƚ ĐĂƵƐĞ ? ĂŶĚ “ƌŝŐŚƚ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
pursuit of war would also not include the justification of revenge.  Nonetheless, the reverse 
of this is, in fact, true.  Augustine believes war is just only if it is the result of necessity, but 
ƚŚŝƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ĐĂŶ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ  “ƚŽ ĂǀĞŶŐĞ ŝŶũƵƌŝĞƐ QƚŽ ƉƵŶŝƐŚ ǁƌŽŶŐƐ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ďǇ  ?ƚŚĞ
opposing cities ?] citizens or to restore what ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƵŶũƵƐƚůǇ ƚĂŬĞŶ ďǇ ŝƚ ?.9  As Hartigan 
                                                          
4
 August. De civ. D., 22.6 (adapted from the Loeb edition). 
5
 Matthew 5: 38-42 & Luke 6:27-31. 
6
 August. Contra Faustum, 22.74. 
7
 ³Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which one may resort to war or to force in general; jus 
in bello governs the conduct of belligerents during a war, and in a broader sense comprises the rights 
and obligations of neutral parties as well.´$OWKRXJKVLPLODUFRQFHSWVFDQEHVHHQLQHDUOLHUZRUNVjus 
ad bellum and jus in bello were rarely used as twin terms until 1930.  These definitions are from Kolb, 
1997 553-562, which provides an excellent summary of the history of these concepts and traces their 
SUREDEO\RULJLQWR.XQ]¶VDUWLFOH³3OXVGHORLVGHJXHUUH"´ 
8
 As best summarised by Turner Johnson (1981, 123) i.e. right authority, just cause, right intent, the 
prospect of success, proportionality of good to evil, and that it is the last resort. 
9
 August. Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, 6.10³Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge 
injuries, when the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected either to 
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ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĨŽƌ ƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ  “ǁĂƌ ŝƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ Ăůů ĞůƐĞ ƚŽ ƌestore a violated moral 
ŽƌĚĞƌ ?.10  Despite the need for restraint at the individual level of combat that Augustine 
calls for in order to avoid sin, at a governmental level revenge is seen as a perfectly 
acceptable reason to wage war.  Most crucially however, it must be noted that whatever 
ƚŚĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŐŝǀĞŶĨŽƌŐŽŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌ ?ƚŚĞƵŐƵƐƚŝŶŝĂŶ ‘ũƵƐƚǁĂƌ ?ŵƵƐƚŽŶůǇďĞ  “ǁĂŐĞĚin a 
struggle for ƉĞĂĐĞ ? (Pacis igitur intentione geruntur et bella).11  
It has been observed above that in The City of God Augustine recalls the contributions that 
Cicero made to the justifications of wars.12  Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that we 
find similar views in the philosophical work of Cicero to those expressed by Augustine.  Like 
ƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ ?ŝĐĞƌŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĞ  “ŽŶůǇĞǆĐƵƐĞ for going to war is that we may live in peace 
without injury ? (Quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob eam causam, ut sine iniuria in 
pace vivatur) ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ “War should be undertaken in such a way as to make it evident that 
it has no object than to secure peace ?(Bellum autem ita suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud nisi pax 
quaesita videatur).13  However, he is not consistent in this matter, as in his earlier work of 
De Re Publica CicĞƌŽ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “dŚŽƐĞ ǁĂƌƐ ĂƌĞ ƵŶũƵƐƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
provocation.  For only a war waged for revenge or ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞĐĂŶĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞũƵƐƚ ? (Illa iniusta 
bella sunt, quae sunt sine causa suscepta. Nam extra ulciscendi aut propulsandorum 
hostium causam bellum geri iustum nullum potest).14  So we find that Cicero also believes 
that although war should always be fought for peace, and should always be seen to be 
such, it is also considered a just cause to enter war for the sake of revenge or defence.  
Therefore on these two crucial elements of just war theory Cicero has preceded Augustine 
by nearly 450 years.   
Cicero does appear to differ in one way from Augustine, ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ “/ĨǁĞ
desire to enjoy peace we must first wage war; if we shrink from war, we shall never enjoy 
ƉĞĂĐĞ ? (si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est; si bellum omittimus, pace numquam 
fruemur).15 Augustine does not put this concept of the inevitability of war to produce peace 
in such a clear way.  If two passages of Augustine are considered together, however, they 
                                                                                                                                                                    
punish wrongs committed by its own citizens or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it´Iusta 
autem bella ea definiri solent, quae ulciscuntur iniurias, si qua gens vel civitas, quae bello petenda 
est, vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per iniurias ablatum est 
10
 Hartigan 1966, 199. 
11
 August. De civ. D., 19.12. 
12
 ibid 22.6. 
13
 Cic. Off. 1.23.80 cf 1.11.36. 
14
 Cic. Rep. 3.23.35 = Isidorus Orig. 18.1. 
15
 Cic. Phil. 7.6.19. 
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ĐĂŶƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ P “by whose labours and dangers, along with the blessing 
of divine protection and aid, enemies previously unsubdued are conquered, and peace 
obtained for the State, and the provinces pacified ? (quorum laboribus atque periculis, Dei 
protegentis atque opitulantis auxilio, hostis indomitus vincitur, et quies reipublicae 
pacatisque provinciis comparatur)16 ĂŶĚ  “ĨŽƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶŝquity of the opposing side that 
imposes upon the wisĞŵĂŶƚŚĞĚƵƚǇŽĨǁĂŐŝŶŐǁĂƌƐ ? (Iniquitas enim partis adversae iusta 
bella ingerit gerenda sapienti).17  War then has been imposed upon the wise man by the 
inequalities within the enemy and therefore, it is he that will need to struggle to pacify the 
province.  For Augustine, then, the inevitability of the failings of men (albeit enemies) 
means that war becomes inevitable, and this inevitable war must be fought so that this 
ĞŶĞŵǇ Žƌ  “ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞ ? ŵĂǇ ďĞ ƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚ ?  ǀĞŶ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ƐĞĞŵŝŶŐ
contradiction between the two authors it can be argued that Cicero and Augustine actually 
agree that peace may require an undesired war.  Why then have they arrived at such 
similar conclusions with such different conditions placed upon them? And if Cicero can be 
shown to display a just war theory that pre-dates Augustine, can any other classical author 
be shown to do so? 
It will perhaps be more prudent to tackle the second of these questions first as this may 
allow us insight into the reasons that led Cicero (and possibly other classical authors) to 
conclude as they did when addressing the subject of war and morality.   
ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂůƐŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐŵĂŶǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽrationalise morality and war.  He describes 
a life spent in pursuit of leisure and explains that to gain leisure a man must first be busy. 18  
ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐƚŚŝƐƚŽƉĞĂĐĞ ?ƐĂǇŝŶŐǁĞ “ŵĂŬĞǁĂƌƐŽǁĞŵŝŐŚƚ ůŝǀĞŝŶƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵƐƚŚŝƐďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ “ŶŽŽŶĞĐŚŽŽƐĞƐƚŽďĞĂƚǁĂƌ ?ŽƌƉƌŽǀŽŬĞƐǁĂƌ ? for the sake of 
ďĞŝŶŐ Ăƚ ǁĂƌ ?.19  This has clear parallels with the accepted just war theory of Augustine.  
Aristotle does not say that peace should be the only motivation for war as Augustine does, 
but rather that peace is the true goal of war, and that we must endure one so that we may 
enjoy the other.  Peace, then, is not seen as a justification for war but rather as a welcome 
reward received after the battles are over, but he does give another reason to go to war.  
In Politica 1. ?ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ P “dŚĞĂƌƚŽĨǁĂƌŝƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂƌƚŽĨĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŝƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ
hunting, an art we ought to practise against wild beasts and against men who, though 
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 August. Letter 229: to Darius, 2. 
17
 August. De civ. D., 19.7 (adapted from the Loeb edition). 
18
 Arist. Eth. Nic., 10.7. 
19
 ibid. 
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intended by nature to be governed, will not submit, for war of such a kind is naturally 
ũƵƐƚ ? ?20  Here we see a very different sort of justification for war to those discussed above; 
war for Aristotle is a civilising process at best and a process of subjugation at worst.  He 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ǁĂƌ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ  ‘ďĂƌďĂƌŝĂŶƐ ? ŝƐ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƉƵƌĞůǇ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ beneath 
concern and are compared with animals, as both are to be hunted and bested, to be 
engaged in battle before conversation.  This idea contains many similarities with the Roman 
belief that by spreading pax Romana through war they were in fact bringing civilisation to 
ƚŚĞƵŶǁŝƚƚŝŶŐ ‘ďĂƌďĂƌŝĂŶŚordes ? ? 
The Pythagorean Corpus also provides an interesting example when examining 
justifications for war.  In The Life of Pythagoras Porphyry claims that Pythagoras was 
 “ƐŚŽĐŬĞĚ Ăƚ Ăůů ďůŽŽĚƐŚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŬŝůůŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ĂďƐƚĂŝŶĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶŝŵĂů ĨŽŽĚ ? ďƵƚ
never in any way approachĞĚďƵƚĐŚĞƌƐŽƌŚƵŶƚĞƌƐ ?.21  Even in sacrificing, Pythagoras is said 
to never have shed blood and to have offered only barley bread.  Porphyry says that the 
accounts of Pythagoras sacrificing an ox after the discovery of his most famous theorem are 
inaccurate and that although an ox was sacrificed, it was ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚĂŶŽǆ  “ŵĂĚĞŽĨ ĨůŽƵƌ ?.22  
This total avoidance of bloodshed and those who made a living from blood stained 
employment sounds like a view of absolute pacifism, more akin to certain forms of 
Buddhism than those of the city states of Greece.  As such we could expect to find 
Pythagoras giving no exceptions in reasons to go to war, but rather a blanket ban, similar to 
those of early Christians.  However, this is not the case.  Diodorus Siculus records that when 
five hundred citizens of Sybaris claimed political asylum in Croton, Pythagoras supported 
war with Sybaris rather than the handing over of the refugees.  Instead of breaking the 
sacred laws of xenia, Pythagoras was willing to submit to the rigours of a justified war.23  
Therefore this could be seen as a just war by practical example rather than theory or 
rhetoric, showing that despite his apparently absolutist values, even Pythagoras sometimes 
had to try and reconcile his beliefs with the necessity of war. 
Returning to revenge as just cause, it is possible to move from philosophy to 
historiography.  In Thucydides, the speech given by Cleon in the Mytilenian debate insists 
that mercy should be reserved for the merciful and that revenge is a just act when 
                                                          
20
 Arist. Pol. 8. 
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 Porphyry The Life of Pythagoras, 7. 
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 ibid 36. 
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 Diodorus Siculus, 12.9. 
Andrew Crane  6 
 
performed on those who are not merciful.24  Also in Thucydides, Gylippus, the Syracusan, 
ƌĞŵŝŶĚƐŚŝƐƚƌŽŽƉƐďĞĨŽƌĞďĂƚƚůĞƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐŵŽƐƚũƵƐƚĂŶĚůĂǁĨƵůƚŽclaim the right to slake 
the fury of the soul in retaliation on the aggƌĞƐƐŽƌ ?.25  These two examples show that 
centuries before Cicero and the systematic theory of just war existed; the Ciceronian belief 
that revenge was a just cause for the pursuit of war was being used not just as a 
hypothetical example but as a practical way in which to muster support for an aggressive 
act.  Thucydides also gives more personal reasons for the pursuit of wars: e.g. when an 
ƚŚĞŶŝĂŶĞŶǀŽǇƐƉĞĂŬƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ƉĂƌƚĂŶĂƐƐĞŵďůǇŚĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚŵĞŶŐŽƚŽǁĂƌĨŽƌ “ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?
honour and self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?26 (sometimes translated aƐ  “ŚŽŶŽƵƌ ? ĨĞĂƌ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ).27  
Perhaps then revenge is considered an appropriate reason to go to war because it allows 
for the maintenance of honour and the righting of past wrongs.  Thucydides also provides 
an interesting example of the just war thought that war should be entered only to secure 
peace, which would later become an important tenet of Ciceronian and Augustinian 
philosophy.  When trying to convince the allies of Sparta to declare war with Athens the 
Corinthian representative states that  “ǁĂƌ ŐŝǀĞƐ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŝƚƐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?.28  Therefore, rather 
than entering war only for the sake of peace, the Corinthian argues that war may be 
entered for many reasons but the most secure form of peace is found after a successful 
war has been waged. 
It appears that even before Cicero pre-empted Augustine with his own just war theory, 
philosophers and historians alike were attempting to justify the extreme recourse to war.  
However, no one created a system as structured and developed as Cicero or Augustine.  
We must now, therefore, return to the question posed earlier; why have these two men 
arrived at such similar conclusions with such different conditions placed upon them?  
ƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶŝƐǁĞůůĂƚƚĞƐƚĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞƉĂĐŝĨŝƐƚďĞůŝĞĨƐŽĨ
the early Christian church with the military demands of the Roman Empire.29  Cicero 
obviously had neither of these concerns, but perhaps his reasons were not so different.  
ŝĐĞƌŽ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ, although eclectic, was influenced most by Stoicism and as such Cicero 
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would have been heavily influenced by the Stoic idea of the cosmopolis.30  These Stoic 
ideals may have caused him to hate all acts of war because they violated this belief.  Brunt 
also believes that it was the stoic influence on Cicero that would have caused him to justify 
war, stating that in this task Cicero was following and developing the work of Panaetius 
ǁŚĞŶŚĞ “ŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƐǁĞůůĂƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞũƵƐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨsuum 
cuique ?31, and that as well as abstaining from unjust acts they should also discourage 
others from committing such deeds.32    So whereas Augustine was writing to convince the 
orthodox Christians, who had a natural hatred of war, Cicero may partly have been writing 
purely for the sake of moral questioning, but also partly to convince himself that the 
aggressive actions of the republic that he cherished, could be reconciled with his own less 
militarian philosophical beliefs.   
Therefore, it is apparent that centuries before Augustine, Cicero was concerned with the 
evils of war and more importantly with how these evils could be excused, either for the 
good of his own conscience or that of the Republic.  It is also evident that before Cicero the 
speeches placed into the mouths of envoys or generals of multiple nationalities were also 
used to put forward ways in which their actions could appear to be justified as not only 
acceptable but essential for either moral or defensive reasons.  This need to justify military 
action is significant as it demonstrates the existence of reluctance either for certain 
individuals to sanction war or distaste for specific conflicts.  It is clear that Cicero and 
others would not need to justify war unless they recognised it as a negative force.33 
Just Peace, Justifications and Conditions for Peace 
 
Livy often offers pax and bellum as equally weighted partners in the machinery of the state.  
ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ďƌŝŶŐƐ ZŽŵĞ  “ƚŽ ŝƚƐ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ƉĞĂĐĞĂůŝŬĞ ? (non bello ac pace 
firmandae),  “ŶĐƵƐƌĞŝŐŶĞĚƚǁĞŶƚǇ-four years, unsurpassed by any of his predecessors in 
ĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďŽƚŚ ŝŶǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?(Regnavit Ancus annos quattuor et viginti, 
cuilibet superiorum regum belli pacisque et artibus et gloria par) and Servius Tullius 
 “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ƚŚĞĐĞŶƐƵƐ ?ĂŵŽƐƚďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂů ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŝŶǁŚĂƚǁĂƐ ƚŽďĞĂŐƌĞĂƚĞŵƉŝƌĞ ? ŝŶ
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 For example, Cic. De Fin 3.62-8 includes a detailed description of the cosmopolis placed into the 
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order that by its means the various duties of peace and war might be assigned, not as 
heretofore, indiscriminately, but in proportion to the amount of property each man 
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ? (Censum enim instituit, rem saluberrimam tanto futuro imperio, ex quo belli 
pacisque munia non viritim, ut ante, sed pro habitu pecuniarum fierent).34  War and peace 
are seen as the two possible conditions of the nation; as the light and shade of state, 
conflicting but inseparable.  Consequently, just as the Romans had varying reasons and 
justifications for war, ranging from the practical to the moral, and as peace can perhaps be 
seen as the opposite side of the coin of government, it could be expected that a similar 
approach may be taken with peace, with different authors from different periods offering 
different conditions for the conclusion of peace.  
For instance, if the attainment of peace is a justification for war, then in a society where 
war is sometimes viewed as a constant, the march to war and (hoped for) consequent 
victory become a necessity for peace.  Augustine is the most pertinent example of this, as it 
is the one at the forefront of the classical just war theory and its affirmation that war 
should only be fought with the goal of peace.  In his letter to Boniface, Augustine reassures 
the general that in waging war he is not committing a sin, as he has been forced into his 
current position by the necessity of war, and thus he must fight this war in order to be a 
peacemaker (pacificus).35  Augustine does, therefore, recognise the paradoxical but 
essential war that must occur for peace to prevail.  This concept can also be seen in one of 
ƵŐƵƐƚŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ ? ^ǇŶĞƐŝƵƐŽĨ ǇƌĞŶ  ?  /Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƚƌĞĂƚŝƐĞOn Kingship he 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĨŽƌŚŝŵĂůŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐĂďůĞƚŽŝŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶũƵƌǇƵƉŽŶƚŚĞĞǀŝů-doer is it given to keep 
ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ QĨŽƌ ŝĨ ŚĞ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ǁĂƌ ŚĞ ǁŝůů ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ďĞ ǁĂƌƌĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?.36  In Christian 
doctrine, at least, this concept seems to be firmly established.  Thus, for peace to be 
achieved war must first be waged, or at least a king must be ready to wage war for the sake 
of peace.  
However, just as Cicero was seen as a predecessor to Augustine in his theory of just war, he 
can also be shown to hold a similar view to his Christian successor in the seventh Philippic 
whĞƌĞŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐ “ŝĨǁĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĞŶũŽǇƉĞĂĐĞǁĞŵƵƐƚĨŝƌƐƚǁĂŐĞǁĂƌ ?ŝĨǁĞƐŚƌŝŶŬĨƌŽŵǁĂr, 
ǁĞ ƐŚĂůů ŶĞǀĞƌ ĞŶũŽǇ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? (si pace frui volumus, bellum gerendum est; si bellum 
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omittimus, pace numquam fruemur).37  Therefore, at this point in his life at least, Cicero 
had decided that before peace could be enjoyed a war must be fought.  Cicero is not the 
only pre-Christian thinker to note the requirement of war in the pursuit of peace, 
Thucydides does more than merely observe this prerequisite he actively endorses ŝƚ ? “tĂƌ
gives peace its security, but one is still not safe from danger if, for the sake of quiet, one 
refuses to fight ?.38  Thucydides here suggests that war should actively be sought in order to 
obtain the most lasting and desired form of peace, whereas Synesius, Augustine and 
perhaps even Cicero are more passive in their outlook.  They have all come to realise that 
war is inevitable, and, as such, must be contested in order to obtain peace.  Thucydides, 
however, does not see war as inevitable in itself but merely insomuch as it will yield better 
results in the long term for the state.   
However, dŚƵĐǇĚŝĚĞƐĂůƐŽŽĨĨĞƌƐƚǁŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ? “in an alliance the only 
safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that wants to break faith is 
ĚĞƚĞƌƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽĚĚƐǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞŽŶŚŝƐƐŝĚĞ ?ĂŶĚ  “there can never be a 
firm friendship between man and man or a real community between differet states unless 
there is a conviction of honesty on both sides ?.39  This seems to contradict the earlier 
presumption that the ideal peace can not exist without there first having been a war.  But 
perhaps these ideas can be reconciled, as the later clarifications could refer to a time after 
the completion of a war, so that when the terms of peace are concluded these are best 
concluded in a position of not only mutual trust but also of mutual fear, allowing for the 
most secure and long lasting peace. 
Even as late as the Justinian War, the role of trust in the maintenance of peace is still seen 
as crucial.  In Procopius, a Roman envoy sent to Chosroes describes the importance of 
oaths and the honouring of oaths in the establishment of trust and therefore peace, and 
ƚŚĂƚ “ŚŽƉĞŝŶƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐŝƐ the only thing left to those who are living in insecurity because of 
ƚŚĞĞǀŝůĚĞĞĚƐŽĨǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽŶĐĞƚƌƵƐƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶůŽƐƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŽŶůǇ “ǁĂƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞŶĚ ?.40 
The longest period of peace that Rome was traditionally thought to have enjoyed was not 
however attained through war, fear or trust, but rather through religious observance.  This 
is the period of the reign of Numa Pompilius, the successor to the throne of Romulus, 
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during which time the newly built gates of the Temple of Janus were never opened.41  
Augustine, however, rejects this theory and suggests that it was not religious observance 
that allowed Rome to live in peace at that time but her neighbours who did not attack her 
during this time42, which seems to be a logical conclusion.  However, Augustine later goes 
on to claim that those who show religious observance to God rather than the pagan gods 
ǁŝůů “ďĞƐĞĐƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞĞƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚŚŝŐŚĞƐƚƉĞĂĐĞ ? (in aeterna et summa pace secura).43  So 
Augustine does believe that peace can be granted by divine will and merely rejects the 
early Roman assumption of this because they were worshipping the incorrect deity.  It is 
ĂůƐŽ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŚĂƚ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĞůĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
reverence towards the old gods and peace to be specious reasoning as a modern secular 
reader would (and even Augustine seems to have done).  When Livy was writing, Augustus 
was being heralded as the bringer of peace and the restorer of the old gods.44  As a result, 
the connection between religious observance and peace was not one foreign to the Roman 
populace.  Even before Augustus made his claim to have restored religion and peace to 
Rome it can be seen that Numa was held as an archetype for peace.  Cicero says that 
Augustus instilled in RomanƐ Ă  “ůŽǀĞ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůůŝƚǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶĂďůĞ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ
good faith to flourish ŵŽƐƚ ĞĂƐŝůǇ ? (amoremque eis otii et pacis iniecit, quibus facillime 
iustitia et fides convalescit)45, showing that Cicero felt that the Romans not only required 
justice in their wars but had an innate longing for peace that began with Numa Pompilius. 
Pliny the Elder offers another cause for the establishment of peace: the foundation of the 
ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƌƵůĞ ? ,ĞĂƐŬƐ  “ǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŶŽǁĂĚŵŝƚ ƚŚĂƚ
now that intercommunication has been established throughout the world by the majesty of 
the Roman Empire, life has been advanced by the interchange of commodities and by the 
partnership in the blessing of peace? ?ĂŶĚadds ƚŚĂƚĂůůŚŽƉĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞǁĞƌĞ “ŽǁŝŶŐ
to the boundlesƐŐƌĂŶĚĞƵƌŽĨƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶWĞĂĐĞ ?.46  For Pliny then, it is the empire itself that 
has provided the conditions for peace.  This may be due to the fact that Pliny was himself 
part of the early empire.  Although he would not have remembered the devastating civil 
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war his grandfathers ? generation would have, they would recall, aided by the shadow of 
ƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ? ƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ, that it had been the establishment of the Principate that had 
restored the golden age of peace.  This was a peace not only felt in Rome but in the 
provinces that had witnessed and suffered first-hand the devastation of civil war. 
Zampaglione believes that Seneca, writing during the same period as Pliny also sees peace 
as a result of the imposition of Roman laws and customs when Seneca says  “Consider all 
the tribes whom Roman peace does not reach  W I mean the Germans and all the nomad 
tribes that assail us along the Danube ? (Omnes considera gentes in quibus Romana pax 
desinit, Germanos dico et quicquid circa Histrum vagarum gentium occursat).
47  However, it 
ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐůĞĂƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  “ZŽŵĂŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ŵĞĂn civilisation, as Basore 
translates, or a more literal peace.  Given that Seneca then continues to dwell on the 
 “ŚĂƉƉǇ ? ůŝǀĞƐ ĐůŽƐĞ ƚŽ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ďĂƌďĂƌŝĂŶ ƚƌŝďĞƐ ůĞĂĚ, then it is more likely that 
civilisation is the coƌƌĞĐƚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞĂŵƉĂŐůŝŽŶĞƐ ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨ “ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂ
continues further into the Imperial period.  Florus, for example, writing in the second half 
ŽĨ ,ĂĚƌŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ƌĞŝŐŶ48, sees peace as something that only the citizens of the empire could 
eŶũŽǇ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚĐůĂŝŵŚĞĂĚĚƐƚŚĂƚ  “ƉĞĂĐĞǁĂƐĂŶĞǁ
state of affairs, and the proud haughty necks of the nations, not yet accustomed to the 
reigns of servitude, revolted against the yoke ƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŵ ? (Nova quippe 
pax, necdum adsuetae frenis servitutis tumidae gentium inflataeque cervices ab inposito 
nuper iugo resiliebat).49  The idea of the entrapments of the empire bringing peace but also 
bringing servitude is seen twice more in accounts of the Roman annexation of Britain.  
Cassius Dio has Boudicca give a speech in which she prefers frĞĞĚŽŵ ƚŽ  “ǁĞĂůƚŚ ǁŝƚŚ
ƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?.50  Here we can see what Florus has described as the nations ? necks revolting 
against the yoke that has apparently brought peace.  Whereas, Tacitus shows some ƌŝƚŽŶƐ ? 
misguided acceptance of Roman culture, he says:  “ƚŚĞƵŶƐƵƐƉĞĐƚŝŶŐƌŝƚŽŶƐƐƉŽŬĞŽĨƐƵĐŚ
novelties ĂƐ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ǁŚĞŶ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ŽŶůǇ Ă ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŶƐůĂǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? 
(Idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset).51  It is not only the 
provincials that can be seen to face this choice of peace or freedom spent waging wars.  
When the kings had been removed from Rome, Livy says the SĞŶĂƚĞ “ĨĞĂƌĞĚŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞ
enemy but even their own fellow-citizens, lest the plebs, overcome by their fears, should 
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admit the Tarquins into the city, and accept peace even though it meant slaǀĞƌǇ ? (nec 
hostes modo timebant sed suosmet ipsi ciues, ne Romana plebs, metu perculsa, receptis in 
urbem regibus uel cum seruitute pacem acciperet).52  Therefore, we can see that both the 
Romans (when they first won their freedom) and the Britons (when they first lost theirs) 
were faced with the same dilemma.  It is of course the Romans who manage to overcome 
both their fear and their enemy and win not only their freedom but peace also, for a time 
at least.  
There is however one classical writer who holds an entirely different view of peace from 
those (mainly Roman) that have so far been cited, that is the Greek philosopher Xenophon.  
,Ğ ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “DĞŶ Qwho sincerely desire peace ought not to expect from others a 
thorough compliance with their own demands whilst they manifest an ambition to engross 
Ăůů ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?.53  Here Xenophon is suggesting that peace should not be 
imposed by a victor upon a vanquished foe but should rather be reached via a compromise.  
The idea that a sincere peace can only be reached via compromise is one that seems 
foreign to Roman thought and can be illustrated by the Roman response to attempts made 
by the Nervii to reach a compromise after the Romans established winter camps in Gaul.  
Quintus Tullius Cicero, the brother of ƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐŽƌĂƚŽƌ ?ĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ “ƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ŝƐ ?ŶŽƚƚŚĞŚĂďŝƚ
of the Roman People to accept terms from an armed enemǇ ? (non esse consuetudinem 
populi Romani accipere ab hoste armato condicionem).54  Therefore it is clear that, at least 
while the Romans were in the dominant position, there was no question of compromise 
being reached for the sake of peace.  This however does not mean that peace was out of 
the question but only that the peace will be made on the grounds that best suit Rome, or in 
this case probably grounds that best suit Caesar. The importance of the imposition of peace 
is commented upon by Polybius.  Polybius draws a distinction between a peace made with 
ĂŶĞŶĞŵǇĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚĂƉĞĂĐĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?ƐƐƉŝƌŝƚǁĂƐ
broken.  IŶƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌĐĂƐĞ ŝƚǁĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶ  “ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŐƵĂƌĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞ
ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇǁĂŝƚƐĨŽƌĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?tŚŝůĞŝŶƚŚĞ “ůĂƚƚĞƌƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƚƌƵƐƚƚŚĞŵĂƐ
true friends and subjects and not hesitate to command ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ǁŚĞŶ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?.55  
Therefore, Polybius would probably have approved of the tactics used by Cicero in the 
negotiations with the Nervii, as it must be clear that it is not only the military victory that is 
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secure but also that the spirit of the enemy is crushed so that they would not again 
consider violent actions against Rome.  Furthermore, there may have been a third option 
that Polybius would have approved of more than either of those allowed by a crushing 
military victory; ĨŽƌ ŚĞ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŝƐ Ă  “ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ŝf achieved through 
 “ŐĞŶĞƌŽƐŝƚǇĂŶĚĞƋƵŝƚǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝŶĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ, the reason that Polybius 
gives in favour of this form of diplomatic peace is not that it does not require spilt blood, 
but rather that it is the work of the commander alone and not of the army at large.56  Thus 
Polybius believes peace should be reached through negotiations (but not necessarily 
compromise) as it confers greater glory on the commander not because it has a higher 
moral value. 
Brunt draws attention to another particularly important aspect of Roman policy, when he 
states that it was difficult for Rome to maintain a realistic claim on defensive motives while 
she so often offered friendship or protection to states that were already either threatened 
or under attack.57  However, although this is certainly the case, it does not show any 
inconsistency.  Once the friendship had been offered it was just for Rome to enter conflict 
on behalf of the other state for either defensive reasons or simply to honour a treaty.  So 
again, perhaps this shows the Romans own sense of the importance of just cause.  
Unwilling to enter the battle without a smokescreen of justice, Rome would create a 
situation in which she had no choice but to act.  
It seems, therefore, that peace can be justified in some of the same ways as war; fear, for 
example, has been used as a cause for both war and peace.  The causes for peace can also 
be debated ǁŝƚŚǀŝĞǁƐĂƐĚŝǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ ‘ďĞƐƚĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽƐƚƐĞĐƵƌĞ
when imposeĚŽŶĂŶĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚĞĚĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?dŚŝƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ, though, when it is 
considered that these views are taken from varying sources spanning not only many 
nations but also many centuries, philosophies and religions.  Even so, despite these 
conflicting views, it appears that there were indeed many who sought to justify the 
conditions for peace as others tried to with war.  It is now necessary to see if the realities of 
Roman wars match any of these idealised views presented in this diverse group of theories. 
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The Rhetoric of War & Peace Compared to the Ideal of 
Just War & Just Peace  
 
&Žƌ ĂůŵŽƐƚ Ă ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ DŽŵŵƐĞŶ ?ƐHistory of Rome the accepted 
view for the causes of Roman military action was that they were practically always 
defensively motivated.58  Rome did not enter large military campaigns lightly, and did so 
only when they felt threatened by a powerful neighbour.  However, with the publication of 
,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC the theory of defensive 
imperialism gained a rival.  A new group of scholars began to consider Roman expansion 
not as an accidental policy created by necessity and fear, but as a deliberate attempt to 
gain both power and economic stability.  Harris, in fact, ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐZŽŵĂŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵĂƐ “Ă
ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ QĂŶĚ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŝƐƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ƚŽ ĂĚĚ ƚŽ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
ƉŽǁĞƌ ?.59  Since then these views have continued to develop in tandem with some scholars 
still adamant in defence of Mommsen and a form of defensive imperialism60 and others 
insisting that Harris has answered the question of whether Rome ?Ɛ military activity was 
defensive or ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ  “ŽŶĐĞĂŶĚ ĨŽƌĂůů ?61, and still more creating a combination of the 
two categories.  Richardson, for example, points out that Rome was often slow in exploiting 
the financial benefits of newly conquered territory62, which shows that if fiscal gain was 
one of the prime motivating forces behind Roman expansion, it could not have been the 
only reason.  If Roman expansion was primarily financially motivated an effective 
administrative system would have been installed more quickly.  Rich also draws attention 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? ŽĨ ZŽŵĂŶ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞƐ ĂŶǇ  “ŵŽŶŽĐĂƵƐĂů ?
explanation (be it defensive or motivated by greed), but does so without offering even an 
attempt at his own interpretation, purely highlighting the shortfalls of MommƐĞŶ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ
,ĂƌƌŝƐ ?ŽǁŶƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ.63    
Given the conflicting modern theories of defensive imperialism and of war and expansion 
for less passive purposes, perhaps we should also expect to see both of these reasons for 
war presented in the texts of the period.  This does not appear to be the case, barring one 
passage in Polybius: when Polybius recounts the reasons given for Rome to enter the 
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second Punic War.64   “dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐĂƵƐĞ ?WŽůǇďŝƵƐƐĂǇƐ “ǁĂƐƚŚĞĂŶŐĞƌŽĨ,ĂŵŝůĐĂƌ ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞ ?
ƐƉŝƌŝƚŚĂĚŶĞǀĞƌďĞĞŶďƌŽŬĞŶ ?.  This suggests that this was a war undertaken out of fear of 
Hamilcar, who had yet to be subdued, even by previous defeat.  However, the reason 
described by Polybius as the most important is financial and linked with the increased 
tributes levied on the Carthaginians.  The final reason according to Polybius is again one 
that seems to put Rome in a defĞŶƐŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?WŽůǇďŝƵƐƐĂǇƐŝƚǁĂƐ,ĂŵŝůĐĂƌ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ
^ƉĂŝŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚWƵŶŝĐǁĂƌ ? dŚĞƌĞůŝĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨWŽůǇďŝƵƐ ? ůŝƐƚ of 
causes can, however, be called into question when it is considered that war did not actually 
break out until ten years after HaŵŝůĐĂƌ ?Ɛ death.  It does, however, indicate that Polybius 
felt this war was necessary for the continued safety of Rome.  This is a reason used again 
ĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶŝŶWŽůǇďŝƵƐ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?^ĐŝƉŝŽŝƐƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĂĚĞƚŚŝƐĐůĂŝŵǁŚĞn he came 
face to face with Hannibal: ŚĞ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŝŶ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌƐ Qwere the Romans 
responsible ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŐŽĚƐ ŚĂĚ ďŽƌŶĞ ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐ ďǇ ŐƌĂŶƚŝŶŐ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ not to the 
 “ƵŶũƵƐƚ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŽƌƐ ? ? ďƵƚ ? Ž ƚŚŽƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŚĂĚ ƚĂŬĞŶ up arms to defend themselvĞƐ ?.65  
Defense motivated by fear is also given as the prime motive in Roman military actions in 
many other places; the Romans aided Messana because they feared a Carthaginian success 
that would create  “ŵŽƐƚtroublesome and dangerous neighbours ?66; the Ebro treaty is 
concluded due to fear of increasing Carthaginian power67; and both the invasion of Gaul in 
225 and the decision to retain the consuls in Italy in 197 were the result of a fear of the 
Gauls68 ? ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŵŽůŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĂƌƚŚĂŐĞ ǁĂƐ ƐĞĞŶ  “ƚŽ ƌĞŵŽǀĞ ƚŚĞfear which had 
ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ ŚƵŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞŵ ?.69  So it appears that if WŽůǇďŝƵƐ ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚcan be considered 
decisive, then the Roman war machine was set in motion more often by defensive rather 
than offensive reasons.  Furthermore, the reported speech of Scipio shows that the 
Romans themselves may also have believed this to be the case. 
It is clear, then, that even if the Romans were not as defensively motivated as some 
modern scholars believe, this was at least the appearance that they wished to project and 
that this appearance was accepted by Polybius.  An extract from Livy also confirms this 
ǁŚĞŶĂZŚŽĚŝĂŶĞŶǀŽǇƐƚĂƚĞƐ “Surely you are the same Romans who boast that your wars 
are favoured of Fortune because they are just ? (certe iidem vos estis Romani, qui ideo 
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felicia bella vestra esse, quia iusta sint).70  Therefore if this speech placed in the mouth of a 
Greek by Livy is correct, ƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŝĚŶŽƚƉƌŽǀŽŬĞǁĂƌǁĂƐǁĞůůŬŶŽǁŶ
enough to be referred to by a foreign envoy.  Even if this speech is not accurate, it at least 
shows another example of a Roman (Livy) taking the opportunity to declare the just way in 
which the Romans felt their wars to be waged.  Livy seems to have been convinced by this 
ĐůĂŝŵĂƐŚĞƐĂǇƐ ? “although he had victory almost within his grasp, he was not rejecting a 
peace, in order that all nations might know that the Roman people acted fairly both in 
beginning and ending wars. ? (tamen, cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat, pacem non 
abnuere, ut omnes gentes sciant populum Romanum et suscipere iuste bella et finire).71 
Polybius also records a debate in which Hannibal attempts to appear justified in his military 
actions.  When envoys were sent to ask Hannibal not to interfere in Saguntum72, as it was 
in the Roman sphere of influence, he responded that he was protecting the Saguntines, as 
previous Roman arbitrators had caused the wrongful execution of the leading citizens.  So 
by becoming involved in Saguntum, Hannibal claims he was upholding his ancestral 
tradition ŽĨƚĂŬŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞ “ĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐŽĨŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?.73  When the second Punic war 
finally seemed to be inevitable, Polybius records a debate between Roman envoys and 
Carthaginian orators.74  The dialogue is not geared towards ceasing hostilities, but rather at 
laying claims to the most justified reasons to go to war, with each claiming the other had 
created a situation where a just war can begin.  Due to the breaking of previous treaties 
(which are then read aloud to provide further evidence) the question is raised as to who 
has been the first to engage in unprovoked aggression.  This debate is particularly 
important, as it takes place after the Senate are already set on war but both states still 
appear to be taking the just role of the defender.75 This illustrates that there was a 
significant amount of importance placed on the ability to claim justification, not merely for 
the act of initiating hostilities, but for more theoretical and ideological purposes.  This 
debate between the Romans and Carthaginians may only be present to illustrate the 
ZŽŵĂŶƐ ?ŽǁŶ ũƵƐƚŝĨŝcations, but as there seems to be no definite conclusion as to whose 
claims are more compelling, this is not definitely the case.  Furthermore, the importance 
placed upon a defensive argument by the Romans can be seen on the occasions when 
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blatantly false defensive excuses are given.76  Polybius tells us that Rome distorted the 
Carthaginian efforts made in preparation of their Sardinian campaign so they could claim 
Carthage was planning a war with Rome and thŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ  “ƉƌĞƚĞǆƚ ? ĨŽƌ ǁĂƌ.77  In 
comparison, Caesar used defensive arguments to explain his technically illegal offensive 
moves against the Helvetii and Belgae, when he claimed these tribes were becoming a 
threat to Rome by migrating near to Roman allies.78 
Book 31 of Livy contains what purports to be the only surviving recorded speech made in 
the Senate on the subject of whether or not to enter into war. This is illuminating on the 
importance the Romans placed on the defensive argument.  The Second Punic war had just 
come to an end and Macedonian powers were increasing under Philip, P. Sulpicius, as 
consul, proposed that Rome attack Philip for  “the injuries he had inflicted and the war he 
had made on the allies of the Roman people ?  ?ob iniurias armaque illata sociis populi 
Romani bellum indici) which in itself may have been enough for military actions to be 
considered just.  At the same time the effects of the Hannibalic war were still being felt in 
Rome and with help from the tribunes, ǁŚŽĂĐĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƉĂƚƌŝĐŝĂŶƐŽĨ “ƐŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĞĚƐŽĨ
wars from this war ? (incusaverat bella ex bellis seri), the proposal was almost universally 
rejected.79  Before the vote in the Campus, Martius Sulpicius made a further speech in 
which he altered the reasons fƌŽŵĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐZŽŵĞ ?ƐĂůůŝĞƐƚŽĚefending Rome herself by 
introducing this false dilemma:  “but whether you are to send your legions across to 
Macedonia or meet the enemy in Italy ? (sed utrum in Macedoniam legiones transportetis 
an hostes in Italiam accipiatis.).80  This change in the reason given by the Consul led to the 
commencement of the Second Macedonian War.  It is of course possible that other factors 
contributed to the change in public opinion.  The personal advantages open to Sulpicius if 
he was successful may have caused him to pass his evening dispensing bribes, but the fact 
that no other speech is recorded in favour of going to war, and that no other change in 
circumstances is given by Polybius shows that this speech, and the arguments within, were 
felt at the time to be the key contributing factor. 
The Ciceronian theory of just war also advocated the just use of force for the purpose of 
revenge.  This becomes particularly evident in one example of justified ǁĂƌ ŝŶ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ
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account of his campaigns in Gaul.  Initially the Helvetii sent envoys to ask Caesar for safe 
passage from their territory and promised to do ƐŽ  “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ ŚĂƌŵ ? (sine ullo 
maleficio).81  However, this request is denied them as Caesar recalled that in 107 BC. they 
had killed the consul Lucius Cassius.  After the battle with the Helvetii had been concluded, 
Caesar was met by envoys from the other Gallic tribes, who congratulated him because his 
actions had helped Gaul as well as Rome.  Though Caesar had set out with intentions of 
revenge, the envoys state that the Helvetii planned to  “ŵĂŬĞ ǁĂƌ ŽŶ 'ĂƵů ĂŶĚ ƚĂŬĞ
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?  ?reliquissent uti toti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque 
potirentur).82  This may show Caesar trying to justify his actions rather than giving an 
honest reason for his aggression, particularly as rather than demonstrate his famous 
clementia, Caesar chose to destroy the vanquished army even putting to death many 
prisoners who had again asked for peace, therefore.  His aggression was such that he 
records that the number of men, women and children had been reduced from 368,000 to 
110,000.83  Perhaps this shows Caesar, aware of his brutality, making use of an explanation 
that he knows will justify his actions, and in this episode the justification is revenge for the 
violence of fifty years earlier.  In this case it is perhaps even more important that Caesar 
justify his actions by invoking the death of Lucius Cassius, because it was this tribe that had 
first caused him to take up arms in Gaul, and, as such, he had not only to justify his brutality 
but also his independent decision to enter a war without the approval of the Senate. 
In many instances, therefore, it does appear that the reasons given for the pursuit of 
military actions match one or more of those argued as just.  Fear, revenge and the 
attainment of peace are all mentioned as the decisive motivation for various military 
campaigns.  However, it is also important to note that on many occasions no justification is 
given or seems necessary.  Perhaps where they do appear it is a signal that some extra 
persuasion was needed either to start the war, as may have been the case with Caesar and 
the Helvetii, or to excuse extreme atrocities committed during the conflict.  Most telling, 
though, are the occasions when a false motive seems to be given, as though Rome was 
always ready to enter any war at any time, as they are sometimes portrayed.  Having 
examined the theories and practices behind justifying wars it is now possible to turn away 
from this topic and look instead at an exception to all these rules: civil wars.  These were 
wars that many Romans felt could never be justified, to such an extent that even 
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generations of the Julian family rule could not shake the hatred for the civil conflict that the 
father of them all, Julius Caesar, wrought against his own homeland. 
Republican and Early Imperial Civil War 
 
Throughout the history of the Roman republic civil wars are presented nearly or entirely in 
a negative light.  Whether viewed through the contemporary eyes of the Republican Cicero 
or through those of Augustine, who wrote with the benefit of centuries of hindsight and 
with the ethics of an early Christian, it is still civil, rather than external wars, that are seen 
as the most base and hated of conflicts.  The first of the civil wars that occurred in the 
historic rather than semi-legendary Republican era84 was that fought between Marius and 
Sulla and their respective political factions.  However, even though this was apparently 
ZŽŵĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƚĂƐƚĞŽĨĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌ, the Senate and the people were ardent in their attempts to 
avoid conflict.  When Marius and Cinna returned ƚŽĞŵƵůĂƚĞ^ƵůůĂ ?ƐŵĂƌĐŚŽŶZŽŵĞƚŚĞǇ
were invited to enter on the condition that they made pledges to not commit atrocities 
within the city.85  What does this tell us about the Romans ? attitude to civil war and civil 
conflict?  Sulla had been the only Roman to previously march in arms on Rome in this way 
and he had acted with restraint once inside the city, actually punishing soldiers that he 
witnessed looting.86  Even his attack had not been excessive, with only the threat of fire 
used against hostile civilians87 (although Plutarch says this threat was carried out)88.  Is this 
willingness to welcome Marius a sign of the Senate ?s political alignment, favouring Marius 
over Sulla?  Is it an attempt at self preservation, hoping that if they welcome rather than 
oppose Marius he would show the same restraint as Sulla?  Is it the simply practical 
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚZŽŵĞŚĂĚŶŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽDĂƌŝƵƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŶĂ ?ƐĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?Kƌ
was there already an ideological hatred of civil war inherent in Roman society perhaps 
stemming from the myths of the HomeriĐƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “The man who wills the 
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chill horror of war within his own people is an outlaw, banished from clan and law and 
hearth ?.89 
It seems that Sulla had acted in a controlled and measured way while within the city and 
had not only minimised damage, but had also reconfirmed the Senate as the forefront of 
Roman political power.90  Thus, it is unlikely that the Senate were either showing Marius 
political support, or that they feared violent reproaches, particularly as the absence of 
violence had been assured by oaths and the Senate, presumably, still remembered Marius 
for his actions to save Rome during foreign wars.  The Senate ?s actions in not opposing 
Marius were therefore either caused by their inability to properly defend Rome, or an 
ideological hatred of civil war.  I believe the first of these is probably more likely at this 
time.  Rome may have had a hatred of civil conflicts, such as those that had been escalating 
over the period since the Gracchi, but they had not yet been stung by civil wars in the same 
way and were perhaps unlikely to fully grasp the significance of Roman-on-Roman battles.  
However, it was the actions of Marius, after he entered Rome that were to become hated 
acts.  We are told by Plutarch that the most hated of atrocities were those committed by 
ƚŚĞ ĂƌĚǇŝĂĞ ǁŚŽ  “ďƵƚĐŚĞƌĞĚ ĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ ŚŽŵĞƐ ? ŽƵƚƌĂŐĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ĂŶĚƌĂƉĞĚƚŚĞŝƌǁŝǀĞƐ ?ďƵƚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚůǇƚŚĞŝƌ “ƉůƵŶĚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚ
murdering ?ǁĞŶƚƵŶĐŚĞĐŬĞĚ.91  This image of Rome as an urbs capta is one that continues 
to be used into the principate.92 The Bardyiae were treating Rome as a captured city; their 
actions were indiscriminate and suitable only for barbarians.   These most barbarous of acts 
may have been attributed exclusively to the Bardyiae purely because they were a private 
bodyguard made up of slaves.93  This distances Roman citizens from the low points of the 
Marian deeds, but does little to soften the impact of them.  Perhaps that is the very reverse 
of what is intended here, as these atrocities may become more virulent if they are 
committed by people that should not wield the power of life and death over a Roman.  
DĂƌŝƵƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞZŽŵĞƚŽĂŶurbs capta but they also place citizens at the 
whim of barbarians, recalling the feared and hated days of the invading Gauls. 
When Sulla re-enters the city, after he returns from the war with Mithridates it is in an 
uproar generated by fear.  This is very different from the defiant scene on his first entry to 
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Rome, and the calculated and collected attitude present when Marius is invited within the 
walls.  However, by now these civil wars are a familiar occurrence for the populace and 
they have learnt all too well what can be expected from a Roman general when he 
manoeuvres on the roads of Rome.  The populace of Rome are perhaps a little premature 
ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉĂŶŝĐŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐ^ƵůůĂ ?ƐƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐƚĂŬĞĂǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇŽĂƚŚŶŽƚƚŽ “ĚĂŵĂŐĞ Italy except 
ďǇ ŚŝƐ  ?^ƵůůĂ ?Ɛ ? ŽƌĚĞƌƐ ?.94  This oath, combined with the fact that the majority of the 
confrontation did not take place in Rome, could have saved her from further damage had 
^ƵůůĂ ǁŝƐŚĞĚ ŝƚ ? ďƵƚ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ DĂƌŝƵƐ ? ďůŽŽĚǇ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ, ^ƵůůĂ  “ĚĞǀŽƚĞĚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ƚŽ
the work of bƵƚĐŚĞƌǇ ?.95 It is important to note that it is the acts committed after the 
battles are finished that receive the most reprimands; the conduct of the Bardyiae and the 
proscriptions of Sulla.  It is the bloodshed in the forum, not the battlefield, that is lamented 
longest.  The hatred felt for Sulla, just as that for Marius, was not forgotten at his time of 
death.  Lepidus suggests that Sulla should not be buried and he is not a voice in the 
wilderness but is supported by many96 ? ĂŶĚ DĂƌŝƵƐ ? ĚĞĂƚŚ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ Ă ĨĞĞůŝŶŐ ŽĨ  “ũŽǇ ĂŶĚ 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ŝŶZŽŵĞ.97  These pockets of resentment amongst the Roman populace must 
have been motivated by the evils that the two once great saviours had brought within the 
ǁĂůůƐ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶ^ƵůůĂ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƌĞǀŝǀĞƚŚĞŐůŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞRepublic could not 
help quell the resentment.  If there had been any doubt as to the destructive qualities of 
civil wars then the proscriptions of Sulla had removed it.  So when the next major civil war 
began between Caesar and Pompey, the presence of one of Sulla ?ƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨ
an army would not have been necessary to send shock into the hearts of the people of 
Rome.  However, by this time not only the civilians, but also the generals, had learnt from 
the previous destruction, and both were eager to minimise the damage to the city.  
Pompey did this in two ways; firstly with the decree stating that no Roman was to be killed 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚ ŝŶ ďĂƚƚůĞ ? ĂŶĚ ďǇ ŬĞĞƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ďĂƚƚůĞƐ  “Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƐƚ ĚŝƐƚĂnce from the city as 
ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?.98  Caesar followed suit with his many acts of clemency both during and after the 
war.  Yet even though this war was not carried out within the city walls, it was still hated.  
Lucan says that tŚŝƐǁĂƌǁĂƐ “ǁŽƌƐĞƚŚĂŶĐŝǀŝů ?99, either because Pompey and Caesar were 
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kin100 or, more likely, as they had not been related since the death of Julia, because this war 
destroyed not only a faction of the state, but witnessed the state destroy itself.101   
The contemporary evidence of Cicero is also telling, particularly his Philippics and the In 
Catilinam.  In the third oration against Catiline, Cicero recalls the previous ills caused Rome 
by the Civil wars of Marius and Sulla.  HĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ĂůůƚŚŝƐƉůĂĐĞǁĂƐĐƌŽǁĚĞĚǁŝƚŚŚĞĂƉƐ
of carcasses and flowed with the blood of the citizens ? (omnis hic locus acervis corporum et 
civium sanguine redundavit) ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  “ůŝŐŚƚƐŽf the state 
ǁĞƌĞĞǆƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚ ? (lumina civitatis extincta sunt).102  dŚŝƐŝƐĂƌĞĐƵƌƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞŝŶ>ƵĐĂŶ ?Ɛ
epic, mourning for a lost generation.103   In book 9 the soldiers make a plea after the death 
ŽĨWŽŵƉĞǇ ? “ƐƵĨĨĞƌƵƐƚŽƌĞƚƵƌŶŚŽŵĞƚŽŽƵƌĚĞƐĞƌƚĞĚŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ QŽƵƌůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
ǁĂƐƚĞĚ QĐŝǀŝů ǁĂƌ ŚĂƌĚůǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ŐƌĂǀĞƐ ĞǀĞŶ ĨŽƌ ůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? (patrios permitte penates, 
Desertamque domum... Perierunt tempora vitae ... Bellum civile sepulchra, Vix ducibus 
praestare potest)104, which highlights the loss that their homelands have incurred by the 
continued killing.  The Philippics and the In Catilinam also use the image of the urbs capta 
that have already been noted in other works.  Mark Antony and his actions are compared 
to those of Hannibal; Cicero asks what has one done that the other has not, linking the 
behaviour of the Roman with that of one of the fiercest enemies of Rome, complicit in the 
 “ĚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĚĞǀĂƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƌĂƉĞ ? (depopulationes, vastationes, caedis, 
rapina).105  The Catilinarian conspirators fare no better, as they are described as viewing 
Rome as not their own country but the city of an enemy.106  These republican images are 
repeated in TaciƚƵƐ ? ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů Đŝǀŝů ǁĂƌƐ ?  WůƵŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ŵƵƌĚĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ƌŝĨĞ ?
ƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĐƵƚĚŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĨůĞĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵĂĚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ƐŽůĚŝĞƌĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶ ? 
(nullo militum aut populi discrimine).  EǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ “ůĂŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĂŝůŝŶŐƐ, 
and all thĞŵŝƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚĐŝƚǇ ? (ubique lamenta, conclamationes et fortuna captae 
urbis).107 
The hatred for all civil wars is perhaps best illustrated by the tirade against all those 
involved in civil wars uttered by Seneca in De Beneficiis.  In that text Coriolanus is part of a 
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treacherous, or unnatural, (parricidio) war; Catiline was not content with seizing Rome but 
set on destroying ŝƚĂŶĚ “ƐĂƚŝĂƚĞhis ŽůĚŝŶďŽƌŶŚĂƚƌĞĚ ? (vetera et ingenita odia satiaverit) 
before sacrificing Roman generals to Gallic gods; Gaius Marius becomes the symbol of 
atrocities committed against his own countrymen, and matches those of the Cimbrians; 
>ƵĐŝƵƐ^ƵůůĂ “ŵĂƌĐŚĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŚƵŵĂŶďůŽŽĚ QƚŽƚŚĞŽůůŝŶĞŐĂƚĞ ? (ad Collinam portam per 
sanguinem humanum incessisset); Gnaeus Pompeius, in return for his three illegal 
consulships, reduced the Roman peoples to slaves so that they could be saved; Julius 
ĂĞƐĂƌ  “ĨƌŽŵ 'ĂƵů ĂŶĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇǁŚŝƌůĞĚ ǁĂƌ ƚŽ ZŽŵĞ ? (a Gallia Germaniaque bellum in 
urbem circumegit) and never laid down his sword; and Mark Antony wished to make the 
tattered remnants of Rome subject to kings, so she might  “hĞƌƐĞůĨƉĂǇƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽĞƵŶƵĐŚƐ ? 
(ipsa tributum spadonibus penderet).108  This vehement invective shows the passion with 
which all attacks on Rome were felt.  Even Julius Caesar does not escape the accusations, 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƵŐƵƐƚƵƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐďůĂŵĞůĞƐƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƉƌŽďĂďůǇĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ?ǁĂƌ
was carefully portrayed as being against a foreign foe rather than against an opposing 
Roman faction, and because his victory did bring a lasting halt to the civil discord.   
Therefore, the reason given for the civil wars from the late Republican period onwards was 
the necessity to overthrow a tyrant.  This may be the case, as at the time the idea of 
kingship was still hated by the Roman citizens and when committing such a despised act as 
marching against Rome, the claim to be ridding her of a tyrant was probably the nearest to 
justification that it was possible to be.  However, as the decades of civil wars mounted, it 
seems that civil war itself became more hated than the idea of reinventing the throne and, 
as such, the solution to reinstate an autocracy became favoured over the even more hated 
civil war.  This can be seen in the comment of Pliny, Seneca the younger and Florus (cited 
above) in which they exult in the fact that peace has been returned by the Principate and 
the glory of empire.  The notion that would have seemed most obscene to a Republican, 
that the rule of one man had restored the glory of Rome, was now a common cry.  This fact 
is all the more astonishing when it is noted that Pliny and Seneca were of the political 
classes that had most fervently challenged the dictators only a few generations previously.  
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The topics examined so far, just war theories and negative attitudes towards civil wars, 
represent two areas that show an ambiguity in ancient attitudes to wars and violence.  
There would be no need to justify wars if they were as universally accepted as some 
scholars have suggested, and although civil wars are without doubt a limited and 
exceptional form of warfare, the negativity towards them could represent the beginnings 
of a more general disapproval of violent actions, particularly in a period in which civil wars 
were becoming more common.  Therefore I will now move away from these more general 
concepts and turn my attention towards specific philosophical schools and their 
presentation of peace.  I will begin with philosophy, for two reasons, firstly because it will 
provide a theoretical framework for a later examination of historians; and secondly 
because it is the area which has afforded the most speculation for pacifist leanings in the 
past, although no consensus has so far been reached.  For example, for John Ferguson the 
Epicureans were the foremost of the anti-ǁĂƌ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?  “YƵŝĞƚŝƐƚ ĂŶĚ
pacifistic, they were in truth an ancieŶƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?.109  Whereas, for Harry 
Sidebottom the Stoics embody this belief more deeply, although as we shall see, he would 
ŽŶůǇ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ  “ǀĞƌŐŝŶŐ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂĐŝĨŝƐƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ
Ferguson would on behalf of the Epicureans.110  Whilst Francis Downing believes it is the 
Cynics who provide the closest similarities to the ideas later found in the pacifistic 
Christians.111  I will begin my examination with Plato and Aristotle in order to establish a 
framework by which their Roman successors may be judged.  Then, in view of the 
assertions of Ferguson, Sidebottom and Downing, I shall turn to the three schools that have 
previously been attributed pacifistic beliefs.  Turning first to the Stoics, due to the greater 
volume of surviving material and because they became the most widely influential 
philosophical school during the early empire. 
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Plato and Aristotle 
Plato 
 
The hope of finding a consistent doctrine on war and peace in the Platonic dialogues is 
perhaps a futile one.  Written over at least half a century and giving voices and opinions to 
numerous historical philosophers, generals, and politicians as well as still more unknown or 
unnamed characters, they present a confused picture of the ethical problem of state 
violence that is not aided by any extended or committed attempt to tackle the topic.  
However, both the Republic and the Laws do contain passages where the issues are 
discussed.  Nevertheless, considering that the goal of both dialogues is to produce an ideal 
constitution, they present surprisingly different attitudes.  The attitude towards warfare, 
that some scholars believe is presented by Plato in the Republic, is probably most clearly 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞŽĨ>ĞŽŶ,ĂƌŽůĚƌĂŝŐ ?Ɛ  ? ?94 book dŚĞtĂƌ>ŽǀĞƌ PƐƚƵĚǇŽĨWůĂƚŽ ?Ɛ
Republic.  Craig argues that the Republic was written with the deliberate intention of 
countering the image of the philosopher as spending his life in passive contemplation; 
 “ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂů ? ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ? ĐŽƐŵŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽĨ  “ĞƚĞƌŶĂů ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ WůĂƚŽ
wished to show that philosophy was a practical art.112  Craig asserts that Plato achieved this 
aim by identifying the philosopher not only with the ruler but also with the warrior113, a 
responsibility that was natural due to the essential philosophical quality of spiritedness.114  
Therefore, for Craig the Republic is a work that will ultimately glorify war, as it is the 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ůŽƚ ƚŽ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ Ăůů ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ and particularly, but not 
exclusively, for battle. 
It is certainly true that in the ideal state of the Republic the army is to play a large and 
lauded part.  Soldiering is seen as an art that needs a dedicated profession and indeed class 
in order to continue its duty to the highest degree.115  The brave soldier is to be rewarded 
with praise from all, both within the army and the polis, and if he dies he is to be 
celebrated with divine honours.  Whereas the coward is to be stripped of his right to be 
part of the army, and even a soldier that falls into enemy hands is to be considered lost, so 
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the enemy can treat him as they wish.116  The importance of the military profession is such 
that the children of the soldiers should be made to accompany the army to battle, the 
danger of their possible slaughter thought worth the risk when compared with the gains of 
increased motivation for the army and early experience for the soldiers of the future.117  
The reason the army in the Republic becomes so important is that the city described is one 
of luxury and great resources, so an army is essential; firstly to acquire extra land for the 
increasing population and then to protect them from aggressive neighbours.118 
There is little doubt then that the Republic is a military state, in which the army holds a 
special place.  However, this does not mean that they are given free rein to act as they 
wish; it is made clear that the enemy is to be treated with restraint (at least in the case of 
fellow Greeks).  The army are not to burn houses, lay waste the soil or ravage territory.  
They are not to treat entire populations as enemies but only those who are the cause of 
ƚŚĞƋƵĂƌƌĞů ?  “ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?.  They will only do enough to persuade 
the guilty to be just, as the main goal of disputes between Greeks should be 
reconciliation.119  However this only shows the ability to maintain a level of decorum during 
wars and not any negative connotations to war itself, in fact it merely legitimises war 
further by minimising its harmful effects and maximising its positives.  Even so, there are 
however places where war is seemingly tackled in a more negative way.  Justice is a crucial 
ƉĂƌƚŽĨŵƵĐŚŽĨWůĂƚŽ ?ƐĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞƐĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞRepublic justice creates concord, agreement 
and love, whereas injustice creates violence and factions120, and at first this could appear to 
be a plea for peace.  Despite this, a passage from the Alcibiades 1 (whether it is indeed a 
Platonic dialogue or later imitation121) reminds us that justice can be served in many ways, 
both in peace and in war; a warring society can still be just.122  So again this does not alter 
ƌĂŝŐ ?ƐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞRepublic is a defence of philosophy through warfare and at the 
same time a defence of warfare through philosophy. 
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In the face of all this, for Plato there is still no doubt that war can be a destructive force; it 
is a powerful weapon in the hands of a tyrant for example.123  A tyrant will deliberately 
start a war so that his subjects will be in need of a leader124 and will not be able to plot 
against him, due to the increased amounts of toil and tax125; also wars allow his enemies 
inside the state to be killed by the enemy outside the state.126  But these actions would 
cause even the tyrant ?s friends to suspect him and the brave to speak out.127  As a result 
the bravest and best from all parts are killed and only the most cowardly and base 
characters are left.128  Within a tyranny, then, war is thought a cause for great concern.  
There are also some hints at a more general negative image of war; there is a retelling of 
the Hesiodic decline of man that leads to the beginning of enmity and war129 and also the 
ĐĂƵƐĞƐŽĨǁĂƌĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞƐŽĨ “ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚdisasters, public and 
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ?.130  Finally, there is a discussion of how the guardians ought to treat each other: a 
young man should do no violence to an elder or strike him in any way, and as such they 
ŵĂǇůŝǀĞŝŶ “ŐƌĞĂƚƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽn of factions within the state.131  
Therefore, despite the important and elevated role of the military class in the Republic and 
the space allocated by Plato to the details of training and regulations, there are still 
moments when peace seems more important than war, namely in the reconciliatory goal of 
all wars with fellow Greek states132 and the importance of harmony with the ruling 
classes133 as well as the association with war and the evils of society.134  
Hobbs goes further still in her assessment of the Republic.  She correctly notes that after 
the initial land grab of the developing society135 all references to the need for the warrior 
guardians are in the context of a defensive, not expansionist, conflict.136  This opens the 
way for a possible society free from the war that was essential to its creation, as long as the 
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Republic is surrounded by likeminded cities ruled by the same idealised philosopher kings.  
This is, in fact, the situation that Socrates envisions in his speech at 473c-e, when he claims 
only a world of philosopher kings could end the troubles of mankind.137  Therefore, it seems 
that even in a city that is so willing to elevate the warrior to hero, and aggressively seize 
land from its neighbours as an inevitable part of its early growth can still hope for a future 
without peace, if all societies are ruled by the same principles.   
The Laws is the seĐŽŶĚŽĨWůĂƚŽ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƐǁŚŝĐŚƐƉĞŶĚƐĂŶǇƌĞĂůƚŝŵĞŽŶƚŚĞƚŽƉŝĐŽĨǁĂƌĂŶĚ
peace, and from the first mention it seems that it will tread the same path as the Republic, 
glorifying the military and concerned more with who should wage a war than how to avoid 
one.  Just two chapters into the work it is suggested that there is no such thing as absolute 
peace but only a state of undeclared war, so a state should always be prepared for 
attack.138  However, this sentiment is spoken by the Cretan Clinias, not by the unnamed 
Athenian who fills a role similar to that taken by Socrates in other dialogues, and it soon 
becomes clear that the Athenian disagrees with Clinias.  The Athenian suggests, contrary to 
the original stance of the Cretan, that any dispute is better solved with negotiation than 
with violence139 ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĨŽƌĂŶǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌ “ƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƐŶĞŝƚŚƌǁĂƌŶŽƌĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ W 
they are things we should pray to be spared from  W bƵƚƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚŵƵƚƵĂůŐŽŽĚǁŝůů ?.140  So 
rather than echoing the ideal state of the Republic, the Laws seems to display contradictory 
principles, at least as far as war and peace is concerned.  Moreover, the idea that peace is 
superior to war is continued throughout the dialogue.141  /ƚ ŝƐ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ǁĂƌ ŝƐ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ
ǁŽƌŬ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐ ǁŽƌŬ ƐŚould be undertaken for the sake of play, therefore war 
should only be undertaken for the sake of peace.  But further to this, ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽ “ƉůĂǇŽƌ
any real education worth the name [in war]...hence it is peace in which each of us should 
spend most of his lŝĨĞĂŶĚƐƉĞŶĚŝƚďĞƐƚ ?.142  This is again confirmed when the state is said, 
ůŝŬĞ ĂŶǇ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ƚŽ ďĞ  “ƉƌĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ƚŽ Ă ŚĂƉƉǇ ůŝĨĞ ? ? ?ƚŽ ĐŽŵŵŝƚ ŶŽ ƐŝŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚƐƵĨĨĞƌŶŽǁƌŽŶŐƐĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?^ŽŝĨĞŝƚŚĞƌĂƐƚĂƚĞŽƌĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůďĞĐŽŵĞƐ
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good, ŝƚƐ “ůŝĨĞǁŝůůďĞŽŶĞŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ ?ŝĨĞǀŝů ?ŽĨǁĂƌǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŝŶ ?.143  Thus not only is 
peace again the preferred route for any man or polis, but war is intrinsically linked to evil 
and peace to good.  This does not mean, however, that the ideal state should reject war 
and all its trappings.  On the contrary, the ideal state should be prepared for war at all 
times, even times of peace, training under arms regularly and involved in preparatory 
sports often.144  Although it is seen as essential for the thoughts of the rulers to be often 
concerned with the training for battle, it is said that peaceful matters should be most 
important to the guardians.145   
However, the Laws is not a pacifist utopia, not merely because the army is still seen as an 
important part of the society, as it is in the Republic, but also because no society should be 
single minded.  The Spartan and Cretan constitutions are said to be absurd because they 
aim purely at war not peace.146  This is not a wholesale rejection of war, merely the way in 
which it is the sole concern of these states.  In the Politicus a love of peace is said to be as 
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐĂƐĂůŽǀĞŽĨǁĂƌ ?ŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇĚƌŝǀŝŶŐĨŽƌ “ƉĞĂĐĞĂƚĂŶǇƉƌŝĐĞ ?ĐĂƵƐĞƐƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƐŽŶƐ ƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ  “ƵŶǁĂƌůŝŬĞ ? ? ?dŚus they are at the mercy of their aggressor... 
[They] wake up to find their freedom is gone anĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĞĚƵĐĞĚƚŽƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ?.147  Equally a 
love of war can be just as destructive.  It brings the anger of powerful enemies from all 
ƐŝĚĞƐĂŶĚ “ƚŚĞǇĞŝƚŚĞƌĚĞƐƚƌoy their country altogether, or else they bring it into subjection 
to its enemies just as ƐƵƌĞůǇ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƉĂƌƚǇ ĚŝĚ ?.148  This seems to be refuted in the 
Laws at an individual level.  At 1.627d-628a Plato considers a group of brothers, some 
righteous, but a majority unrighteous.  It is asked whether the best route would be to kill 
the sinners and let the righteous rule themselves, or to place government into the hands of 
the righteous and bring the majority into line beneath them.  It is decided that a third route 
is more preferable and that it would be best to reconcile the family and have them live in 
harmony, a route that like the first two options would be in opposition to war.149  This is 
not used as proof that the ruler of a city should ignore the needs of war and instead focus 
on peace.  Rather, Plato is suggesting that just as this domestic peace was provided by 
dealing with the domestic war, ƐŽŵƵƐƚƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŽůŝƐďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚďǇ “ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŶg 
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ĨŽƌ ǁĂƌ ĂƐ Ă ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŽ ƉĞĂĐĞ ?.150  Therefore, Plato does not advocate for war to be 
completely neglected.   
Like the Republic, the Laws also contains two passages about the development of early 
man.  The first of these, 3.677a-679c, concerns the reestablishment of civilisation after its 
destruction by a flood.  The inundation is said to have been of such a prolific magnitude 
that only those isolated herdsmen, who passed their days with their grazing flocks on 
mountains, could have been saved.151  All trace of the cities in the plain was destroyed.152  
This would result in the arts of metal work being lost and that any art that relied on metal 
work would also be lost153, most specifically warfare154, aided by the fact that lonely men 
would welcome the company of others, even strangers after such depopulation.155  The 
now comparatively abundant amounts of natural resources would mean there would be no 
need to war for wealth or material gain.156  It is not surprising that this simpler way of life is 
lauded for the abundance of peace but it is surprising that the men of this time are 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ŵĂŶůŝĞƌ ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŵĞŶŽĨĂǁĂƌƌŝŶŐƉŽůŝƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂƐƚŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶŵĞĞƚƐ
no objection from the Spartan and Cretan present, two men who earlier are proud of their 
warring societies.157  The second description of the development of man goes back still 
further to tŚĞ  “ĂŐĞŽĨ ďůŝƐƐ ? ƵŶĚĞƌƌŽŶƵƐ ?158  In this age, says the Athenian, Ă  “ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ
ƌĂĐĞŽĨƐƉŝƌŝƚƐ ?ƌƵůĞĚŽǀĞƌŵĞŶŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŵĞŶƌƵůĞŽǀĞƌŐŽĂƚƐ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ
ǁŝƚŚ “ƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚŵĞƌĐǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ĞŶĚŽǁŝŶŐ ? ? ? ?ŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŶĐŽƌĚĂŶĚŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?
Again unsurprisingly it is suggested that this was a superior way of life and that men should 
govern themselves in the manner the spirits governed them, in order to live at peace with 
each other.159  However, despite the recourse to peace and order (backed by preparedness 
for war) throughout the Laws, it is clear that wars and violence have more power than any 
peace or any man can have.  It is said that laws and constitutions are not in fact ever truly 
made by man, but ratŚĞƌďǇĐŚĂŶĐĞ ?   “ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞǁƌĞĐŬĞĚĂŶĚůĂǁƐƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĞĚ
ďǇǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚǁĂƌ ?ŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƵƉŽŶŐŽǀĞƌnments by plagues and diseases.160  It 
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ŝƐƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŽƌƚŽĞŵƉůŽǇ “ƐŬŝůů ?ƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚĞƐĞ
negative forces and to help the city survive them, if indeed they are unavoidable.     
The Laws and the Republic are the two dialogues in which Plato dedicates several passages 
to the topic of war and peace.  The Republic, although not as aggressively pro-war as Craig 
would have us believe161, is a dialogue concerned with an ideal state based on the necessity 
of a military that was to be lauded and raised above the rest of society, and the Laws 
appears to be the antithesis of this.  The ideal state of the Laws does not only concern its 
time with peace, because to do so would be destructive.  However, peace is idealised in the 
Laws ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŐŽĂůŽĨƚŚĞŐƵĂƌĚŝĂŶƐ ?ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?Before 
leaving Plato it may be necessary to examine the other few places where Plato discusses 
war to see if either the attitude shown in the Republic or Laws can be traced through his 
other dialogues.  For example, the Politicus also declares that war is an art, as is stated in 
the Republic162 and the Laws.163  However, this is not seen as a positive aspect of war as it is 
in the Republic ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĂƌŝƐĂ “ŵŝŐŚƚǇĂŶĚĚƌĞĂĚĨƵůĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞƚĂŵĞĚďǇ the 
 “ĂƌƚŽĨƚƌƵůǇƌŽǇĂůƌƵůĞ ?.164  Even so, it is not an art that should be dismissed outright, but 
rather one that has to be treated with the authority that only true kingship can repress.  
The Protagoras also describes war as an art, but an art that is part of the art of politics; 
early man was incapable of waging war on wild beasts because they did not possess the art 
of politics.  This caused men to band together in groups for safety but again, due to their 
limited ability in diplomatic matters, these groups soon disbanded and man was left as prey 
for feral animals.165  These primitive men were only saved by the divine gift of justice that 
was distributed evenly among all, allowing for the development of politics, cities and 
ultimately safety.166  Therefore, although the relationship of this to more general warfare is 
not explicit, it can perhaps be suggested that as war, albeit war against animals, was the 
original reason for men to form groups, and an understanding of justice was what allowed 
these groups to survive, justice is inextricably linked to warfare.  War cannot exist without 
politics, politics cannot exist without justice ergo war cannot exist without justice.  
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However, although war relies on politics, politics ŵƵƐƚĂůƐŽĨŽůůŽǁ “ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?167, so war 
can now exist but this does not mean it should be rushed into. 
Zampaglione says that in Protagoras 359e PlĂƚŽƐĞĞƐǁĂƌĂƐĂ “ĨŝŶĞƚŚŝŶŐ ?.168  However, it 
seems clear that war itself is not being judged in the Protagoras, but rather the actions of 
soldiers in battle.  The brave soldiers that entered battle willingly are said to have 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚĂŶŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůĞĚĞĞĚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŽŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƚŚĞĐŽǁĂƌĚ
has acted dishonourably and therefore has committed a negative act.169  At no point is the 
ethical quality of war discussed independently and as such, it cannot be concluded as a 
 “ĨŝŶĞ ƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?170  There is one passage though that does show great similarities with the 
Republic, namely the opening of the Timaeus.  In the Timaeus Socrates has spent the 
previous day describing an ideal state that appears to share its major principles with the 
state in the Republic.  He has asked his companions to describe the actions of this state at 
war, for the purposes of his own philosophical entertainment; the city is to be shown as 
glorious in battles and celebrated in its victories.171  Critias goes on to recount a story told 
to him by Solon while in Egypt, about Athens before the famous deluge and the survival of 
Deucalion and Pyrrha.  In this time Athens was said to be first in warfare, but also the 
noblest and fairest race with the strongest constitution.172  Athena is described as a lover of 
 “ďŽƚŚǁĂƌĂŶĚǁŝƐĚŽŵ ? (philopolemos and philosophos) and as such she selected a location 
for the city that would produce men like her who were also lovers of wisdom and 
warfare.173  Unlike the tales of early man in the Laws, these are not visions of a peaceful 
society happily co-existing in a time before war.  These are men made for war by divine 
design, but more than this they were able to be lovers of war and also lovers of wisdom.  
War is not then a mistake or an accident of nature but a position made tenable by wisdom.   
It has been shown that the above passage of the Timaeus echoes the possible pro-war 
stance of the Republic.  However, there is not a passage that shares the Laws more 
negative view of war as closely.  Nevertheless, there are two passages that hint at a more 
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negative image of wars.  Firstly, the Gorgias that states: it is better to be wronged than to 
wrong another.  The man that does wrong is evil, base and wretched even if he is the 
wealthiest of rulers, whereas the man that is wronged is noble and good and as a result is 
happy.174  Ethically speaking this could be described as similar to the more pacifistic 
philosophy of the Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean schools.  However, as has already been noted, 
a passage in the Alcibiades 1175 reminds us that war itself can be a force for justice and as 
such one that enters into war, rather than submitting, is not unquestionably in the wrong.  
IĨĂǁĂƌ ŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽŽĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇƚŚĞŶŶŽƚĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐĂǁĂƌǁŽƵůĚ ? ŝŶWůĂƚŽ ?ƐĞǇĞƐ ?ďĞƚŚĞ
wrong action and therefore base, evil and miserable.  This leaves only one passage that can 
be seen as an overtly anti-war statement.  In the Phaedo Socrates describes wars, 
revolutions and battles as caused by the desires of the body, distractions of needs and 
wants that are driven in part by the acquisition of wealth.176  This could again be dismissed 
as showing neither a firm positive nor negative stance on war, but rather merely identifying 
the causes and making no moral judgement.  However, Socrates continues to describe how 
the needs of the body (including war) reduce the time that it is possible for man to spend in 
the pursuit of truth.  So rather than being an important aspect of the philosopher ?s concern 
as Craig argues in The War Lover177, war prevents the philosopher from continuing his 
crucial business, so far from loving war a practical philosopher cannot truly exist during 
times of conflict. 
Aristotle 
 
:ƵƐƚĂƐƚǁŽŽĨWůĂƚŽ ?ƐĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞƐŐŝǀĞĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚconsideration to the ideas of war and peace, 
Aristotle also contemplates these issues in two of his works, the Nicomachean Ethics and 
the Politics178.  However, unlike the Laws and the Republic that show a contradictory 
attitude towards war and peace the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics are much more 
consistent in their stance and so can be examined together.  Like Plato, Aristotle believed 
that an army was a necessity when it came to establishing a city.  He says in the Politics, 
that ĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵƵƐƚďĞ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂŶĞŶĞŵǇ
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state could at any time make an attack in order to gain wealth179 and that the military  “are 
as necessary as any other class, if the country is not to ďĞƚŚĞƐůĂǀĞƚŽĞǀĞƌǇŝŶǀĂĚĞƌ ?.180  He 
goes further than Plato on this point.  Plato only allowed for the need for an army once the 
state in the Republic had reached a certain size and had gained some wealth.181  Aristotle, 
though, insists that even when a state is in its infancy it will need a military, as some of 
those citizens who are part of the commercial life of the city (farmers, shoemakers, builder 
etc.) would also naturally either become leaders or soldiers, or indeed both.182   
However, later in the Politics Aristotle contemplates an example of an isolated state.  He 
says they would thus have no need to make any constitutional measures towards warfare, 
and that this shows that for other states also, ǁĂƌŝƐŶŽƚ “ƚŚĞƐƵƉƌĞŵĞĞŶĚŽĨĂůůƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?.183  
He claims at this point that warlike pursuits are generally to be considered honourable.184  
In this regard Aristotle again shares his views with Plato; Aristotle can envisage that deeds 
of warriors can be honourable actions.  Aristotle sees courage as part of excellence along 
with justice, temperance, liberality, magnanimity, magnificence, prudence, gentleness, and 
wisdom.185  Courage is seen as one of the two most honoured parts of excellence with 
ũƵƐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞƚŚĞƚǁŽĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŵŽƐƚƵƐĞĨƵůĨŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? “ƐŝŶĐĞĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŝƐ
useful to others in war, justice ďŽƚŚŝŶǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?,186 and it is courage that causes men 
to do noble deeds.187   
Despite the necessity of an army for any city that does not find itself in total isolation and 
the need for the leaders of a city to consider the needs of war, Aristotle, again following 
Plato, dismisses the constitutions of cities aimed simply at war as mistaken.  He says the 
charge brought by Plato that because the Spartan state only aimed at excellence in wars, it 
collapsed in times of peace, ŝƐũƵƐƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?,ĞĂůƐŽƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚƐŽĨƉĞĂĐĞƚŚĞǇŬŶĞǁ
nothing, and have never engagĞĚŝŶĂŶǇĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁĂƌ ?, therefore the art of 
peace is considered a  “ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ? Ăƌƚ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ.188  Further to this, he adds another 
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ƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉĂƌƚĂŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ P “ƚŚĞǇĞƌƌŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞŐŽŽĚƐ
are to be preferred to thĞĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞǁŚŝĐŚŐĂŝŶƐƚŚĞŵ ?.189  This is repeated again later in 
the Politics, where Aristotle says that many of his contemporaries mistakenly praise the 
Lacedaemonians ? constitution for their training to meet great dangers and gain great 
powers; that they are right to do thŝƐĐĂŶ “ďĞƌĞĨƵƚĞĚďǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚand has long ago been 
ƌĞĨƵƚĞĚďǇĨĂĐƚƐ ?.190  Aristotle goes one step further for he says that a legislator who trains 
his citizens to conquer his neighbours is committing an act of great harm.191  This is 
contrary to what Plato recommended in the Republic.   
Again Aristotle follows Plato in giving soldiers an elevated social status.  He says that the 
warrior class is the higher part of society, due to its involvement in administering justice 
and in deliberations, which are political activities and are more essential than those which 
provide the necessities of life.192  He states also that the class of warriors and councillors 
are at once different and the same, as men who were of the military class in their youth 
should be the same men who form the governing class in their old age.193  However, just as 
Plato could see that war could be used as an abuse of power, so could Aristotle; tyrants 
wage wars not for defence or protection but so that the citizens are occupied and in need 
of a leader.194  Therefore, it is necessary for the guardians to be not only ex-soldiers but 
also moderate, even towards those they do not know.  It is wrong to be angry at anyone, 
and a high mannered soul is only angered by truly evil acts.195  moderation, therefore, is as 
important in a leader as courage was in a soldier, and this is little wonder considering two 
of the other elements that make up excellence: i.e. temperance and gentleness.    
However, the most important aspect of AristotůĞ ?Ɛ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ
peace is a higher state of being than war.  As has been shown, Aristotle believed it was 
necessary for men to be able to go to war, but  “ůĞŝƐƵƌĞĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞĂƌĞďĞƚƚĞƌ ?196, and the 
Spartan Empire failed because they had  “ŶĞǀĞƌ ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚ ŝŶ ĂŶǇ ĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŚŝgher than 
ǁĂƌ ?.197  As a result war should only be entered into for the purpose of peace,  “ƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚ
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be war for the sake of peace, busŝŶĞƐƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŬĞ ŽĨ ůĞŝƐƵƌĞ ?198, they must do what is 
 “ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ďƵƚǁŚĂƚŝƐ “ŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďle is ďĞƚƚĞƌ ?.199  For Aristotle happiness is dependent on 
leisure, and war is an act devoid of all leisure, for no one chooses to enter a war merely for 
the sake of being at war, and they would seem murderous if they did.200  To this end 
Maurice Defourney believes that the goal of the state in Aristotle is peace201, and he 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŬĞ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?Ɛ
statements about not subjugating men if they are not slaves by nature.  It is unjust to 
enslave those who are not meant to be slaves202 and, as such, a war cannot be just if it 
performs this unjust act.  Therefore, war cannot be legitimised because it is an act of 
subjugation.203  However, this is only true in the case of wars between two Greek states, as 
Aristotle did believe that some men were naturally inclined to slavery while others were 
born masters.  This divide was namely that of Greek masters and non-Greek slaves.204  In 
fact even wars that were waged with the intention of enslaving those who were by nature 
subordinate, but by will were free, are considered just.205  There are also two other reasons 
ŐŝǀĞŶĨŽƌĞŶƚĞƌŝŶŐǁĂƌƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚũƵƐƚ ?ĨŝƌƐƚůǇƚŽ “ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ĞŶƐůĂǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?  ?ĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ǁĂƌƐ ) ? ƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ƚŽ ĞǆƚĞŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŐŽod of those 
governed, and not merely to increase power and prestige for its own sake.206   
Therefore, although like Plato, Aristotle believed the military to be an essential part of any 
state that had contact with other states, and gave warriors an elevated position within the 
community, he also felt that peace should be the ultimate goal for the guardians of the 
state, and the ultimate goal of any war.  That the goal of a war should be peace was 
probably just as true for wars started with the intention of enslaving non-Greeks as with 
wars between Greeks.  However, wars for the enslavement of barbarians were permitted 
to be initiated deliberately.  So the cosmopolitan attitude found later in the Stoics and 
Cynics is noticeable by its absence in the doctrine of Aristotle, but as Defourney observes 
ƚŚĞ  “ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ-making wars was destined to survive...Saint Augustine, Gratian of 






 Eth. Nic. 10.7.1177b2-12. 
201
 Defourney  1977, 195-201. 
202
 Pol. 7.2.1324b36-7. 
203
 Defourney 1977, 198. 
204
 Pol. 1.5.1254b16-23. 
205
 Pol. 1.8.1256b25 & 7.14.1334a2. 
206
 Pol. 7.14.1333b39-1334a2. 
Andrew Crane  37 
 
Bologna, Saint Thomas and VicƚŽƌŝĂ ? ? ?ƌĞƉĞĂƚ ŝƚ ŝŶĐĞƐƐĂŶƚůǇ ?207, and although Plato does 
touch on the idea once in the Republic, it was Aristotle who developed and expanded it. 
Having considered the attitudes of Plato and Aristotle to peace I shall now examine the 
major schools of the period, all of which were influenced in varying degrees by the works of 
Plato and Aristotle.  I shall begin with the three schools that have previously been 
considered the most pacifistic by other modern scholars; the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans. 
Stoicism 
 
Very little has been written about Stoic attitudes to war and peace.  The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics, for example, does not at any point cover either topic.  Where the 
ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŝƐ ďƌŝĞĨůǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ƌĞĂĐŚĞĚ ĂƌĞ ǀĂƐƚůǇ
diverse.  Arnold, writing about Roman Stoicism claimed that, although in general war was 
considered an evil force, it could also be a force for good as it purges the world of 
 “ƐƵƉĞƌĨůƵŽƵƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?.208  Whereas Hicks, writing specifically about the later Stoics, says 
ƚŚĂƚ  “ǁĂƌ ǁĂƐ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇ ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĐĂƵƐĞĚ ďǇ  “ďůŝŶĚness and 
infatƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?.209  In this case it is the argument of Arnold that can be most easily discarded, 
as he bases his theory not directly on the work of a Stoic but on that of Plutarch, who says 
this view of the Stoic attitude to war was found in a lost work of Chrysippus.  Plutarch used 
this as an example of the contradictions present within the Stoic beliefs.  However, 
Chrysippus would often argue both sides of an argument and as this, like the majority of 
ChƌǇƐŝƉƉƵƐ ?ǁŽƌŬ, does not survive, it is impossible to tell if this concept was to be believed 
or was merely put forward as one of many opposing views.  However, before completely 
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐƌŶŽůĚ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇ, it will be necessary to examine each of the prominent Imperial 
Stoics, looking not only at their opinion of peace but also of war to see if there is any truth 
in the suggestion that, although war was evil, it could well be a justified evil sent by the 
gods to reduce the ever increasing population.  I will begin this investigation with Musonius 
Rufus because of his active involvement in an attempt to stop the civil wars of AD 69, 
before moving to his successors Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom.  Finally I will consider 
Seneca as his public career as tutor to Nero makes him somewhat of a special case: as such 
he may provide an exception to any rules, if indeed any rules can be shown to exist at all.  
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EŽŶĞŽĨDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?ŽǁŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŚĂƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĞĚ extant: instead what we know of 
him and his work comes from fragments contained within other scholars ? work and also 
from the events recorded by historians, most prominently Tacitus.   The majority of the 
fragments of his philosophical work come from the compiled extracts of Joannes Stobaeus 
ĂŶĚĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?ŵŽƐƚĨĂŵŽƵƐƉƵƉŝůƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ, although in turn the 
works of Epictetus are only preserved by his own pupil Arrian.  As a result, what we possess 
ŽĨDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?ǁŽƌŬŝƐŽŶůǇĂŐůŝŵƉƐĞŝŶƚŽŚŝƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĂŶĚŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇŚŝƐ
work on war and peace is therefore, also limited.  In the majority of cases war is mentioned 
only in passing as an analogous example.  Clothes, Musonius says, should be like armour in 
that they should be used only for the practical purpose of protection and not as 
decoration.210  Furthermore, while proposing that women as well as men should be trained 
in philosophy he uses the example of the Amazons who could defend themselves from 
attack and possessed great courage, two traits that a philosopher should also be endowed 
ǁŝƚŚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ ?s defence should be wisdom not warfare.211  The only other 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ŝŵĂŐĞ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶ DƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ŝŶ his discourse on the question Is 
Marriage a Handicap for the Pursuit of Philosophy?  In this discourse he encourages all men 
ƚŽŵĂŬĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ  “ŚŽŵĞa rampart for [tŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ? ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?.212  However, just a few lines 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐŵĂŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŶĚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
sake of his neighbours that allows him to be different from wild beasts, in that he does not 
have to live by violence, but rather by co-operation and justice.213  It is unlikely then that 
this image of home as rampart is meant in any literal way.  This is less likely when the 
context of the image is considered, Musonius is extolling the virtues of marriage, one of 
which is the fact that marriage leads to procreation, and that children allow for the 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ P  “ƚŚƵƐ ?whoever destroys human marriage destroys the 
ŚŽŵĞ ?ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŚƵŵĂŶƌĂĐĞ ?.214  Therefore the rampart created in marriage is 
not a literal battlement from which to ward off an enemy, but is built by marriage because 
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ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ĂůůŽǁƐ ĨŽƌ  “ũƵƐƚ ĂŶĚ ůĂǁĨƵů ƉƌŽĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ?215, which in turn allows for the 
preservation of man. 
The nearest Musonius seems to come to discussing battle is a description of a fight 
between two cocks or quails, in which he praises the wounded bird for not submitting and 
even for fighting to the death.  This, he says, is the most noble response, when the 
ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŝƐĨŽƌ “ĂŐŽŽĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? PƚŽŚĞůƉfriends or kin, for the good of the city or, best of 
all, ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐŚĂƌĚƐŚŝƉƐƐŽƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞ “ŐŽŽĚĂŶĚũƵƐƚĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-controlled ?.216  This 
could therefore be seen to express an acceptable aspect of violence, at least on a personal 
level.  However, it must be remembered that the purpose of this extract is to demonstrate 
that one should not disdain hardships.  Thus, it is not extolling the benefits of violence but 
rather using the plight and reaction of a bird to violence merely as one example of a 
hardship, and comparing the bird ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨŵĞŶ ? “ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŶŝŵĂůƐ QƐŚĂŵĞƵƐŝŶ
ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŚĂƌĚƐŚŝƉƐ ? ƐĂǇƐ DƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ.217  Therefore it is not the violent actions that are 
praised, but the refusal of the bird to retreat from this hardship.  If a quail can endure, then 
so should men.  It is also interesting to note that in this example it is a cock that Musonius 
Rufus has picked to demonstrate such an admirable quality, as the Epicureans are said to 
have revered this animal, especially the white cock.218  So perhaps, far from picking this 
example for purely demonstrative purposes, Musonius has been influenced in this example 
by the Epicureans, or perhaps ƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞƌ  “ŽƌƋƵĂŝů ? ŝƐĂĚĚĞĚƚŽĂǀŽŝĚƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
relying on an Epicurean motif.  
The idea that the example of the cock has not been used to glorify violence en masse 
becomes more apparent when we consider the one fragment in which Musonius considers 
personal violence.  He says men that have been met with physical violence and have done 
nothing ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌŝŐŚƚƐ Žƌ  “ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĞĚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ  ?ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƚƚĂĐŬĞƌ ? ŝŶ ĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ŚĂǀĞ
reacted in the correct way.  Whereas those who meet violence with violence are no better 
ƚŚĂŶǁŝůĚďĞĂƐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚŝƐ “ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌity of 
ǁƌŽŶŐƐ QĚŽŶĞƚŽŵĞŶ ?.219  It is possible to suggest that perhaps this is a position Musonius 
felt should be taken by nations as well as individuals.  For in his treatise, That Kings Also 
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Should Study Philosophy, delivered to a Syrian king, he extols the beŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨĂ “ƐŽďĞƌrule 
ĂŶĚ ƐĞĞŵůǇ ƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?.220  Once the lecture was finished Musonius was told the king 
would not refuse anything he wished for.  All that Musonius required was for the king to 
follow his teachings.221  Therefore, this submissive quality that the king was to follow could 
perhaps have been meant in a similar way to the submissive quality required of individuals.  
This is further demonstrated in a two line fragment that also muses on the role of the king: 
 “dŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ŽŶĞ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƌĞŐĂƌded with awe rather than with fear.  Reverence 
attends the one ?ďŝƚƚĞƌŶĞƐƐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?.222  Presumably this awe would have been created by 
ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ “ƐĞĞŵůǇƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?223 rather than through ill judged acts of retribution which 
would have caused fear and bitterness among a subject nation. 
The oft repeated mantra of war for the sake of glory, rejected by Cicero,224 is also 
disparaged in Musonius.  He sees glory as unworthy225, while listing the unworthy ends for 
which people are willing to suffer hardships he condemns  “ŚŽǁŵƵĐŚƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
are pursuinŐ ĨĂŵĞ ĞŶĚƵƌĞ QǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇ ?.226  Therefore, glory is dismissed as a goal not 
worthy of the hardships people so often endure for its vain prize.  So even though its role in 
warfare is not considered, Musonius would almost certainly have viewed the idea of war 
ĨŽƌŐůŽƌǇǁŝƚŚůŝƚƚůĞƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇ ?dŚĞĨŝŶĂůĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ, which could be 
said to show a longing for peace, is his belief that men are most wretched, if they harm 
their enemy.  He supposes that ĂĚĞƐƉŝĐĂďůĞŵĂŶ “ŝƐŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĞĂƐŝůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚďǇŚŝƐ
ŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŚĞůƉ ?ŚŝƐĞŶĞŵǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶĐŽŵŵŽŶĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚŽŶĞƐŚŽƵůĚ “ƐƚƌŝǀĞƚŽ
harm the first enemies we meet is the mark of mean-mŝŶĚĞĚĂŶĚŝŐŶŽƌĂŶƚŵĞŶ ?.227  Again 
we see Musonius calling for the restraint, so often present in Stoic thought, a restraint that 
sees Musonius willing to help rather than attack his enemies, which if elevated to the state 
level would again result in peace, rather than aggression. 
Now the meagre remains of MusoniƵƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉĞĂĐĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉŝĐŬĞĚŽǀĞƌ, it is 
possible to examine the life of the philosopher to see if any further examples can be found 
that confirm or contradict these opinions.  The philosopher ?s most important act in this 
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respect is undoubteĚůǇ ŚŝƐ  “ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŽƵƐ ?228  ?Žƌ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ  “ůƵĚŝĐƌŽƵƐ ?229) actions during the 
civil wars of 69 BC.  Tacitus tells us that he followed an envoy sent to the advancing army of 
sĞƐƉĂƐŝĂŶŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ “ĞǆƉŝĂƚĞƵƉŽŶƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?bona pacis 
ac belli discrimina disserens).230  Sidebottom correctly observes that, although there is no 
extended discourse on war or peace in the work of Musonius, this incident demonstrates 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞ  “ĨĞůƚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶƚƚŽ ůĞĐƚƵƌĞŽŶǁĂƌ ?.231  However this incident demonstrates more 
than this, as it shows Musonius willing to risk his life to practically apply his philosophical 
beliefs, putting his money where his mouth was, so to speak232, and in this case his money 
and mouth were both heavily invested in the spreading of concord.   So Musonius was 
more than a theorist in the world of Philosophy: he lived by the high standards he set 
himself and others in his discourses. 
ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ DƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ? ůŝĨĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ƐŚŽǁ ŚŝƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ŝŶ
Athens, probably in the early 70s AD.233  Dio Chrysostom states that Musonius protested 
against the Athenian practice of holding gladiatorial contests in the theatre and was forced 
to leave the city because of his actions.234  The philosopher is said to have rebuked the city 
becausĞ ƚŚĞ ŐůĂĚŝĂƚŽƌƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ŽĨƚĞŶ ďĞ  “ƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌĞĚ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ƐĞĂƚƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ
,ŝĞƌŽƉŚĂŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŝĞƐƚƐŵƵƐƚƐŝƚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ, it is said to have been the location of 
the slaughter not the bloodshed alone that caused his disapproval.  Therefore, due to the 
fact that either Musonius never wrote about the blood sports of Rome, or because his 
opinions on this do not survive, it is impossible to tell if there was any more general 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŐůĂĚŝĂƚŽƌŝĂůďĂƚƚůĞƐ ?ĂƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁŝƚŚƚ^ ?dĞůĞŵĂĐŚƵƐ ?own protest that 
ended in his martyrdom in 404 AD.235  As there is no evidence of Musonius making a similar 
protest during his time spent in Rome, it must be assumed that either it was the specific 
location of the theatre that disturbed him so greatly or perhaps he was displaying his 
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shrewdness, that also allowed him to leave the field of conflict when his life was repeatedly 
threatened while he rodĞĂŵŽŶŐsĞƐƉĂƐŝĂŶ ?ƐƚƌŽŽƉƐ.236 
Epictetus 
 
Like Musonius Rufus, there is no extant work written by the hand of Epictetus, yet 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ?ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ŝŶĂŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ
way.  This is because eight books were composed by one of his students, Arrian, who claims 
ƚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŚŝƐƚĞĂĐŚĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ “ǁŽƌĚĨŽƌǁŽƌĚ ?ĂƐďĞƐƚ/ĐŽƵůĚ ?to preserve it for a 
ŵĞŵŽƌŝĂů ?.237  Out of these eight books the first four have survived as well as the 
Encheiridion, or Manual, which is a summary also composed by Arrian, and gives a good 
indication what the four lost books may have contained.  Due to the larger volume of 
ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ŝƚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŵĂǇ
appear, however this is not the case.  It seems that Epictetus never dedicated a discourse 
to war and, like Seneca, was more concerned with the ethics of the individual than those of 
the state or army.238  He also felt it was the job of the philosopher to focus more on issues 
of happiness and unhappiness or freedom and slavery than war and peace.239  Despite 
Epictetus not devoting a treaty to war, Sidebottom believes he would have felt negatively 
about war.240   “ŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŵŽƌĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?241 was truly where a man ought to focus his 
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůǁŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽ “ůŽǀĞŝŶƚŚĞŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚ ?ĐŽŶĐŽƌĚŝŶƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ, 
[and] peĂĐĞĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?.242  Therefore, if control over moral purpose is the way a man 
should spend his life, and this leads to peace among nations, then war must be a negative 
ĨŽƌĐĞ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? Certainly this seems to be what 
Epictetus implies.  He gives the example of Polyneices and Eteocles, whose poor 
judgements about exile and kingship caused them to lose control of their moral purpose 
and started a war as a result.243 
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However, it appears that Epictetus goes much farther than merely believing peace to be a 
positive force, because it is promoted by those who have committed themselves to control 
over moral purpose.  When Epictetus discourses on desire, 3.22, he considers the origins of 
the Trojan War and abduction of Helen.  /ƚ ŝƐ ĂƐŬĞĚ  “ƐŚĂůů ǁĞ ƚŚĞŶ ďĞ ĚĞƐƉŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
dƌŽũĂŶƐ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ:  WŚŽĂƌĞƚŚĞdƌŽũĂŶƐ ?ƌĞƚŚĞǇ “ǁŝƐĞ
men or foolish?  If they are wise why are you fighting them?  If foolish, why do you 
ĐĂƌĞ ? ?244 Epictetus states, then, that wars should not be fought against either the wise or 
the foolish.  The wise should not be warred with purely because they are wise and the 
foolish because they are not worthy of the attention that war would give them.  For the ex-
slave Epictetus, who was obsessed with the idea of freedom245, war should not even be 
waged for the preservation of freedom.246  But most important of all is the encouragement 
ŽĨƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐƚŽĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞĂƚ “ƉĞĂĐĞǁŝƚŚĂůůŵeŶ ?ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽ ?.247  
According to Epictetus, if you are able to make this claim then you are like the city that 
laughs at its besiegers, since you know you are safe and fully supplied within the walls.248  
So Epictetus goes one step further than Musonius Rufus: as while Musonius urged others 
not to seek revenge for violent acts, Epictetus encouraged a proclaimed peace among all 
men because of the safety it creates. 
Although Epictetus does not give an extended consideration to the ideas of war and peace 
he does, however, address one of his discourses To Those Who Have Their Hearts upon 
Living a Quiet Life, to this topic.249  In this discourse his opinions are perhaps surprising; he 
is as negative towards those who desire to live peacefully as he is towards those who desire 
any other object or personal gain.250  The desire for turmoil, property, reputation, office 
and freedom from office are all equal evils with a desire for peace.  It is not the object of 
desire that is important but the desire itself, for it makes you subservient to another.251  So 
it seems that although Epictetus could see no justification for war in any circumstances and 
also saw peace as the result of the true calling of man, the Stoic belief that emotions should 
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be controlled meant that the desire for peace was an evil force despite the fact that peace 
itself was ultimately good.  
As well as these few instances when Epictetus deals directly with war and peace, he also 
uses many military images.  The most positive are those that compare the role of the 
philosopher to a scout252 and the role of God to a general.253  However, none of these 
images show either the scout or the general in a particularly positive light, but rather are 
used purely metaphorically.  The philosopher is sent out as a scout to bring back 
information to the populace and God is only as a general because he must be obeyed and 
Epictetus is seen as an unquestionably loyal soldier.  Whereas these images appear neutral 
ĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ?ǀŝĞǁŽĨƉĞĂĐĞŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ, there is one in which the military is possibly 
seen iŶ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ůŝŐŚƚ ?  ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ  “ĂƉƉĞĂƌ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ĂůůƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐŽĚŽĂŶŝŵĂůƐ “ďŽƌŶĨŽƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌƵƐĞ ?ĞƋƵŝƉƉĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ
in need of no further attention.  Consequently, one small child with a rod can drive a flock 
ŽĨ ƐŚĞĞƉ ?.254  This perhaps shows Epictetus not only as a supporter of peace but also 
someone who felt negative towards the role of the soldiers.  However, this would depend 
on whether or not the comparison between sheep and soldiers was still intended to be 
considered when the idea of the child controlling the flock was introduced.  Were Arrian 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ?ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƉŝĐƚƵƌĞĂŶƵŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂƌŵǇďĞŝŶŐďĞĂƚĞŶ
back by the free-willed child with a stick or was this only a comment on the inability of 
domesticated animals to resist any amount of coercion?  WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ? ĞĂƌůŝĞƌ
comparison between soldiers on campaign and convicts255 indicates that this is a further 
example of the ƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ? lack of free thought, and the ease with which they can be 
controlled.  A final point to make on Epictetus is that he uses his philosophical theories to 
question the motives of contemporary wars.256  On a personal level Epictetus dismisses the 
possibility that self-interest is good.  It is in the individual ?s interest to have a farm, so it is 
also to take his neighbour ?s farm; equally it is in his interest to have a cloak so his interest 
can be met by stealing ĂĐůŽĂŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĂƚŚƐ “ƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨǁĂƌs, stasis, tyrannies 
ĂŶĚƉůŽƚƐ ?.257  This idea is confirmed exactly a book later when the interests of Polyneices 
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ĂŶĚƚĞŽĐůĞƐĂƌĞƚŚƌŽǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵ “ůŝŬĞĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ ŵĞĂƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽĚŽŐƐ ?.258  Again 
a misconception of the importance and magnitude of self-interest is the cause for stasis 
and war.  Further, ŝƚŝƐƚŚŝƐ “ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐĐĂƵƐĞĚƚŚĞǁĂƌƐŶŽƚŽŶůǇŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŶŝĂŶƐ ?
Spartans and Thebans but also those, as Epictetus points out, ŝŶ “ŽƵƌĚĂǇƐƚŚe Romans with 
ƚŚĞ'ĞƚĂĞ ?.259  So although Epictetus did not ride out to confront an advancing army in the 
way Musonius Rufus may have done, in the privacy of his own classroom he was willing to 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞŵƉĞƌŽƌ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŐŽŝŶŐƚŽǁĂƌ.260 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ?ĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨdƌĂũĂŶĨŽƌŚŝƐǁĂƌǁŝƚh the Getae, which was caused 
by his failure to correctly gauge the worthiness of self-interest, Epictetus also shows a 
conflicting image of the Principate ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ?   “ĂĞƐĂƌ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ƵƐ ǁŝƚŚ
ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞďĂƚƚůĞƐĂŶĚǁĂƌƐŚĂǀĞĐĞĂƐĞĚ, brigands and pirates no longer are a 
ůĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞŶƵŝƐĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚůŽŶŐĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚƌĂǀĞůŝƐƐĂĨĞďǇůĂŶĚŽƌƐĞĂ ? “ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŝƐŝŶŐƐƵŶƚŽ
ŝƚƐ ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ? ?261  Although specific imperial wars are condemned, the empire has brought 
peace.  However, the peace provided by Caesar is very different from that given by the 
philosopher, which promises also peace from love, sorrow and envy: this peace may come 
from philosophy but is proclaimed by God not by the Emperor.262  This internal peace 
provides a very real external benefit also, for a man in possĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐŚĂƉĞĂĐĞƐĂǇƐ “ŶŽ
evil can befall me, for there is no such thing as a brigand [or] earthquake, everything is full 
of peace, everything full of ƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůůŝƚǇ ? ?263  This peace is so profound that even murder can 
ŽŶůǇŚĂƌŵ “ǇŽƵƌƚƌŝǀŝĂůďŽĚǇ ?.264  The peace from Caesar is an absence of war at the centre 
of the empire and is secondary to the peace that philosophy can bring which may not 
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Dio Chrysostom (of Prusa) 
 
Dio Chrysostom, like Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, often used military images and 
comparisons in his discourses: The loyalty of a friend is compared to a rampart265; Dio says 
each man should be ready for life as each soldier is prepared for war266; and the constant 
search for morality over depravity is described as an unremitting war.267  However, unlike 
Musonius and Epictetus, Dio engaged much more directly with the ideas of war and peace, 
most notably in the twenty-second discourse Concerning Peace and War, but also in the 
first four kingship orations believed to have been delivered to Trajan268 and the fifth 
kingship oration believed not to have been addressed to Trajan due to its less complete 
style and the repetition from orations 1 and 3.  Most significant perhaps are his orations 
delivered to the cities of Bithynia, either theoretically promoting concord over civil strife269, 
or practically promoting peace between the cities at times of specific and genuine 
unrest.270 
tŚĂƚǁĞƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŽĨŝŽ ?ƐƚǁĞŶƚǇ-second discourse Concerning Peace and War is sadly only 
a fragment, the majority of which focuses not on the question that Dio assures us will be 
tackled at length, but rather on the differences in the way philosophers and orators tackle 
such questions: philosophers in considering  “ƚŚĞŝƌ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ŽƌĂƚŽƌƐdiscuss 
 “ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?271  However, it is still possible to take something from this discourse both 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐŝŽ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ?ŝŽ
tells us that this is a subject often addressed by philosophers and that it is one of the main 
questions of the age.272  TŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ? ĂŶĚ DƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ? ŽŶůǇ
passing references to warfare but, as it has already been noted, DƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?confrontation 
ǁŝƚŚ sĞƐƉĂƐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ƚƌŽŽƉƐ273 shows that Musonius could not only lecture on peace and 
concord274, but was also well rehearsed in the topic, as he was able to give this lecture 
spontaneously under the pressure of an advancing army.  Dio also suggests that he will go 
on to ask whether or not revenge is a just cause to wage war and how serious an act must 
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be committed before a war should be waged.275  This suggests that Dio will define a point 
at which war becomes a viable option.  Dio sides with the philŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ?ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ŝŶƚŚĞ
way to approach these questions, saying that it is best to have already considered the topic 
in the abstract form and that this will prevent hesitation and the need for rushed 
improvisation.276  Yet, not long after this, the discourse breaks off and it is never made clear 
where Dio would have drawn the line between just and unjust cause, or even if he would 
have been able to find any just cause at all. 
Despite ŝŽ ?Ɛ assertion that it is best to consider the general nature of war and peace in his 
twenty-second discourse, he often became involved in the specific examples.  The thirty-
eighth discourse was delivered to the Nicomedians with the purpose of ceasing hostilities 
between the inhabitants and their neighbours in Nicaea.  The fortieth discourse was 
delivered with the same intent as the thirty-eighth, but in his own city of Prusa, with the 
aim of encouraging peace with their neighbours, the Apameians.  So although Dio 
preferred the advantages of dealing with a theoretical conflict, he was also willing to 
involve himself when a specific need arose.  Despite having entered into a specific dialogue 
about concord, he first spends some time discussing the more general nature of concord.277  
ŽŶĐŽƌĚ ŝƐ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŽ ĨŝŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ŝŶ  “ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ŽĨ ĚŝǀŝŶĞ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?, the same origins as 
 “ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ? ?278  Dio acknowledges that there are those that 
love strife, but Dio says this is like loving a disease of our bodies and that people that love 
factions and wars and diseases are evil as these things are evil.279  This more general 
appraisal of concord also contains a section on the various reasons men have chosen war 
over peace, including kingly power, liberty and territory, but these are all treated as equals 
and there have beeŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞ “ůĂŝĚǁĂƌĂƐŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĞǀŝů ?ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŚŝŶŐƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ  “ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚ ǀĂůƵĞ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ǁĂƌ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?280  Dio then, like others, sees 
tyranny and profit as unworthy of war, but unlike others he also sees liberty as not worthy 
of war and concord as of more value than freedom.  Worse than all these though is war 
without purpose (even an unworthy purpose) whiĐŚŝƐĐĂƵƐĞĚŽŶůǇďǇ “ŵĂĚŶĞƐƐ ?.281  Most 
confusing for Chrysostom is the fact that people are actually grateful for wars when they 
are begun.  War is as destructive as an earthquake or pestilence, and these are seen as 
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punishment from the gods.  Yet, wars are caused not by the gods, but are chosen by men.  
Rather than being a meeting of  “ĞǀŝůĨŽƌĞǀŝů ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞĨŽƌƌĞǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĚŚŽŶŽƵƌƐ.  
This, Dio says, ŝƐ  “ǁŝƚůĞƐƐ ? ĂƐ ŝƚ ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚŵĞŶ ĂƌĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĂŶŬĨƵů ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ Ğǀŝů ƚŚĞǇ
cause themselves.282  This is a concept at odds wiƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝŽ ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŚĞƌĞǁĂƌ
is said to be given by Zeus, the creator and inspirer of war283, but Dio himself says that this 
ƐŽƌƚŽĨŐŽĚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽďĞ “ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇŚŝƐĂƌƚ ?ďƵƚǁĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽďĞƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚ
by Homer.284  Perhaps, at this point, Dio was claiming modesty and saying his talent was 
not equal to Homer and, as such, he could not do justice to the image of the warring god.  
However, perhaps instead the meaning is that the philosopher deals with truth and the 
poet with fiction, so that ŝŽ ?Ɛ Ăƌƚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ ŐŽĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ďƌŝŶŐĞƌ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ĂƐ ŚĞ ŝƐ
dedicated to truth and the Stoic Providence would not cause such evils among men.  That 
the latter possibility is more likely is suggested by the announcement made to the 
Nicaeans, in Orations 39, in which Chrysostom proclaims that it is right for men, descended 
from gods, to live in peace and concord.285  dŚŝƐŝƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇŝŽ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ made 
while at Prusa, where he states ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂǀĞŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŐŽĚƐ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ Ă ƐƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ  “ŽƌĚĞƌ ĂŶĚ
concord and self-ĐŽŶƚƌŽůǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĞƚĞƌŶĂů ?ũƵƐƚĂƐƚŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŝŶďĂůĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
ƚŚŝƐ “ƐƚĂďůĞ ?ƌŝŐŚƚĞŽƵƐ ?ĞǀĞƌůĂƐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶĐŽƌĚ ?ƚŚĞǇƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞŵƐĞlves but also the 
universe.286  Therefore, it is likely that Dio declined to present the gods as the creators of 
wars on philosophical, not purely artistic, grounds.   
Also in the Prusa orations, Dio tells his own people that it is better to show reluctance to 
make war than peace and that it is preferable to be seen as weak than base.287  He even 
tells ƚŚĞ ĐƌŽǁĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĂŶǇƉĞĂĐĞ QŝƐ ďĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ǁĂƌ ? ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞ and concord have  “ŶĞǀĞƌ
ĚĂŵĂŐĞĚĂƚĂůůƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? ?288   It seems then that the advice Dio gave 
to Nicaea and Nicomedia was not merely acceptable for other towns, but was also the path 
he would urge his own town to take: willing to make compromises to the point at which he 
would appear weak rather than engage in a war.  This idea continues at 40.30 when Dio 
ĂƐŬƐ “,ŽǁŵƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞn, is it worth to avoid experiencing these things?  How much more to 
ĂǀŽŝĚ ŝŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ŽŶ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? For Dio, the crime of inflicting military defeat on an 
enemy comes at a greater cost than experiencing one.  He is as keen to avoid the moral 
                                                          
282
 ibid 20. 
283
 ibid 12.78. 
284
 ibid 12.79. 
285
 ibid 39.2. 
286
 ibid 40.35. 
287
 ibid 40.24. 
288
 ibid 40.26. 
Andrew Crane  49 
 
stain of victory as he is the practical hardship of loss.  However, despite these passages in 
which it seems Dio is convincing his townsmen that a subservient life is favourable to any 
situation, ŚĞŝƐŬĞĞŶƚŽĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŚĞĚŽĞƐŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽďĞ “ǁŚŽůůǇƐƵďŵŝƐƐŝǀĞ ?.289  Instead he 
claims that he is merely suggesting that when Apamea have made steps towards peace 
that Prusa are quick to appear eager in the negotiations.290  However, it is unclear whether 
this passage is added in an attempt to allay the concerns of the more aggressive in the 
crowd or whether the more total pacifistic arguments are the result of rhetorical 
hyperbole. 
Unlike the orations delivered to Nero by Seneca, ŝŽŚƌǇƐŽƐƚŽŵ ?ƐŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽdƌĂũĂŶŽĨƚĞŶ
broach military topics.  The first kingship oration opens with Dio comparing himself to 
Timotheus, the favourite flautist of Alexander the Great.  TiŵŽƚŚĞƵƐ ?ƉůĂǇŝŶŐǁĂƐĐĂƉĂďůĞ
ŽĨŝŶƐƉŝƌŝŶŐ “ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĂŶĚŚŝŐŚ-ŵŝŶĚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?.291  Dio says that had Timotheus been able to 
both call men to arms and ĂůƐŽƚŽůŝǀĞŝŶƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ “ƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶĐŽƌĚ ? ?ƚŽŶŽƚŽŶůǇŚŽŶŽƵƌ
gods but also give consideration to men292, then he would have been of far greater use to 
Alexander.  Dio, then, is suggesting that whereas Timotheus roused Alexander to 
courageous acts, Dio will inspire Trajan to concord.   
ŝŽ ?ƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĐŽŶĐŽƌĚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚhe does not consider military ideas and 
focuses purely on peace.  He advocates fair treatment and familiarity between king and 
army saying that a good ruler is by nature fond of his soldiers.293  This is explained fully in 
an analogy of the shepherd and his sheepdogs; one that distorts the previous positivity, as 
the image of the sheepdogs is not one that portrays soldiers in a peaceful light as they were 
 “ƌĞŶŽǁŶĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ǀiciousness ?.294  But the good king is also said to be only warlike 
because it is with him the responsibility of war lies and, even in war, should be described as 
ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůĂƐƚŚĞƌĞ “ŝƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ůĞĨƚǁŽƌƚŚĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌ ? ? The king must be prepared for war 
only because this makes it more possible to attain peace.295  This is reconfirmed when Dio 
uses the example of Hercules.  Dio states that men who claim that Hercules travelled 
without an army are mistaken for it is not possible to overthrow tyrants without an 
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army.296  Here, again, then we see Dio embracing the necessity of an armed force for the 
conflicting purposes of removing tyrants and maintaining peace.    
Dio does again turn to peace towards the end of his first kingship oration in the invented 
etymological myth that explains the reason men so often choose tyranny over peace.297  In 
this tale Hercules is led by Hermes to a mountain with the twin peaks of Royalty and 
dǇƌĂŶŶǇ ?dŚĞŚŝŐŚƉĞĂŬ ?WĞĂŬZŽǇĂů )ŝƐƚŚĞŚŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ďůĞƐƐĞĚůĂĚǇZŽǇĂůƚǇ ?.  Royalty is 
attended by three women; Justice, Civic Order and Peace, who is the most important of the 
three, and one man; Law (also called Right Reason, Counsellor, and Coadjutor by Dio), 
without whom none of the others can act.  Peace then can only be brought about through 
Law and Right Reason and in the presence of Royalty.  This is why peace is the concern of 
the good king: it is with him that the responsibility for peace must finally rest, as Dio has 
already stated earlier.298  As Hercules descended, he reached the lower of the two peaks, 
Peak Tyranny.  Here Hermes explained that only the path to one peak was easily viewed 
(that to Tyranny), the other was more perilous and hidden from plain sight.  Once Hermes 
had escorted Hercules to Tyranny, she was seen to be imitating Royalty but on a more 
elaborate throne, carved and bejewelled but more unstable than that of Royalty, and 
beside her were her companions Cruelty, Insolence, Lawlessness, and Faction.  Tyranny, 
then, is chosen by men because they are deceived by her illusion of Royalty.  True Royalty 
however comes with Peace; Tyranny only with Factions. 
Peace is not considered again in such detail in the other kingship orations (perhaps because 
peace forms such a key role in the first oration), but the third oration299 does return to the 
topic.  In a section that extols the virtues of friendship, ŝŽƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ĂƌŵƐ ?ǁĂůůƐ ?ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ?
ĂŶĚĐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƌĞŽƵƌ  “ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ďƵƚ ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƵƐĞůĞƐƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽů
them, whereas friends are useful even without arms.300  Thus Dio says that a king should 
value his friends above his armoury and, moreover, in unbroken peace these items become 
a burden.  However, Dio himself questions the reality of this image, asking whether  “ƐƵĐŚĂ
ƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƵŶďƌŽŬĞŶƉĞĂĐĞĐĂŶ ?ďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĞven if it can exist there is no 
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stability in peace without friendship.301  The change in attitude seen here is probably due to 
the change of focus: Dio is not commenting on peace here, but on friendship, by employing 
an image of war and peace and friendship ?s role in each, so he does not need to promote 
peace here in the same way as he did in the first kingship oration.  Even so, it is important 
ƚŽ ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŽ ?Ɛ ĨŽĐƵƐis not peace, it is not portrayed negatively but merely 
more practically, without the utopian hue it is given in other places.302 
^ŝĚĞďŽƚƚŽŵ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ŝŽ ?Ɛ ŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ dƌĂũĂŶ ?303  Like 
Musonius Rufus304, Dio Chrysostom did not view glory as worthy cause for war: he saw 
glory as foolish305 and wrote orations 66 and 68 against the concept of glory.  Trajan is seen 
by other writers of the Imperial period to be heavily motivated by glory.306  As a result, 
Moles says that oration four, with its discussion on the problems of ambition and attack on 
militarianism, iƐ “ĂǁĂƌŶŝŶŐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨdƌĂũĂŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌĂŶĚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?.307  Dio 
is, therefore criticising the vain pursuit of military glory under an emperor who is accused 
of just that.308 
A final point of interest can be found in the life of Dio Chrysostom as recorded in 
WŚŝůŽƐƚƌĂƚƵƐ ?Lives of the Sophists.  Philostratus recounts a tale similar to that of Musonius 
Rufus ďĞƌĂƚŝŶŐsĞƐƉĂƐŝĂŶ ?ƐƚƌŽŽƉƐin Tacitus, but rather than riding towards an advancing 
army Dio, after the assassination of Domitian, is said to have removed his beggar disguise 
while quoting from the Odyssey  “ƚŚĞŶ KĚǇƐƐĞƵƐ ŽĨ ŵĂŶǇ ĐŽƵŶƐĞůƐ ƐƚƌŝƉƉĞĚ Śŝŵ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ
ƌĂŐƐ ? ?309 Dio, realising that the army may mutiny and throw Rome into further civil strife, 
compelled them to cease hostilities and, unlike Musonius he was successful.310  It seems 
likely that there was a real fear of mutiny at this time, as Suetonius records it in his Life of 
Domitian.311  However, rather than the involvement of Dio Chrysostom, Suetonius says the 
reason the mutiny did not fully materialise was due to the lack of adequate leaders, which 
seems much more plausible especially given that the time scale involved makes DŝŽ ?Ɛ
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presence nearly impossible.312  Yet, despite the unlikely realiƚǇŽĨŝŽ ?ƐƉůĞĂ, it does show 
the type of man Dio was, that is  “ĂŵĂŶŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ ?313, like Musonius Rufus, committed not 
only to the theory of peace (seen in the first kingship oration) but also to the practicality of 
concord (demonstrated by his four orations given in Bithynia).  It may have been this 
attitude, nearing the pacifistic314, that caused Dio to write a discourse, now lost, praising 
the Essenes, a Jewish sect from the Dead Sea area who were renowned for their own 
pacifist beliefs and lives.315 
Seneca the Younger 
Philosophical Works 
From the discussion above on the three most prominent first century Stoic philosophers, it 
seems clear that Harry Sidebottom was not only correct in his conclusion that they were 
verging on the pacifistic316, but perhaps he does not go far enough.  Musonius Rufus, 
Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected not only personal aggression317, but the violence of 
wars also.  The Stoics not only condemned the commonly criticised motives of greed318, 
power319 and glory320, but also freedom321 and self defence.322  This is because they 
believed that violence would cause impiety323, financial and moral bankruptcy324, and the 
collapse of normal society.325  War was also denounced because it conflicted with the 
fundamentals of Stoic metaphysics; i.e. that the gods live in supreme peace and the 
universe is centred on concord, peace, friendship and justice  W a precarious balance that 
stasis and war can only destroy, so man must also be intended to live in peace, as this is the 
only way he may achieve a state close to god and maintain the balance of nature.326  
Musonius and Dio both apparently risked ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ůŝǀĞƐ ƚŽ ƉƌĞĂĐŚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚŽ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
                                                          
312
 Jones 1978, 51. 
313
 Berry 1983, 79. 
314
 Sidebottom 1993, 25. 
315
 Syncellus, 24-26. 
316
 Sidebottom 1993 250, 262 
317
 Muson. fr. 10.78.20-30; Epict. 1. 22. 14-15. 
318
 Epict. 1. 22. 14, 2. 22. 22; Dio Chrys., Or. 13. 35, 17. 10. 
319
 Dio Chrys., Or. 4. 
320
 Muson. fr. 7. 56. 15-20.  Dio Chrys., Or.66, 68, 38.29.  
321
 Dio Chrys., Or. 38.16-7, 80.3; Epictetus 4.1.171-3.  
322
 Muson. fr. 4.44.29±46, 10.78.26-32;  Dio Chrys., Or. 40. 24-30.   
323
 Dio Chrys., Or. 36. 4-6, 38, 14. 
324
 Dio Chrys., Or. 17. 10, 31. 101-2. 
325
 Dio Chrys., Or. 38. 19, 36. 4-6. 
326
 Dio Chrys., Or.1. 42-3, 12.79, 38. 8-20, 39. 2, 40. 35; Sidebottom 1993, 245.   
Andrew Crane  53 
 
armies.327  Furthermore, ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐƚŽDƵƐŽŶŝƵƐ ?ŽǁŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽ
calm their passion for battle, coupled with the general objections to warfare already stated, 
means that the critical depiction of soldiers should not be surprising.  It is only soldiers 
from the distant past or from foreign lands that are praised.328 Contemporary soldiers are 
compared to vicious dogs and the lowest level of labourers. Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus 
viewed them as a threat not a sign of security.329  Given all this, perhaps Sidebottom does 
ŶŽƚ ŐŽ ĨĂƌ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ? ǁŚĞŶ ŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ^ƚŽŝĐƐ ŚĂĚ Ă  “ĨůŝƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ
ƉĂĐŝĨŝƐŵ ? ?330  However, regardless of whether these three philosophers were merely flirting 
with pacifism or were more committed to this belief, the pattern is clear.  Therefore, if 
these three near-contemporaries can be taken as representing the standard Stoic view of 
the period then when the works of Seneca are examined a similar outlook should be 
expected.    
Some scholars have previously concluded that the pacifistic views of the Imperial Stoics can 
also be found in the philosophical works of Seneca. For example, Anna Motto believes that 
 “^ĞŶĞĐĂĂďƐŽůƵƚĞůǇĐŽŶĚĞŵŶƐǁĂƌ ?331, and in some places it certainly seems that Seneca 
does share this total rejection of wars with his fellow Stoics.  In Ep. 95 Seneca asks why it is 
that the crime of murder is punished by the state, but at the same time wars and genocides 
are praised.332  He sees murder and war as comparable, and claims that it is madness for an 
action to be condemned when carried out in private, but praised when it is performed by a 
uniformed officer.333  It is apparent that Seneca believes that not only should soldiers not 
be praised, but he asks whether they should not be treated in the same way as murderers 
and punished with loss of life.334  This is an idea similar to that which appears in the tale of 
WŚŝůŝƉŽĨDĂĐĞĚŽŶĂŶĚŚŝƐĚŝƐŚŽŶĞƐƚƐŽůĚŝĞƌ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĂŶǇ
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ŵŽƌƚĂů ƚŽ ďĞ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ŵĂŶ ĂŶĚ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ?(non potest quisquam 
eodem tempore et bonum virum et bonum ducem agere).335  A comparable idea (though 
more moderately phrased) is even suggested to Nero in De Clementia, the first book of 
ǁŚŝĐŚĐůŽƐĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ  “ƚƌƵĞŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ ŝŶŐŝǀŝŶŐƐĂĨĞƚǇƚŽŵĂŶǇ QŶŽƚ
[in] trophies torn from a vanquished enemy, nor chariots stained with barbarian blood, nor 
ƐƉŽŝůƐĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚŝŶǁĂƌ ? ?&ĞůŝĐŝƚĂƐŝůůĂŵƵůƚŝƐƐĂůƵƚĞŵĚĂƌĞ ?ŶŽŶŚŽƐƚŝůŝĂĂƌŵĂĚĞƚƌĂĐƚĂǀŝĐƚŝƐ ?
non currus barbarum sanguine cruenti, non parta bello spolia).336  Seneca, then, does not 
tell Nero not to enter wars, but does warn him that they will not make him happy, and that 
killing multitudes without distinction will only cause him ruin.  Also, in Ep. 90 Seneca states 
that wisdom plays no part in wars or arms, bƵƚ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ  “ŚĞƌ ǀŽŝĐĞ ŝƐ ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŚĞ
ƐƵŵŵŽŶƐĂůůŵĂŶŬŝŶĚƚŽĐŽŶĐŽƌĚ ? ?Non arma nec muros nec bella utilia molitur, paci favet 
et genus humanum ad concordiam vocat).337  According to Seneca, war is the interest of 
fools, and as such philosophers are thankful when they may be excused from a role in it.338 
Just as Musonius, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected the importance of glory in all 
relations, especially as a motivation to go to war, Seneca is at times also dismissive of 
gloria.  He states that, if a soldier wants glory, he must pray for war339, but if Scipio prayed 
for war purely so he could win gloria by ending it, then he is not deserving of praise.340  In 
this way, although gloria is not itself belittled, the desire for war in order to win gloria is 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ǁŽƌƚŚǇ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ĂůƐŽ ƉƌĂŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ  “ŐƌĞĂƚ-souled ? actions 
(quanti animi) of men that reject the need for political and military glory and instead offer 
no prayers to Fortuna.341  Furthermore, Seneca believes that man has misused the gifts of 
nature in a vain lust for glory that has caused them to harness the winds so that they may 
attack other nations, nations that they had previously had no contact and no quarrel with.  
These men, so desperate for glory that they will risk their lives in perilous journeys and 
seek out new enemies, are described as both mad and evil, just as Dio describes men that 
lust for war as mad and evil.342  This passage also contains further ideas akin to those of Dio 
Chrysostom. Seneca maintains that the gods are not, in fact, the cause of wars, and their 
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presentation in myth that affirms this role is rejected.  Instead, Seneca says that although 
the gods created the wind they did not do so with the intention of causing wars but rather 
merely to prevent the air from becoming stagnant and to provide rain in order that life 
could be sustained.  The gods did realise that the wind would allow men to travel between 
foreign lands, but the intention was to create communication so men from disparate 
societies could benefit each other not bring destruction.343 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŶŽŶĞŽĨ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ƚƌĞĂƚŝƐĞƐǁĞƌĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚ ŝŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ Orationes 38 
and 40 of Dio, where they are intended to calm localised parties intent on warfare, Seneca 
is often particularly damning of the evils of civil war.344  In De Beneficiis a list of generals is 
ŐŝǀĞŶ ? ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ŝŶǀĂƌŝĂďůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  “ĐƌƵĞů ?  ?crudelis ) ?  “ƵŶŐƌĂƚĞĨƵů ?  ?ingratus) and as 
ƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ  “ŝŶďŽƌŶ ŚĂƚƌĞĚ ?  ?ingentia odia) and it is said about Marius that he  “not 
merely gave the signal, but was himself the signal for civil disasters and butcheries ?  ?nisi 
civilis exitii et trucidationis non tantum dederit signum, sed ipse signum fuerit).345  It is clear 
from the members of this list, which includes Coriolanus, Catiline, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, 
Julius Caesar and Mark Antony that it is specifically civil wars not the universal act of war 
that Seneca demonises.  Earlier in De Beneficiis Seneca also describes civil war as insania, 
and states that it defiles all that is holy (qua omne sanctum ac sacrum profanetur).346   
Yet, despite what seems to be a comprehensive rejection of civil war in De Beneficiis, 
Seneca is able to praise Cato for his role in the civil wars.  He says in Ep. 95 that he would 
describe Cato as Vergil describes the brĂǀĞŵĂŶ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞǁĂƐ “ƵŶƚĞƌƌŝĨŝĞĚĂŵŝĚƚŚĞĚŝŶ
ŽĨĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐĨŝƌƐƚƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬĂƌĞƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĞŶĞŵǇĂŶĚŚĞ “ƉůƵŶŐĞĚĨĂĐĞ-forward into 
ƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ? ?347  Cato is not only said to have thrown himself into civil war but also to 
have created a third faction against Caesar and Pompey, a faction fighting for freedom and 
for the Republic.348  Cato is praised in similar terms in De Providentia, Seneca says that 
Nature chose Cato to not only endure the hardship of civil war, but to fight the whole world 
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 “ĨŽr ĂũƵƐƚĐĂƵƐĞ ? (pro causa bona).349  For Seneca, then, freedom and the preservation of 
ƚŚĞZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚũƵƐƚĐĂƵƐĞĨŽƌǁĂƌ ?/ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨĂƚŽ ?ĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌ
peace is not as absolute as those Stoics that followed him.  Just causes for war also find 
their way into De Clementia, where Seneca says that a wise man will let his enemies not 
only go free but will also praise them if they have warred against him for honourable 
motives, whether loyalty, a treaty or liberty.350   
Perhaps most sƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŽĨĂůů ŝƐ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚŽĨǁĂƌƐ ĨŽƌ
glory.  As we have seen, Seneca rebuked soldiers that prayed for war in order to win glory 
and despised men for using the god given gift of wind for the purpose of carrying out a war 
for glory.  Nevertheless, Seneca says in De Beneficiis that for a young man to act in a way 
that bestows glory on his father is a great and laudable act. He goes on to say that there are 
no greater glories than those won in war.351 Also in De Beneficiis, Scipio is praised for 
bringing glory to his parents and the city, he is said to have brought more glory than 
protection, and Aeneas, Amphinomus and Anapius, Antigonus and Manlius are all also 
presented as examples of upstanding men who obtained gloria through their actions in 
battle.352  However, as we have seen, Seneca states in book 6 of De Beneficiis that a general 
should not pray for wars for the sake of glory.353  Perhaps, then, although glory is an 
admirable thing if won in a war for self-preservation, it should not be a motivating force in 
and of itself and peace should be seen as more admirable still than gloria won in war.  
However, the more complex relationship with gloria is perhaps to be expected due to the 
Roman aristocratic traditions that strongly associate gloria with virtus.354  Therefore, 
^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĞůŝƚĞĂƚZŽŵĞŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂ
watered-down version of the absolute dismissal of gloria that is present in the Stoics of 
Greek origin from this period, we should rather, perhaps, be impressed by the extent to 
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which Greek philosophical ideas have been able to overcome the more traditional ethical 
theories of aristocratic Rome.  
ŶŐĞƌĂůƐŽƉůĂǇƐĂĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨǁĂƌƐŝŶ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?In De 
Ira Seneca says that anger is the most base, evil and deadly of emotions, and war is the 
result of the anger of the powerful, yet even when the lowly give in to anger, it is still war, 
but war without arms.355  In the same work, anger is also rejected as beneficial in warfare.  
Seneca quotes an unknown work of Aristotle, which claimed anger was necessary in 
conflict, but dismisses it saying that a soldier must also listen to reason, and as such cannot 
be spurred on by anger.356  Therefore, Seneca believes anger to be a destructive force that 
not only causes war, but also should not be employed in battle.357 As such one might 
expect a total condemnation of warfare to follow, but it does not.  Interestingly, there is an 
explanation as to why it is necessary to remain calm in warfare.  In De Ira, both Cornelius 
Scipio Aemelianus and Fabius Cunctator are praised for their tactical decisions, they did not 
allow themselves to be controlled by anger, but rather carried out a controlled and 
calculated plan, which brought security and safety to Rome, and destruction to Carthage.358  
Therefore, when Seneca seems to create an opportunity to dismiss the evils of warfare due 
to their being caused by anger, he instead praises two great generals and suggests the best 
ways to enter and win a major engagement.  
To Summarise, Seneca, consequently, presents a more complex picture of war and peace 
than the other Stoics of his era.  While, like them, he could reject glory as a reason to 
initiate war, he differs from the other Stoics by praising the glory won in wars. Moreover, 
while he shares their view on anger, he goes on to say how the control of anger can be of 
particular use for soldiers, a group that the Greek Stoics had no interest in, other than to 
attack.  Although the attitudes of Seneca are complex, they nonetheless seem more 
negative than positive towards warfare. Even the traditional aristocratic virtue of gloria is 
queƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?ǁŚĞŶ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ^ƚŽŝĐďĞůŝĞĨƐĨŽƌĐĞŚŝŵƚŽƌĞ-evaluate it.  Furthermore, though 
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soldiers are encouraged to act in a measured way in warfare Seneca can also ask, whether 
it is right that they are treated differently than murderers purely because they are wearing 
a uniform. 
Tragedies359 
Having concluded that the presentation of war, peace and violence in the philosophy of 
Seneca shares many of its features with his near-contemporaries, I will now turn to the 
tragedies of Seneca, as his plays contain large amounts of Stoic doctrine and numerous 
^ƚŽŝĐůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƐǀŝĞǁďĞĐĂŵĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁŚĞŶ ?t ?DĞŶĚĞůůĐůĂŝŵĞĚ
ŝƚǁĂƐ “ƚŚĞƚŽŶĞŽĨ^ƚŽŝĐĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞƐƚŽƚŚĞƉůĂǇƐĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵŶŝƚǇŽĨĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?360  
However, its most extreme advocate was Berthe Marti, who suggested that the order of 
the texts preserved in MS E was first conceived by Seneca personally, with the specific 
intention of delivering Stoic lessons on progressing themes.361  Despite the fact that the 
majority of work on SenĞĐĂŶƚƌĂŐĞĚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞǇĞĂƌƐƐŝŶĐĞDĂƌƚŝ ?ƐŵŽƐƚƌĂĚŝĐĂůĐůĂŝŵĂďŽƵƚ
Stoic doctrine have believed that there is at least some crossover from philosophy to 
ƚƌĂŐĞĚǇ ? ŶŽƚ Ăůů ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚ ?  &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƌĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐ ůĂŝŶĞ &ĂŶƚŚĂŵ ?Ɛ
edition of the Troades ?  ? ? ŽƵŐůĂƐ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ  “ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ^ƚŽŝĐŝƐŵ ŚĞƌĞ ? ŽŶůǇ Ă ĚƌĞĂĚĨƵů
ĞŵƉƚŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?362  Bearing this in mind, if the similarities found between Musonius, Epictetus, 
Dio and Seneca can be taken as representing the standard doctrine of the Stoics of this 
period, ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽ ĨŝŶĚƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŚĞŵĞƐĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽĨ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂŐĞĚŝĞƐ ?  /Ŷ
order to examine this hypothesis, I will focus on Troades, Phaedra and Thyestes, as I believe 
ŝƚŝƐƚŚĞƐĞƚŚƌĞĞƉůĂǇƐƚŚĂƚďĞƐƚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐƉŚŝlosophy and 
tragedy in relation to warfare.  It is worth noting, however, that similar ideas and concepts 
ĐĂŶďĞ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌ ƚƌĂŐĞĚŝĞƐ ?363 particularly the Hercules Oetaeus, which has 
been left aside due to its possible spurious composition.364 
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In the Troades the first scene to examine the ethics of violence and warfare is the 
Fürstenstreit between Pyrrhus and Agamemnon.365  In this dispute Agamemnon several 
times expresses a Stoic attitude towards warfare and violence.366   ,ĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “to not be 
able to govern ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŝƐĂĨĂƵůƚŽĨǇŽƵƚŚ ? ?iuvenile vitium est regere non posse impetum) 
ĂŶĚ “ƚŚĞmore you are capable of doing, the more you should have ƚŚĞƉĂƚŝĞŶĐĞƚŽĞŶĚƵƌĞ ?
(quo plura possis, plura patienter feras).367  He even regrets that Troy has been razed to the 
ground (ruere et aequari solo etiam arcuissem),368 for he believes the victor who shows no 
restraint and still lusts for blood once his sword is stained is suffering from madness 
(vecors).369  This contrasts strongly with the opening speech of Pyrrhus370 who is derisive of 
the Greek armies for so quickly forgetting the deeds of war.  While Agamemnon and the 
rest of the Greeks are anxious to start the journey home, Pyrrhus is still revelling in the 
brutality of war, even celebrating the great wars waŐĞĚ ďǇ ĐŚŝůůĞƐ  “ǁŚŝůĞ ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ
ǁĂƌ ? ?tanta gessit bella, dum bellum parat).371  The dichotomy of attitudes seen in the two 
great generals can be compared with Dio Oratio 38.372  :ƵƐƚĂƐŐĂŵĞŵŶŽŶƐĞĞƐWǇƌƌŚƵƐ ?
lust for blood after the war as madness, so Dio explained to the Nicomedians that war 
without purpose is madness.373  Interestingly, this scene is often thought to be derived 
from the Polyxena of Sophocles.374  However, the corresponding scene in Sophocles is 
between Agamemnon and his brother Menelaus, not Pyrrhus, who is thought not to have 
been a character in the Polyxena at all.375  Therefore, if the Fürstenstreit of Seneca was 
inspired by that of Sophocles, it must be asked why he has decided to remove this extra 
dimension by eliminating the added fraternal bond, particularly when the motif of brother 
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turning on brother is associated with unnatural lusts and crimes in other plays.376  Perhaps 
Seneca chose Pyrrhus and Agamemnon because they embody the conflicting states of war 
and peace more explicitly than Agamemnon and Menelaus, both of whom are older and 
ǁŝƐĞƌƚŚĂŶWǇƌƌŚƵƐǁŚŽƐĞǇŽƵƚŚĨƵůĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚĂƐĂĨŽŝůƚŽŐĂŵĞŵŶŽŶ ?ƐŵŽƌĞ
considered and measured responses. 
NĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞŐĂŵĞŵŶŽŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƐƚŝƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨWǇƌƌŚƵƐ ?ǇŽƵƚŚĨƵůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ŚĞŝƐŶŽƚ ?
and could not be, described in totally pacifistic terms throughout the Troades.  At line 319 
Agamemnon derides Achilles for his time spent in the camp.  His thoughts turned away 
from war and instead focused on the quill and lyre.377  This scene also shows Agamemnon, 
himself a perpetrator of human sacrifice, preaching the brutality of such a practice.378  
Seneca could have selected to emphasise the same version of the Iphigenia myths present 
ŝŶ ƵƌŝƉŝĚĞƐ ?Iphigenia at Aulis.  In Euripides version of the sacrifice Agamemnon is 
reprieved at the last moment and ultimately kills a deer rather than his own daughter379, 
however, Seneca repeatedly makes it clear that Agamemnon has killed his own daughter in 
order to start the war.380  dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŐĂŵĞŵŶŽŶ ĂƐ
innocent in this matter emphasises that it has been the years of war that have taught him 
the importance of restraint.381   It should, however, be noted that Agamemnon should not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐŶĞǁƚŽƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵŵĂŶƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞ ?  /ŶƵƌŝƉŝĚĞƐ ?
Iphigenia at Aulis Agamemnon argues against such brutality, and by the Neronian period 
this topic was a popular choice for rhetorical declamation.382  Therefore, just as Pyrrhus is 
an understandable choice to show the futility and arrogance of violence, so too 
Agamemnon could be a logical character to embody the fatigue of warfare and the cruel 
nature of human sacrifice.  
The next scene where Seneca discusses war and peace is also a debate, this time between 
Andromache and Ulysses.  In Euripides' Trojan Women, Talthybius says that Astyanax must 
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ĚŝĞŽƌƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬƐǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐĨĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ,ĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐƐŽŶŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞŝƌŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?383 However, 
his reason is given only once, and seems to be of little importance as long as the child is 
killed.384  /Ŷ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶhůǇƐƐĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŝƚŚŶĚƌŽŵĂĐŚĞ ?,ĞƐĂǇƐ P
  sollicita Danaos pacis incertae fides 
  semper tenebit, semper a tergo timor 
  respicere coget, arma nec poni sinet, 
  dum Phrygibus animos natus eversis dabit, 
  ŶĚƌŽŵĂĐŚĂ ?ǀĞƐƚĞƌ ? ? 
   
     ?ƐŝƚĂŵĞŶƚĞĐƵŵĞǆŝŐĂƐ ? 
  veniam dabis, quod bella post hiemes decem 
  totidemque messes iam senex miles timet 
  aliasque clades rursus ac numquam bene 
  Troiam iacentem. 
 
(A fretting mistrust of uncertain peace will always possess the Danaans, and 
fear ever will force them to look behind and not let them lay down their arms, 
so long as your son, Andromache, shall give heart to the conquered 
WŚƌǇŐŝĂŶƐ QŝĨǇŽu reflect, you will forgive a soldier if, after ten winters and as 
many harvest seasons, now veteran he fears war, fears still other bloody 
battles and Troy never truly at rest.)385  
 
Ulysses employs the same argument as Dio uses in his Or. 40, when he assures his home 
town of Prusa that `all peace so they say ŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶǁĂƌ ? ?ʋଌʍɲɶଊʌ ?୩ʎʔɲʍɿʆ ?ɸ଺ʌଫʆɻ
ʃʌɸ୅ʏʏʘʆ ʋʉʄଡʅʉʐ).386  hůǇƐƐĞƐ ? ƚĂƐŬ ? ŝŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ? ŝƐ ŵĂĚĞ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĂĐĞ ŚĞ
wishes to win is his own and will not benefit Andromache.  That said, Ulysses still hopes 
Andromache will reach this conclusion, sacrificing her son for a lasting peace as 
Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter for a prolonged war.   
It is also worth noting that although in his analysis of Troades Calder gives little credit to 
Seneca as far as originality is concerned, the prologue is considered his own invention.387  
&ŽƌƚŚŝƐƉƌŽůŽŐƵĞŚĞĐŚŽƐĞ,ĞĐƵďĂĂĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĂůĚĞƌƐĂǇƐ ?ǁĂƐ “ĞĂƐŝůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ
ĂƐĂƚƌŝĞĚĂŶĚƚĞƐƚĞĚƐǇŵďŽůĨŽƌƚŚĞŚŽƌƌŽƌƐŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?388  Consequently, it appears that from 
the opening of the Troades Seneca wanted the audience to have the horrors of war at the 
forefront of their minds. 
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In the Phaedra it is again a debate scene that allows Seneca to consider Stoic ideals. This 
time, however, one character alone does not promote Stoic beliefs.  Instead, the Nurse 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ ,ŝƉƉŽůǇƚƵƐ ĨŽƌ ŚŝƐ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ  “you believe that ŝƚ ŝƐ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƚĂƐŬ ƚŽendure harsh 
times... and wage fierce battles in bloody war ?  ?hoc esse munus credis indictum viris, ut 
dura tolereŶƚ ?Ğƚ saeva bella Marte sanguineo gerant?).389  The Nurse goes on to question 
the metaphysical problems that his lifestyle will create.  She assures Hippolytus that love 
 “ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐĂŶĚƌĞŶĞǁƐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽǀĞƌŝƐŚĞĚƌĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝƚ  “ƚŚĞŐůŽďĞǁŝůů ůŝĞĨŽƵůŝŶǀŝůĞ
nĞŐůĞĐƚ ?  ?quae supplet ac restituit exhaustum genus: orbis iacebit squalido turpis situ).390  
dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŝŽ ?ƐOrationes 3 and 40391, so Dio Chrysostom and the Nurse both 
voice the Stoic metaphysical belief that without love there can be no order in the world. 
,ŝƉƉŽůǇƚƵƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚĂƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĚĞĂůƐĂƚŝƚƐŚĞĂƌƚ ?ǁŚŝůĞƐƚŝůůƉƌĞƐĞŶting ideas 
seen in the other 1st century Stoics and closely linked to warfare and violence.  He is not a 
slave to kings, because he has given up the pursuit of kingship, which holds only empty 
honours or elusive wealth.  His heart is inflamed by no unnatural desires, and he is devoted 
to harmless roaming.392  Just as Epictetus explained; greed is the cause of many evils in the 
world, including wars, stasis tyrannies and plots,393 Hippolytus has defeated his own self-
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ? ďǇ ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ? ůŽŐŝĐ ? ŚĞ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶ ǁĂƌƐ, the very 
accusation that the Nurse has levelled at him.394  Thus, it is evident that not only do both 
characters base their arguments on Stoic ideals, but that they have also used Stoic doctrine 
closely related to war and peace in their attempts to convince the other that they are living 
the morally correct lifestyle. 
For Hippolytus it is of prime importance that his actions echo those of the golden age, a 
period when:  
     Qnon vasto aggere 
  crebraque turre cinxerant urbes latus; 
  non arma saeva miles aptabat manu 
  nec torta clausas fregerat saxo gravi 
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  ballista portas,  
  
 ? “ĐŝƚŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ ŶŽƚ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ǁĂůůƐ ? ƐĞƚ with many 
towers, no soldier applied his fierce hand to arms, nor did hurling 
ĞŶŐŝŶĞƐďƵƌƐƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĐůŽƐĞĚŐĂƚĞƐǁŝƚŚŚĞĂǀǇƐƚŽŶĞƐ ? )395  
 
dŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽůĚĞŶĂŐĞŝƐŶŽƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƚŽ,ŝƉƉŽůǇƚƵƐ ?ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚ
he does not become involǀĞĚŝŶǁĂƌ ?ďƵƚ ŝŶƵƌŝƉŝĚĞƐ ?ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚŚŝƐĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ
his wild life (as seen in his opening ode sung with his followers) is based on purity and 
piety, not on any pacifistic elements.396  In Seneca, however, peace and war become the 
most important ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ,ŝƉƉŽůǇƚƵƐ ? ƌĞƉůǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ
increasingly Stoic.  Iƚ ǁĂƐ  “ƵŶŚŽůǇ ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ŐĂŝŶ ƚŚĂƚbroke up [this peaceful life], 
ŚĞĂĚůŽŶŐǁƌĂƚŚĂŶĚůƵƐƚǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƚƐŵĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂƌƚƐĂĨůĂŵĞ ? ?Rupere foedus impius lucri furor 
et ira praeceps, quaeque succensas agit libido mentes.).397  He goes on to say that lust for 
power increased, breeding violence, firstly with naked fists before turning to stones and 
rough clubs for weapons, and that it was rage that furnished arms.  This violence escalated, 
creating wars which in turn produce new crime and strife leading to the unbalancing of 
natural orders.  Brother slays brother, father is slain by son, husband by wife,398 and it is 
this imbalance that has allowed Phaedra to commit her own crime.  Again, war and 
violence have been heavily emphasised despite the lack of direct relevance to the point 
that Hippolytus is making.  He could have made the same claim but focused on purity and 
sexual morality as he did in Euripides, but Seneca has placeĚƚŚĞďůĂŵĞĨŽƌWŚĂĞĚƌĂ ?ƐĐƌŝŵĞ
in a progression of violent not sexual corruptions.  It is this decline of man that allows 
Hippolytus to turn his attention back to Phaedra and the topic of women, and once more 
the central arguments against her and her sex are military not merely moral.  Women have 
ďĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ǁĂƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨĂůů ŽĨ ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?   “ďǇ ŚĞƌĨŽƵů ĂĚƵůƚĞƌŝĞƐ ƐŽ ŵĂŶǇ ĐŝƚŝĞƐ
smoke, so many nations war, so many people lie crushed beneath the ruins of their 
ŬŝŶŐĚŽŵƐ ? ƵƚƚĞƌůǇ ŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁŶ ?  ?huius incestae stupris fumant tot urbes, bella tot gentes 
gerunt et versa ab imo regna tot populos premunt).399  Not only does the most powerful 
argument made against women stem from the anti-war attitudes prevalent in the Stoics, 
but this accusation finds a parallel in ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐŽǁŶDe Matrimonio ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƐĂǇƐ “ĂůůƚŚĞ
bombastic themes of tragedy, the overthrow of households, cities and kingdoms is but 
                                                          
395
 Sen. Pha. 531-535. 
396
 Eur. Hipp. 60 ± 85. 
397
 Sen. Pha. 540-542. 
398
 ibid. 540-557. 
399
 ibid 560-562. 
Andrew Crane  64 
 
ƐƚƌŝĨĞŽǀĞƌǁŝǀĞƐĂŶĚĐŽŶĐƵďŝŶĞƐ ? ?quidquid tragoediae tument, et domos, urbes, regnaque 
subuertit, uxorum pellicum que contentio est).400 
The Thyestes opens with a violent and warlike atmosphere, very similar to that created by 
Hecuba in Troades.  In the Thyestes, the Fury calls for swords to be drawn and for rage and 
passions to be enflamed.  As in the Phaedra, this violence is to be used unnaturally, brother 
against brother, father against son, wife against husband.  Foreign wars are also to be 
ǁĂŐĞĚ “ƐƚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐďůŽŽĚĚƌĞŶĐŚ ?ŝŶŐ ?ĞǀĞƌǇůĂŶĚ ? ?effusus omnes irriget terras cruor).401  The 
ghost of Tantalus, hearing what must be done, begs to return to Hades rather than be a 
part of such a scheme,402 ďƵƚƚŚĞ&ƵƌǇƌĞĨƵƐĞƐƵŶƚŝůŚĞŚĂƐ “ ?ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ? battles with you and a 
lust for the sword that is evil for kings ?  ?inferque tecum proelia et ferri malum regibus 
amorem)403.  This again contains parallels with the work of the first century Stoics.  For 
example, Dio knew that although the king was the only man with whom the power of war 
and peace could rest, this was not so the King could lust for war, but merely to be prepared 
for war, because it made for an increased chance of peace404   
In the Thyestes, as in the Troades and Phaedra, it is a debate scene that allows Seneca to 
explore the Stoic attitude to war, peace and violence.  As with Phaedra, the debate is 
between a master and a servant, although here it is an attendant rather than a nurse.  The 
scene begins with Atreus desperate for war.  He cannot believe that the whole world is not 
already at arms in order to carry out his revenge.405  Atreus, then, is the very antithesis of 
what the Stoics believed a ruler should be.  The Stoics would argue that Atreus has not 
been harmed in any real sense by the actions of his brother, but is now harming himself 
with his own passion for hatred.  Rather than trying to help his enemy, as Musonius Rufus 
advocates,406 he is desperate for revenge  W another cause of violence that these Stoics 
rejected.407  dŚĞ ĂƚƚĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ĨŝůůĞĚ ǁŝƚŚallusions to Stoic attitudes to 
warfare and violence.  He says that a true king will win hearts and not merely be feared.  If 
the king chooses the right course so will his subjects, and that with no shame, no care for 
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right, no honour, no virtue and no faith then sovereignty is insecure.408  After expressing 
this Stoic view, the attendant also calls for Atreus to refrain from his lust for violence, for 
 “ƚŚŝƐis a greater evil than ĂŶŐĞƌ ? ?Maius hoc ira est malum),409 but Atreus will not restrain 
his intentions even calling his own plans  “ǁĂƌs ŽĨŚĂƚƌĞĚ ? ?bella odia).410 
Thyestes, in stark contrast to his brother, has learnt as much from his years in exile as 
Agamemnon did from his years at war in the Troades.  He has learned to love the simple 
ůŝĨĞ ?ŚĞŬŶŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ “ƉŽŝƐŽŶŝƐĚƌƵŶŬĨƌŽŵŐŽůĚ ? ?venenum in auro bibitur),411 he has no need 
for weapons and his estate may be small but has a profound peace.412  He tells his son that 
the height of power is nothing if you do not desire power413, this is the same boast made by 
Hippolytus in the Phaedra when he proudly proclaims that he has given up the race for 
kingships.414  Thyestes, then, will not make the same mistake of judgement that Epictetus 
says Polyneices and Eteocles made, when they judged Kingship to be greater than exile.  
This misjudgement caused them to lose control of their moral purpose and as a result begin 
a brutal war, and as we have seen this war would be even more hated because it involved 
the unnatural element of fratricide.415  dŚǇĞƐƚĞƐ ?ƵŶůŝŬĞKĞĚŝƉƵƐ ?ƐŽŶƐ ?ŚĂƐŶŽƚŵŝƐũƵĚŐĞĚ
exile as an evil.  Rather, he understands a deeper peace, a peace not found in gold and 
arms.  It seems that the Attendant must have some understanding of the character of 
Thyestes, as he had suggested earlier that Thyestes will only be persuaded if he can be 
ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ “ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?fidem pacis).416  Even once peace has persuaded 
Thyestes to share the throne, he accepts only the title and specifically rejects laws and 
arms (sed iura et arma servient mecum tibi).417 
The choral ode at lines 546-622 also shares many of the Stoic attitudes to war and violence.  
Love and friendship are said to be the strongest powers ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞ P  “EŽ ĨŽƌĐĞ ŝƐ
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ QƚŚŽƐĞ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ŚĞůĚ ? ƚƌƵĞ ůŽǀĞ ŚŽůĚƐ ?  ?ŶƵůůĂ ǀŝƐ ŵĂŝŽƌ ?ƋƵŽƐ ĂŵŽƌ verus tenuit, 
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tenebit) as the Nurse in Phaedra and Dio Chrysostom agree.418  The Chorus explain at 552-9 
that even once friendship has been cast aside by the mad god of war, Love can stop 
violence at the very point that two battle-lines meet.  Even if these men want war, love will 
clasp their hands in peace.419  They also recall the uselessness of weapons during peace 
time, symbolised by the sword that has rusted and the battlements that are in a state of 
disrepair.420  The chorus ends by reminding the audience that a king does not have true 
power, but is subject to a weightier power, recalling Thyestes ? advice to his son. 
FinalůǇ ?ǁŚĞŶdŚǇĞƐƚĞƐ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂƌĞŬŝůůĞĚ ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ^ĞŶĞĐĂƌĞĐĂůůƐƚŚĞĐǇĐůĞ
of violence in the history of the house of Atreus by the presence of the Myrtoan Chariot.  
But the image of war is also present in equal measure, for the grove is full of the trophies 
taken from barbarians421 ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞůŝƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŚĂƌŝŽƚĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ƌĂĐĞ ?ƐĞǀĞƌǇ
ĐƌŝŵĞ ?  ?omne gentis facinus).422  The chorus, then, see wars against barbarians as 
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŝůǇ ?ƐƉĂƐƚ ?ƚƚhis point Atreus believes 
ƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂƐĨŽƵŶĚŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐŝŶŚŝƐĐƌŝŵĞ ?ďƵƚĂƐ^ĞŶĞĐĂƚŽůĚEĞƌŽ “ƚƌƵĞŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚƐ
ŝŶ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ƐĂĨĞƚǇ ƚŽ ŵĂŶǇ QŶŽƚ  ?ŝŶ ? ƚƌŽƉŚŝĞƐ ƚŽƌŶ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ǀĂŶƋƵŝƐŚĞĚ ĞŶĞŵǇ ? ŶŽƌ ĐŚĂƌŝŽƚƐ
stained with barbarian blood, nor spoils acquired in ǁĂƌ ?  ?Felicitas illa multis salutem 
ĚĂƌĞ ?ŶŽŶŚŽƐƚŝůŝĂĂƌŵĂĚĞƚƌĂĐƚĂǀŝĐƚŝƐ ?ŶŽŶĐƵƌƌƵƐďĂƌďĂƌƵŵƐĂŶŐƵŝŶĞĐƌƵĞŶƚŝ ?ŶŽŶƉĂƌƚĂ
bello spolia),423 ĂŶĚĂƐ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞŬŶĞǁ ?ƚŚĞŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚƌĞƵƐǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƐƐƵƌĞĚďǇ
these crimes but rather, they merely perpetuated the curse on his household and 
foreshadowed his own death at the hands of Aegisthus. 
It is apparent that the pacifistic arguments found in the other Stoics in the Imperial period 
are also found in the philosophy of Seneca. He rejects not only individual, but also 
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institutional violence, and further dismisses the more aggressive causes for war. The 
traditional Roman virtue of gloria is not worthy of a war of aggression and his metaphysical 
beliefs led him to conclude with his contemporaries that the corrupting forces of war 
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĞ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂůconcordia.  Unlike the other Stoics, however, he is not 
consistent in this stance. While he can be dismissive of gloria he also extols its benefits for 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚůŝŶĞĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŽƉĞŶůǇƉƌĂŝƐĞƐ Cato for his involvement in the civil wars.  
Equally, the tragedies of Seneca show many of the same themes present in Stoic 
philosophy, with many characters using pacifistic arguments  W even if the discussion is not 
directly related to ideas of war and peĂĐĞ ?  WĞƌŚĂƉƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ
attitude to war and peace that caused him to incorporate the majority of references to this 
theme into the scenes of debate, working through the ideas in his tragedies that he found 
difficult to resolve in his philosophy due to the conflicting nature of contemporary Stoic 
doctrine and traditional aristocratic Roman virtues.        
Therefore, it is apparent that all of the pacifistic arguments found in the other Stoics in the 
Imperial period are also found in the philosophy of Seneca: he rejects not only individual 
but also institutional violence; he dismisses the more aggressive causes for war, even on 
occasion the traditional Roman virtue of gloria; soldiers are often described in hostile tones 
and his metaphysical beliefs led him to conclude with his contemporaries that the 
corrupting forces of war threaten the universes natural concordia.  Unlike the other Stoics, 
he is not so consistent with this stance; he can be dismissive of gloria, but, he can also extol 
ŝƚƐďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĨŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƐĨĂŵŝůǇĂŶĚůŝŶĞĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŽƉĞŶůǇƉƌĂŝƐĞƐĂƚŽfor his involvement in 
the civil wars.  Equally the tragedies of Seneca also show many of the same themes as Stoic 
philosophy, with many characters using pacifistic elements to convince others, even if the 
discussion is not directly related to ideas of war and peace and some characters are also 
described in terms of the Stoic anti-ǁĂƌĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐŝƚŝƐ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐŽǁŶĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ
attitude to war and peace that caused him to incorporate the majority of reference to this 
theme into the scenes of debate, working through the ideas in his tragedies that he that he 
finds difficult to resolve in his philosophy due  to the conflicting nature of contemporary 
Stoic doctrine and traditional aristocratic Roman virtues.        
 
 




The ethics of the Stoics are often traced back to the Cynics, through the founder of the 
school Zeno.  Zeno is traditionally said to have been a pupil of Crates, who was the most 
famous follower of Diogenes of Sinope, and after Diogenes became the most prominent 
Cynic of his day.  As such, at this time it will be useful to explore the beliefs of the Cynics 
next.  This is because the shared heritage of the Schools ? ethics means that a comparable 
attitude towards war and peace may be expected. 
dŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŝŶĚĞĚƵĐŝŶŐǁŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƚƌƵůǇ  ‘ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚ ?ďǇĂŶǇĂŶĐŝĞŶƚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂƌĞ
found more in Cynics than in many other of the classical schools: in part because there was 
no rĞĂů  ‘ƐĐŚŽŽů ? ƚŽ ƐƉĞĂŬ Žf (compared to the formally structured Academy or even the 
loosely structured Stoa for example).424  ǇŶŝĐŝƐŵ ?ƐǀĞƌǇŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƐĂƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ, described 
ďǇ dƌĂƉƉ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ďĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ Ă  “ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ŝŶ-society-but-not-of-it-ŶĞƐƐ ?425, meant that the 
core values were more those of moral strength than larger ethical debates.  Furthermore, 
very few self-penned Cynic sources survive and many of those sources that do survive from 
the Roman period are written either with the intention of using one of the founders, such 
as Diogenes of Sinope, ĂƐĂŵŽƌĂůĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽƌ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨĚĂŵŶŝŶŐ  ‘ƐƚƌĞĞƚ ĐŽƌŶĞƌ
ǇŶŝĐ ?ĞŶŵĂƐƐĞŽƌƉŽƌƚƌĂǇŝŶŐŽŶĞ ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƐ  “a charlatan or ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƐƚ ?.426  Many 
scholars have manoeuvred around these problems by using the better recorded Stoics as 
examples of Cynic ethics.  For example, Dudley uses the Cynicising-Stoic Dio Chrysostom427 
or Branham and Goulet-ĂǌĠ ?Ɛ ĞǀĞŶ ŵŽƌĞ ŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐ ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŽ, as well as his 
predecessor Musonius Rufus and the satirist Meleager.428  This inclusion of Stoic material to 
answer Cynic questions is undoubtedly dangerous if handled imprecisely.  However if the 
Stoic sources with the most clear Cynic influence (for example those which describe the 
ideal Cynic or use Diogenes as the protagonist) are focused on and if they show a similar 
doctrine to the fragmentary evidence of the earlier Cynics, then this does seem to be the 
most efficient way to plug the gap in our knowledge of Cynic philosophy. 
This methodological tendency, coupled with the fact that early Stoic ethics were heavily 
influenced by the Cynics, means that a great similarity may be expected between the Cynic 
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and Stoic attitudes to war and peace.  The rejection of individual violence and vengeance is 
certainly present in the many Cynic sources.429  /Ŷ >ƵĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ůŝĨĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǇŶŝĐ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ
Demonax, he is struck on the head with a rock for wearing the clothes of an athlete.  When 
the massed crowds urge him to seek redress by legal measures he replies, with the typically 
dry wit of the Cynic, by proclaiming that he would rather visit a doctor.430  Demonax is also 
said to have never become angry when faced with incorrect behaviour of any kind: he 
 “ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞƐŝŶ ?ďƵƚĨŽƌŐĂǀĞƚŚĞƐŝŶŶĞƌ ? ?431  /ŶƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ?ƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐŽŶƚŚĞgood Cynic he 
ƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚŝůĞŚĞŝƐďĞŝŶŐĨůŽŐŐĞĚŚĞŵƵƐƚůŽǀĞƚŚĞŵĞŶǁŚŽĨůŽŐŚŝŵ ?ĂƐƚŚŽƵŐŚŚĞǁĞƌĞ
the fathĞƌŽƌƚŚĞďƌŽƚŚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵĂůů ?.432  These two descriptions of imperial Cynics profess 
to an attitude of non-retaliation, and there are precedents in the earlier Cynics and their 
forbears also.  The two most important influences on Cynic ethics were Socrates and 
Antisthenes, both of whom are reported by Diogenes Laertius to have held the same 
attitude to physical attacks.  Socrates is said to have beĞŶƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇĂďƵƐĞĚĂŶĚďĞĂƚĞŶ “ǇĞƚ
bore all this ill-ƵƐĂŐĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚůǇ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŶŽƚ ƚĂŬĞ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů Žƌ ůĞŐĂů ƌĞǀĞŶŐĞ.433  
WŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚŝĨŚĞĨŽƵŶĚ “ƐŽ-and-ƐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨĨĞŶƐŝǀĞ ?ŚĞƌĞƉůŝĞĚ “EŽ ?ĨŽƌit takes two to make 
ĂƋƵĂƌƌĞů ?.434  Antisthenes, too, advised his followers to endure being slandered and pelted 
with stones.435  However, the evidence for the first Cynic is slightly more complicated.  On 
several occasions Diogenes of Sinope shows the same temperance and forgiveness as 
>ƵĐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ ĞŵŽŶĂǆ ĂŶĚ ƉŝĐƚĞƚƵƐ ? ideal Cynic.  For example, when he is punched in the 
street he merely jokes that he was foolish to have forgotten his helmet.436  On another 
occasion he refuses to retort in kind but prefers to shame his attackers by hanging a tablet 
round his neck naming his attackers.437  On a third occasion however, when he was 
ĂƚƚĂĐŬĞĚĂŶĚƚŽůĚ “ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞ ? ? ? ?ĚƌĂĐŚŵĂƐƚŽǇŽƵƌĐƌĞĚŝƚ ?, he returned with boxing gloves 
ĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌďĞĂƚŝŶŐDĞŝĚĂƐƐĂŝĚ “ƚŚĞƌe ĂƌĞ ? ? ? ?ďůŽǁƐƚŽǇŽƵƌĐƌĞĚŝƚ ?.438 
Nevertheless, when Dio Chrysostom described Diogenes in his ninth discourse, he says that 
ŚĞ ǁĂƐ ůŝŬĞ Ă ŬŝŶŐ ĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă ďĞŐŐĂƌ ǁŚŽ ? ůŝŬĞ KĚǇƐƐĞƵƐ ĚŝƐŐƵŝƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞŶĂ ?  “ŵŽǀĞĚ
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ĂŵŽŶŐŚŝƐƐůĂǀĞƐĂŶĚŵĞŶŝĂůƐǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇĐĂƌŽƵƐĞĚŝŶŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨŚŝƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?.439  However 
whereas Odysseus took bloody revenge, Diogenes is said to have borne his abuse with 
patience440, so regardless of the true nature of Diogenes ? attitude to violent revenge, by the 
first century AD he was described in the same way as the passive Demonax and 
Antisthenes. 
This insistence on non-retaliation is present at the social level as well as the personal.441  A 
fragment of the poetry of Crates shows an idealised state that has managed to rid itself of 
warfare:  
There is a city Pera in the midst of wine dark vapour, 
 Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owning nought, 
 Into which sails nor fool nor parasite 
 Nor glutton, slave or sensual appetites, 
 But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves, 
 &ŽƌǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƐĂŬĞŵĞŶĨŝŐŚƚŶŽƚǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? 
 Nor stand to arms for money or for fame.442 
 
From this it is evident that in Pera, where there are no wars and no greed there are also no 
fools and no parasites, thus Crates not only sees greed for material possessions as causes of 
wars but also equates warfare with fools and those enslaved to their appetites.  Diogenes 
>ĂĞƌƚŝƵƐĂůƐŽĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŽƌĂƚĞƐ P “ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐƚƵĚǇƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŽƚŚĞ
point of seeing generals as nothing but donkey-ĚƌŝǀĞƌƐ ?.443  This demonstrates that, like the 
Stoics, the Cynics where negative in their presentation of both contemporary soldiers and 
generals.  This attitude towards warfare is also seen in the pseudo-Lucian The Cynic in 
which the unnamed Cynic tries to persuade Lucian that luxurious possessions are immoral 
because they are the cause of wars and violence.  The CǇŶŝĐĂƐŬƐ>ƵĐŝĂŶ “ŚŽǁŵƵĐŚƚŚĞǇ
[luxuries] cost in trouble, in toil, in danger, or rather in blood, death and destruction for 
ŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?. The wars created by the desire for luxuries are said to the causes of an 
unbalancing of the natural order in the same way that the Stoics claimed, as they set 
 “ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĨĂƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŝǀĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵƐďĂŶĚƐ ?.444  For this 
reason the Cynic wishes that he can remain free from the desires that cause these ills and 
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ƚŚƵƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵ “ĐŝǀŝĐƐƚƌŝĨĞ ?ǁĂƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐŝĞƐĂŶĚŵƵƌĚĞƌ ?.445  Finally, there is some 
evidence that Diogenes could also have rejected warfare in the same way as Crates and the 
unnamed philosopher in The Cynic; ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽŝŽŐĞŶĞƐ ?Republic in 
ƚŚĞ ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŝĐƵƌĞĂŶ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ WŚŝůŽĚĞŵƵƐ ŽĨ 'ĂĚĂƌĂ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬOn the Stoics.  
Philodemus states that Diogenes taught the uselessness of weapons, but he has only 
gained this knowledge second-hand through the works of the Stoic Chrysippus.446  As a 
third-hand fragment of Cynic thought filtered first through a Stoic and then through an 
Epicurean, this detail is far from definite, especially considering that the very existence of 
ŝŽŐĞŶĞƐ ?Republic has at times been doubted.447  Nevertheless, again we have a tale 
preserved in Dio Chrysostom, which shows that whatever the attitudes of Diogenes at the 
time, by the first century he was assumed to have held a pacifistic belief.  In the fourth 
discourse on kingship Dio includes the tale of the meeting of Diogenes and Alexander the 
Great.  In this version Diogenes tells Alexander that he cannot be a true king, since a king 
has no fear and as such no need for weapons, just as the king448 bee has no sting because 
he is safe in his position within the hive.449  Indeed, Moles has suggested that the main 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵƌƚŚ ŬŝŶŐƐŚŝƉ ŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝŽ ŚƌǇƐŽƐƚŽŵ ŝƐ ƚŽ  “ĐƵƌď dƌĂũĂŶ ?Ɛ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶ ?.450  Even Onesicritus, a Cynic who joined the army of Alexander as a steersman 
and was active in military service, is said to have lauded the people of Musicanus in India, 
because they regarded ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ QĂƐǁŝĐŬĞĚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞůŝŬĞ ? ?451  Therefore, just as Dio Chrysostom is said to have written a discourse lauding 
the pacifistic Essenes, Onesicritus is reported to have done something similar with the 
country of the Musicanians despite his own involvement in the military sphere. 
The Cynics therefore, can be shown to have held many of the same beliefs as the Stoics in 
rejecting wars and extolling the virtues of peace.  Like Dio Chrysostom, Onesicritus is said to 
have written a work praising a pacifistic society; Crates, as well as writing poetry that 
commended a pacifistic society was disapproving of those who saw benefits in a life in the 
military:  Many of the Cynics are presented as suffering personal violence rather than 
taking retribution; and Diogenes of Sinope could even be used as a foil to the all-
conquering Alexander, and advise that he give up his armies.  As the Epicureans are the 
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third of the three groups that have previously been credited with pacifistic beliefs they will 
be considered next, then the schools that have been described in this way are also 




In his 1963 survey of Peace and War in the Ancient World John Ferguson proclaimed that 
the Epicureans were foremost among the groups of the ancient world that renounced war 
and compared their ethics to the anti-war beliefs of the Society of Friends.452  Nussbaum 
more recently has seen De Rerum Natura as a rejection of violence at all levels from within 
the soul to between individuals and also in society at large.453  From the prologue this 
seems to be the case: rather than evoking the muses at the opening of his philosophical 
epic Lucretius appeals to Venus.  SŚĞ ŝƐ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŽ ƐƚƌŝŬĞ Ăůů ĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ  “alluring ůŽǀĞ ? 
(blandum amorem), and it is this love alone that can bless man with peace for Venus can 
ĞǀĞŶŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞDĂƌƐǁŝƚŚǁŽƵŶĚƐŽĨ ůŽǀĞ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌZŽŵĞĂ  “ƋƵŝĞƚƉĞĂĐĞ ? (tranquilla 
pace) ?ƵƚƚŚŝƐƉĞĂĐĞŝƐĂůƐŽŵŽƌĞƐĞůĨŝƐŚůǇĨŽƌ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ŽǁŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĨŽƌŚĞcannot fully 
continue his work while there is still civil war.454  As De Rerum Natura continues, various 
parallels can be found with the Stoic and Cynic anti-war statements. 
One of these parallels is present in the invocation of Venus in the opening of book 1.  Like 
Dio455, Lucretius describes the heavens as peaceful.456  This belief in peaceful gods re-
appears twice more in book 2.  Firstly, a parade for Cybele, performed with the intention of 
showing that they are ready to protect their homeland is dismissed as unfounded.  
>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐ “removed froŵƚƌƵĞƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? (a vera ratione repulsa)457; as it is 
the nature of the gods to live a deeply peaceful life detached from the troubles of men.  
Then, when Lucretius appeals to the gods towards the close of the second book, he does so 
with these words:  “For I appeal to the holy hearts of the gods, which in tranquil peace pass 
untroubled days and a life serene ? (nam pro sancta deum tranquilla pectora pace quae 
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placidum degunt aevom vitamque serenam).458  This image appears again in books 3 and 6; 
in book 3, the gods can pass their time with untroubled peace because they are supplied 
with all their needs by nature.459  The passage in book 6 is perhaps the most important 
because, as well as again describing the gods as living  “ƋƵŝĞƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂĐŝĚƉĞĂĐĞ ? (placida 
cum pace quietos)460, it also explains that if man does not understand that the gods are at 
peace and will not inflict mortal lives with vengeance then man himself can never be at 
peace, not because the gods will not allow them, but because if you cannot imagine the 
gods at peace then you can never attain peace yourself.  Paranoia will grip those that 
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐŽĚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŝůů ŶŽƚ ďĞ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ  “ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂŶƋƵŝů ƉĞĂĐĞ ŽĨ ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? (suscipere haec animi tranquilla pace valebis) which is attained 
through the understanding of what divine shapes are.461  The reasons that the gods are 
able to live in this state of peace can be seen in both Lucretius and earlier Epicurean 
doctrine.  The first of the Principal Doctrines ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ?  “ ďůessed and indestructible 
being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being; so he is free from 
ĂŶŐĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ĨŽƌ Ăůů ƐƵĐŚ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ŝŵƉůǇ ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐ ?.462  This idea is repeated in the 
Letter to Herodotus, ǁŚĞŶƉŝĐƵƌƵƐƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “Ŷothing suggestive of conflict or disquiet is 
compatible with aŶ ŝŵŵŽƌƚĂůĂŶĚďůĞƐƐĞĚŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?.463  The Epicurean god was a complete 
and self-sufficient being, and so could not be affected by any events in our (or their own) 
world; rage, anger and aggression are not conceivable behaviours for such a divine and 
superior being.464  Lucretius certainly agreed with this interpretation of the gods.  He says in 
book 1 that: 
  omnis enim per se divum natura necessest  
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur  
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;  
nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,  
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,  
nec bene promeritis capitur nec tangitur ira. 
 
 (Every one of the gods, by the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy 
immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separate from our 
troubles; for without pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources, 
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needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by 
wrath.)465   
 
Lucretius also states that the gods do not affect nature and are not affected by it.466  If we 
cannot understand this, then we do more damage to ourselves in our attempts to 
conceptualise the gods than if we knew their true state of tranquillity and indifference 
towards humanity.467  Therefore, although the Epicureans have reached the same 
conclusion as Dio Chrysostom about the nature of divinity, they have done so through their 
own doctrine and have not merely appropriated the tranquil gods from the Stoics (or 
indeed the Stoics from the Epicureans). 
However, although these passages invoke the same positive attitude to peace as the initial 
invocation of Venus, in which she is able to directly intervene in human affairs by defeating 
Mars with tŚĞ “ĞǀĞƌ-ůŝǀŝŶŐǁŽƵŶĚŽĨůŽǀĞ ? (aeterno vulnere amoris)468, they also contradict 
the Epicurean image of self-sufficient gods unmoved by mortal misery.  As the image of 
gods unmoved by war or troubles of any kind shows a more conventional Epicurean 
representation of the gods as a neutral presence, unaffected by human forces and not 
willing to influence the lives of man, then it is likely that Lucretius wanted his readers to 
believe the philosophical not mythological presentation of the gods.  This being the case, 
why has Lucretius decided to open his philosophical epic with such conflicting and 
conventionally mythological depictions?  Throughout the De Rerum Natura Lucretius makes 
ŝƚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁŝƐŚĞƐƚŚĞǁŽƌŬƚŽďĞƌĞĂĚ  “ĂƐĂŶĞƉŝĐ ŝŶƚŚĞ tradition of Homer and 
ŶŶŝƵƐ ?.469  In the first book Lucretius tells us that Ennius credited Homer with unfolding 
 “ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? (rerum naturam expandere)470, this is the very task which Lucretius 
has set himself, and as such he could not do much more to affirm his place in the epic 
tradition.  However, at the opening of book 6 there is a second invocation, this time not for 
Venus but for Calliope, the standard muse of heroic poetry.471  It is within these appeals to 
epic tradition that we find the answer to our question since; as well as continuing the epic 
tradition, Lucretius also subverts it.472  We are told that this will be the epic of Epicurus, 
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that the philosopher, not the warrior, will take centre stage473, and Lucretius invites the 
reader to join him following Epicurus, waging a war on false religion and foolishness rather 
than a foreign or mythical enemy.474  As Gale states, by replacing the hero with the 
philosopher, >ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ  “ĚĞǀĂůƵĞƐ ŝƚƐƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐƵďũĞĐƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?ǁĂƌ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚƐƚŝůů ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝŶŐ
the genre as the highest literary form.475  This is precisely what we see in the invocation of 
Venus.  Whilst the standard language and form of the appeal to a Muse are present, leaving 
the reader in no doubt that what will follow will be epic, the use of Venus instead of the 
Muses, as well as the sharp focus on peace rather than war, invert the values of epic 
tradition whilst still staying within its boundaries.  As such, the use of an active rather than 
passive Venus and Mars are purely poetic not philosophical and, once the true nature of 
the gods has been established, it becomes hard to view these two gods as anything more 
than metaphors for war and aggression, and love and peace. 
Also, like the Stoics, Lucretius rejects the idea of wars for material gain.  Lucretius says that 
men waste their lives in war for purple and gold, but even before the era of such riches 
wars were fought for what little possessions they did have, all this is done in vain, and from 
the misunderstanding of what true pleasure is.  It is the inability to judge when we have 
enough that breeds discontent and war.476  He also declares wars ineffective at banishing 
superstitions, fears and anxieties which only reason can defeat, so war cannot benefit our 
minds or bodies any more than riches can.477  Again, the same conclusion has been reached 
as the Stoics; nonetheless, once more Lucretius finds cause for this belief in Epicurean 
doctrine, the fifteenth principal ĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞƚĞůůƐƵƐ “ƚŚĞǁĞĂůƚŚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚďǇŶĂƚƵƌĞŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ
and is easy to procure; but the wealth required by vaŝŶ ŝĚĞĂůƐ ĞǆƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĨŝŶŝƚǇ ?.478  
Lucretius builds on this by saying that if men attribute false irrational qualities to wealth, 
poverty feels like a state close to death; in turn wealth is then wrongly thought to be close 
to the self-sufficient security of the gods.479  This can be seen in the myth of the 
development of man in book 5, based on the theory of ages in Hesiod.480  Early man is 
described as hardier  “with bones larger and more solid, fitted with strong sinews 
throughout the ĨůĞƐŚ ? (solidis magis ossibus intus fundatum, validis aptum per viscera 
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nervis).481  They are compared with beasts and though their harsh life must involve violence 
for preservation, there is no sign of rage and Lucretius has already said that when 
situations are limited then some primitive aggression can be an excusable response.482  
However, once families and societies form, neighbours agree not to attack each other, and 
a thought is always given to the weak as they should be protected.  Man was only able to 
survive because it kept to these agreements483 ĂŶĚĂƐ ƐƵĐŚŵĂŶ ?ƐƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůǁĂƐƌĞůŝĂŶƚŽŶ
the ability to inhibit aggression.484  However, these new societal bonds caused far more ills 
than they solved as they created the conditions and provided the structures that would 
eventually lead to more structured violence and the desire for unnecessary wealth.485  So 
the new society based on noticeably human rather than animal qualities introduces 
friendship and agreement that are so crucial for humanity, but at the same time it also 
sows the seed of discordia to come.  
>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨŵĂŶƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶŝŶŝƚƐŵŽƐƚƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŝŶŝƚƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚĐŝǀŝůŝǌĞĚ
state violence and aggression are an ever present threat, albeit in very different forms.  
However, there is hope for a more profound peace, one that can exist in the developed 
society created by friendship; ƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞŽĨƉŝĐƵƌĞĂŶƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ƉŝĐƵƌƵƐ ?ǀŝĐƚŽƌŝes 
are those of words not arms486 and it is these victories and Epicurus who can provide a life 
that is not fearful to man and not rife with aggression.487  Epicurus is described as bettering 
the heroic deeds of Hercules; the mythical monsters that Hercules destroyed would be of 
ůŝƚƚůĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ >ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ? ƚŝŵĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽn from armour 
and civilisation.488  The monsters that Epicurus teaches man to defeat are the monsters of 
greed and rage that are the true cause of man ?ƐƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ.489  Without the monsters now 
killed by Hercules, there are still troubles for men, still irrationality and fear, but without 
the false perceptions defeated by Epicurus, man can live in peace and tranquillity even if 
monsters are round every corner.  So it seems for Lucretius societal bonds are crucial if 
man is to enjoy philosophy, which in turn is crucial to enjoy the new societal bonds free 
from paranoia and anxiety. 
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Epicurus, ƚŚĞŶ ?ĂĐƚƐĂƐƚŚĞ,ĞƌĐƵůĞĂŶŚĞƌŽŽĨ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ĞƉŝĐ ?ďƵƚŵŽƌĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐƚŝůůŝŶƚŚĞ
presentation of Epicurus is the role he plays in historical rather than mythological epic.  This 
is most clearly present in the triumphal scene where he is the Roman general parading his 
spoils.490  Nussbaum observes that the image of victory illustrates the victory of the 
peaceful arts over the arts of war, a victory that is vital for Memmius and Rome if either are 
to enjoy their own victory.491  This is further emphasised by the repeated reduction of the 
Roman values of conquest and gloria.492  In the proems of books 2 and 3 we are told that 
the lust for military power and gloria are erroneous attempts to escape the fear of death, 
just as the aggressive accumulation of wealth was.493  The clearest example of this is found 
ŝŶ >ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŵĂŶ ǁŚĞŶ ŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ  “it is indeed much better to obey in 
peace than to desire to hold power over affairs and to rule ŬŝŶŐĚŽŵƐ ? ?ut satius multo iam 
sit parere quietum quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere)494, and the Punic Wars 
are treated as an irrelevance not a source of pride.495  ƐEƵƐƐďĂƵŵŶŽƚĞƐ “ƚŚĞƚƌŝƵŵƉŚŽĨ
philosophy...is a triumph not through political action ? ? ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚŝŶĞĂĐŚŚƵŵĂŶƐŽƵů ?496 and 
as Lucretius has told us this is a triumph of words not arms.497   
So it seems that as Nussbaum, Segal and Gale state the De Rerum Natura is a poem that 
universally condemns war, violence and aggression and offers an escape from such a life 
through the rejection of traditional Roman values and an acceptance of Epicurus and the 
victory of words not arms.  However, there are two ways in which this attitude is called into 
question.  The first is the use of war imagery in the description of atoms and is tackled by 
Gale, although not by Segal, as it is not directly relevant to 5.1308-49, which is the focus of 
his attention, nor by Nussbaum, perhaps because her main area of interest is aggression 
and the wars of the atoms are not seen as aggressive or hateful.  Gale notes that the use of 
this militaristic language to explain cosmological phenomena is not found in earlier 
Epicurean works and is much more similar to the Presocratic Empedocles.498  However, 
unlike Empedocles, the war between the atoms is seen as a creative as well as disruptive 
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force, and these forces cannot exist separately.499  This then means that the imagery of 
warfare used to describe the atoms in De Rerum Natura is not as wholly negative as that 
found within Empedocles, and although it is more neutral than it is positive, the use of the 
war image is perhaps more likely reliant on the poem ?s place in the epic than the 
philosophical tradition.  Lucretius may have borrowed this use of language from 
Empedocles because it would fit the genre rather than the doctrine.  This indifference 
ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ǁĂƌ ĐĂŶ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ŝŶ >ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ? ƵƐĞ of  ‘ĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ?  ?eventa).  He says that 
 “ƐĞƌǀŝƚƵĚĞ ?poverty, riches, freedom, war and concord ? (servitium paupertas divitiaeque, 
libertas bellum concordia)500 are eventa as they do not affect the essence of things, 
whereas weight, heat and fluidity are properties and cannot be removed without 
destroying matter.  Eventa cannot exist without matter but matter can exist without any 
eventa.  The Trojan War was an accident of the atoms that make up that tract of land, even 
the most pitiless of wars cannot exist independently without matter but matter can exist 
independently without wars.501  As an accident such as a bloody and brutal war leaves the 
essential balance of the world unchanged, the matter that allowed the war to exist is still 
intact, matter continues to exist and nature is left unchanged and unaffected.  So rather 
than presenting a natural image of war, this in fact merely shows an indifference towards 
it.  Even the Trojan War has had no effect on nature, so this does not show that war is an 
acceptable pastime but rather that it has no value and no impact on nature, and if an 
individual has followed the way of Epicurus he will not be affected by the battles any more 
than the atoms in the swords. 
The second passage of the De Rerum Natura ǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽǀĞƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌ&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ
ŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?ŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉŝĐƵƌĞĂŶƐŝƐ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ “ŐƌĞĂƚĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐŽĨ
warfare arrayed over the plains, with ŶŽ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ǇŽƵƌƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝů ? (suave etiam belli 
certamina magna tueri per campos instructa tua sine parte pericli).502  This causes more 
trouble than the use of war imagery for atoms, as this seems to be a joyful rather than 
indifferent aspect of war for Lucretius.  There are two possible explanations for this, both 
found in Epicurean doctrine.  Firstly, the pleasure of observing a war from a distance could 
come from the knowledge that the Epicurean himself is free from pain. This is an important 
part of Epicurean doctrine, and the explanations of the reasons why pain should be avoided 
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are the subject of eight of the principal doctrines of Epicurus.503  However if the avoidance 
ŽĨƉĂŝŶǁĂƐĂůŽŶĞƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞĂƚŽďƐĞƌǀing the battle then this would 
mean he has misunderstood this key part of Epicurean doctrine, as Epicurus tells us that 
bodily pleasure does not increase because pain has been removed but because fear of 
these pains has been rejected.504  So it is more likelǇƚŚĂƚ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵ
knowing he is not afraid of (and therefore not affected by) the wars of other men.  Later in 
the same book he compares watching the movements of armies to watching the grazing of 
ƐŚĞĞƉ ?ĂƐ'ĂůĞƐĂǇƐ  “ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚe military manoeuvres is no more troubling to the 
detached philosophical observer than the attractive pastoral images in the first part of the 
analogy ?.505  The true follower of Epicurus is just as the self-sufficient gods; they do not 
affect nature and are unaffected by it.  They are merely happy in their own community 
based on friendship and agreement, shrouded in peace.  This is a point Lucretius specifically 
makes himself immediately preceding the description of the armies on the plain.  He notes 
that the joy of watching a ship in a storm is derived from knowing that you are not 
affected.506 
Lucius Torquatus in Cicero 
 
The De Finibus of Cicero is a brief explanation and defence of the ethics of the Epicureans 
delivered by Lucius Torquatus, and although even here there is not as much time spent on 
war and peace as in Lucretius, it also shows a longing for peace similar to that of the 
opening invocation of De Rerum Natura.  Wisdom is contrasted with desire, coupled with 
the misunderstanding of good and evil, as the main cause of misery to man.  Desires cannot 
ďĞ ƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ůĞĂĚ ŵĞŶ ŝŶƚŽ  “ŚĂƚƌĞĚ ? ƋƵĂƌƌĞůůŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌŝĨĞ ? ŽĨ ƐĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŽĨ ǁĂƌ ?
(odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella) whereas wisdom can banish fear and allow man 
to live in peace free from desires507 and also shows the way to moderation, which again 
leads to peace and calmness.508  Just as Lucretius and the Stoics rejected wars for the 
purpose of material gain so does De Finibus.  Possessions lead to a greed for further 
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possessions; this lust for possessions is seen as an evil in itself, so any attempt to pander to 
greed be it war or theft would be seen as a further evil.  But generosity creates true 
affection and goodwill and thus is the true route to peace, moreover any natural desire can 
be satisfied without wronging another individual.509  As such true peace is not attained 
through wars or greed but by generosity and compromise.  The most absolute refutation of 
discord is that neither civil strife, household arguments nor even disputes within the mind 
can exist and still allow for a life of peace.510  It is not only war that is here seemingly 
rejected by the Epicureans but also private violence.  Finally it is concluded that with these 
ƌƵůĞƐĨŽƌůŝĨĞƉŝĐƵƌƵƐŚĂƐ “ŐƵŝĚĞĚĂůůƐĂŶĞ-minded men to peace and happiness, calmness 
ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉŽƐĞ ? (omnes bene sanos in viam placatae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae 
deduceret).511  Therefore the teachings of Epicurus inherently contain the path to peace, 
through the avoidance of disputes and physical pain and the understanding of wisdom. 
Epicureanism in Horace 
 
As a philosophically eclectic author, who also worked in many different styles, it is not 
surprising that the attitudes of Horace towards war are more confused than those of the 
men that belonged to just one of the philosophical schools.  The Odes and Epodes for 
example contain ideas ranging from those near to Stoic pacifism to others that revel in the 
chances given in war and glory in the possible outcomes.  In the Odes Horace prays to 
Apollo for he will drive out war, hunger and disease (bellum famem pestemque)512, he 
states that the wise man has no need for arms513, that wise counsel shows the way to 
peace514, that peace is a true happiness that riches cannot help attain515, and that civil wars 
are dismal, unholy strife.516  However, at times the message is mixed.  In Odes 1.12.32-41 
Horace states that he will tell of peaceful reigns, but proceeds to praise the deeds of great 
generals and men of war, not actions that lead to or prolong peace.  At 4.5.17-24 Augustus 
is praised for when he is at Rome all is at peace, but then Horace goes on to say at 4.5.25-8 
that there is no need to fear war with Spain or Germany, so here peace is not praised as 
absence of war but rather as a state of martial security.  However this also works the other 
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way, as in 4.14 ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĐĞƐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞƉƌĂŝƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĚĞĞĚƐŝŶǁĂƌand in extending 
the empire, but this is all because they bring an end to war.  Moreover Horace even openly 
praises the military establishment of Rome.  3.2.6 tells of the excellence of Roman youths 
hardened in active service and their ability to endure haƌĚƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵƐ “it is sweet 
ĂŶĚĨŝƚƚŝŶŐƚŽĚŝĞĨŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?(dulce et decorum est pro patria mori).  The Epodes also 
show a similar, although less detailed view.  Again civil strife is seen as a woeful state, but 
this time even this is portrayed as a positive as Horace praises Rome for she can only be 
defeated by herself517, and Horace is pleased by the fact that wars are undertaken gladly to 
win favour.518  This is in total contrast to the ideas of the Stoics, that wars for glory are to 
be completely abandoned.   
As the Epistles are said to be the most highly influenced by the philosophers ŽĨĂůů,ŽƌĂĐĞ ?Ɛ
works and the most serious of his philosophical endeavours, it is surprising that they 
contain no more opinions on war and peace than the Epodes and are no more negative 
towards warfare either.  In Epistle 1.20 Horace says that he found favour in war and peace, 
so he does not distinguish between the needs of either situation or between the ethical 
problem of profiting in (if not from) war.519  In Epistle 2.1 Horace is openly negative toward 
a state of peace, although he states that peace allows time for leisure.  Instead of praising 
this in a way that may be expected from an author with Epicurean sympathies he dismisses 
this leisure as opening the way for fickle arts that reduce the moral fibre of the state.520  
Only once does Horace come close to the attitude which may have been envisaged, this is 
when he advises that men should study the words of wise men as they bring tranquillity.521  
However, this is clearly an internal personal peace rather than pacifism or even an absence 
of war. 
It is in the Satires that the most conventional philosophical views are present.  The third 
satire in book 1 contains a description of the golden age that includes ideas which are 
ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ >ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ? ƉŝĐƵƌĞĂŶ ǁŽƌŬ ĂŶĚ ĂůƐŽ ŝŶ ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ƚƌĂŐĞĚŝĞƐ ?  Ɛ ŝŶ ^ĞŶĞĐĂ, it is 
women who are blamed for causing wars, but like Lucretius it is the establishment of towns 
and the beginning of laws that brings about peace.522  Even more purely Epicurean is the 
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description of Horace as a lover of peace, and his following plea ƚŚĂƚ “let no man injure me, 
a lover of peace ? (nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi pacis).523  This seems to be based on 
the Epicurean avoidance of physical pain.  If Horace was a lover of peace for Stoic rather 
than Epicurean reasons he may have been more likely to insist ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽŵĂŶŝƐĂďle to injure 
ŵĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “ŵĂǇŶŽŵĂn injure ŵĞ ?.    
The three schools examined above have all previously been associated with pacifistic 
beliefs.  However, this pacifistic attitude has not been found in the later Platonists or the 
Peripatetics, it is to these two schools this work will now turn in order to discover if there is 
any connection with the more peaceful ethics of the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans. 
Later Platonism and the Peripatetics 
Maximus of Tyre 
 
Maximus of Tyre is the only middle-Platonist who dedicates a specific work to the topic of 
war and peace.  In Orationes 23 and 24 he argues firstly that the soldier is more important 
to the state than the farmer and then in 24 that the converse is in fact the case.  This pair of 
essays has received little attention but Zampaglione suggests that they form a work of an 
obviously Sophist type, and that the presence of arguments for botŚƐŝĚĞƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚƐ
[the 24th Oration ?Ɛ] importance and its power of convŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŵƵƐƚ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ƐƵĨĨĞƌ ?.524  
Whereas Trapp, in his edition of MaximƵƐ ?Orationes, ƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌthe second of the 
ƚǁŽƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐǁŝŶƐ ?.525  However, the Platonic view of war often calls for a middle line that 
is neither too pacific nor too militarian, so perhaps neither oration is meant to wholly 
convince and therefore allow the audience to reach this Platonic conclusion.  A detailed 
analysis of these orations is needed before any conclusion can be reached. 
The twenty-third Oration argues in favour of the soldier over the farmer and is split into 
five main subjects: chapter one uses examples from Homer and the Trojan War more 
generally, chapters two to four give examples from history of warring compared to farming 
societies, chapter five uses similar examples but from the divine not mortal world.  Chapter 
six argues that the choice is one of freedom over slavery and that eternal injustices mean 
that there is really no choice at all but the decision is forced upon man, and chapter seven 
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argues that farming cannot exist without soldiers and farming itself is a cause of wars.  The 
twenty-fourth Oration is also split into five main points of contention: chapter one argues 
that farmers are as brave as soldiers, chapters two to four are all centred on ideas of justice 
and injustice, chapter five asks which creates the greatest evils and desires and which the 
greatest virtues.  Chapter six argues that farmers are not only stronger but more inclined to 
wisdom than soldiers and chapter seven concludes that farmers are not only more useful 
for a state, but also that they make the best warriors.  So if quantity carried any weight in 
philosophical debate then it is clear that neither one has carried the day. 
The first argument in Oratio 23 is based on Homeric examples.  Firstly, Maximus states the 
warriors in Homer were born of Zeus and therefore divine, secondly that it was the 
warriors that Homer chose to make kings, thirdly that while the men fight they are happy, 
ĂŶĚĨŽƵƌƚŚůǇƚŚĂƚKĚǇƐƐĞƵƐƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐƌŽƉŽĨ/ƚŚĂĐĂŝƐǇŽƵŶŐŵĞŶ ? “ƌŽƵŐŚ land, but a 
ŐŽŽĚŶƵƌƐĞŽĨǇŽƵŶŐŵĞŶ ?. 526  These arguments vary in philosophical quality, as a middle-
Platonist Maximus would have been influenced by the importance of the telos (telos 
agathôn  W the end of goods) which for many middle-Platonists had come to ďĞ “>ŝŬĞŶĞƐƐƚŽ
'ŽĚ ?.527  dŚƵƐ Ă ĚŝǀŝŶĞ ŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇ ĂůůŽǁ ĨŽƌ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ůŝƚĞƌĂů  “>ŝŬĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ
'ŽĚ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŵŝƚŵĂŶƚŽďĞŽŶĞƐƚĞƉĐůŽƐĞƌƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨŐŽŽĚƐ ?dŚis point also 
finds support in Plato and Aristotle, which asserted that leaders should be warriors.528 
However, ŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐĂƐĂWůĂƚŽŶŝƐƚ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐ less philosophically sound, 
because the happiness for these warriors is achieved through a solely bodily pleasure, not 
one of the soul, and although the degree to which bodily qualities mattered to happiness 
varies between middle-Platonists, it is never seen as able to create happiness without a 
deeper internal virtue.529  The final point, based on a quote from Odysseus carries the least 
weight as it relies purely on semantics and has no deeper quality or value. 
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The element which is given the most space is historic example.530  Chapters two and three 
focus mainly on Sparta and Crete; their military constitutions are lauded and it is said they 
were free while they fought but became slaves once they put their weapons aside.  Chapter 
four gives the same points again, but for a wider number of nations; Egypt, Assyria, Persia, 
Lydia and Scythia.   This, however, is in total contradiction to the Platonic views of these 
constitutions, which Plato saw as too one sided and which were, in fact, the cause of the 
Spartan and Cretan failures; as they could not live in peace and stability but only while 
engaged in active service.531  From a Platonist ?s point of view it seems clear that far from 
dedicating the majority of the text to the strongest arguments, Maximus has committed 
nearly half the dissertation to an argument that is rejected by Plato and Aristotle.  The 
force of this argument is further reduced by a more logical point.  The final example given is 
that of the Lydians, who were warriors when they were free but farmers once enslaved.  So 
it was not farming that caused them to be enslaved, but rather their militarism caused their 
downfall.  Farming was not the cause of their woes but rather the result of them. 
Chapter five provides divine examples, and as we shall see seems to lack any real 
persuasive power, in part because it is self-contradicting, but also because it has no basis in 
the realities of the day.  The main point is that the most powerful gods are all warriors, and 
that even those gods that became farmers began as warriors.  It continues with an example 
from the golden age; it claims that in the age of Cronus, farming was not important and 
that great quantities of food were still available growing wild.  However, this contradicts 
DĂǆŝŵƵƐ ?ŽǁŶĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ about the gods that converted to farming; if it was necessary for 
the gods to becomĞ ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ƚŚĞŶ ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇ ƚŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ Ă  “ůŝŬĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ 'ŽĚ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ
necessary for man to turn to agriculture.  Also, the abundance of wild food lacks any 
influence in an age which was so reliant on mass agriculture, particularly for supplying the 
army, and as will be shown, this is directly and convincingly answered in Oratio 24 chapter 
5. 
Chapter six argues that military action is freely chosen but that farming is forced upon us 
and that, as this is the case, becoming a soldier must be a virtue.  However, this argument 
is again contradicted, as Maximus goes on to say that the debate being held is not one 
between war and peace and furthermore, if it was, then we should all farm; but there is 
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injustice and conflict in the world.  Men are roused by desires and greed, and armies are 
always on the march in some areas of the world.  So it seems that it is not farming that is 
forced upon man, but war caused by the greed and violence that are a constant elements 
of the world.  It is also important to note that even in this oration, which argues for the 
importance of the army, it is still stated that if there is a choice between war and peace, 
peace should be the obvious option. 
The final chapter532 asks where it is possible to farm in peace.  Generals are seen as having 
a desire and greed for distant lands, so farming actually causes wars as it increases the 
desirability of the land.  Poor soil is said to produce more stable communities because no 
one desires to possess them.  So again, here we see the supposed champion of the military 
solution arguing that farmers are not beneficial because they themselves increase the 
chance of wars occurring.  Therefore, the final point made is not a battle cry but a call for 
peace:  “zŽƵŚĞĂƌŚŽǁŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƌƐƐƚĂƌƚ ?ŽŶ ?ƚďĞĂĨĂrmer... You are laying the grounds 
ĨŽƌĐŝǀŝůƐƚƌŝĨĞĂŶĚǁĂƌ ? ?
The arguments in Oratio twenty-three are not only self-contradictory but also conflict with 
the ideas present in WůĂƚŽ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ǁŽƌŬƐ ? as such, for the Platonist Maximus, it is surely 
philosophically unconvincing.  But does Oratio twenty-four fare any better?  Chapter one 
begins in a similar vein as Oratio twenty-three, first by claiming that a farmer is no less 
skilled with weapons than a soldier (a topic that is covered more fully in chapter six) and 
then with examples from poetry.  However, rather than using Homer, Oratio twenty-four 
quotes from Aratus on the loss of the golden age and the hated onset of wars.  
Who were the first to forge the sword of the highwayman,  
The first to eat of the flesh of the ploughing-ox.533 
 
However, having concluded that the argument derived from Homer in Oratio twenty-three 
carries little weight it must also be decided that this poetic section must be of equal value. 
As in Oratio twenty-three, the most detailed extended argument is found in chapters two 
to four.  Here, however, the examples are not historic, but rather the focus turns to 
philosophical theory and the concept of justice.  Here the tone becomes very Stoic. 
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Maximus asks  “do the just fight with the just? ?534  ŶĚƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌŐŝǀĞŶŝƐŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ “ďǇŶŽ
ŵĞĂŶƐ ? ? ?ǁŚĂƚŶĞĞĚĐŽƵůĚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?535 This is very similar to the argument put 
forward in Epictetus who claims that wise men should not war against other wise men.536  
Only the unjust are the cause of wars, for they will start a war with other unjust nations or 
with just nations that must then defend themselves.  Maximus says that the just maintain a 
 “ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂůƚƌƵĐĞĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞũƵƐƚǁŽƵůĚĨŽƌŐŽĂůůŵŝůŝƚĂƌy activity if they could, 
but at times they must enter into battle for defence or to maintain the state of justice.537  
Chapters three and four continue to focus on justice.  It is said that both farmers and 
soldiers may show justice, therefore comparing just farmers with just soldiers is irrelevant 
as both will be good, and comparing unjust farmers with unjust soldiers is also irrelevant as 
both will be evil.  Therefore it is decided that the rest of the oration will compare men who 
are neither wholly just nor unjust, in order to see which profession encourages men to 
pursue justice.538  
Chapter five examines the virtues of each profession and the effects they would have on a 
man from the middle ground.  This chapter asserts that desire is the greatest evil, war is 
insatiable in its desire while farming is thrifty, and that war and weapons increase anger, 
which should be moderated.  These arguments are based on existing Platonic ideas about 
the moderation of passions and, as such, seem more convincing than those in Oratio 
twenty-three.539  When virtues are considered, then farming is seen as more productive for 
the improvement of virtues; armed men cannot afford to show self restraint as they appear 
cowardly if they do.  War is also said to teach injustice, as justice is a lesson of peace.  
However, ŝŶWůĂƚŽ ?ƐĂŶĚƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?s works justice can be found in both war and peace, so on 
this theme Maximus disagrees with his predecessors.540  War is also a source of greed, and 
as a result increases injustices.  Then Maximus turns to the Platonic theme of friendship:541 
the farmer is more inclined to be a friend to all as he needs to maintain friendly 
relationships and is innocent of blood and slaughter, so continues to be holy and 
consecrated.  Thus, although not all of these arguments concur with the Platonic dialogues 
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they do, at least, take their cues from them and continue to use philosophical arguments.  
The final section of chapter 5 addresses points made in Oratio twenty-three, about the 
divine elements of life.  He says that, far from not wishing men to farm, the gods prefer the 
farmer.  For it was farmers who were the origin of the most important religious rites542  
and, as such, the gods prefer ofĨĞƌŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚƐŚŽǁƚŚĞ “ůŽǀĞĨŽƌĨĞůůŽǁŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞƐ
are well-omened and spring from their own labours, with no taint of calamity or 
ŵŝƐĨŽƌƚƵŶĞ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞŶŽƚ “ĂĐƚƐŽĨƉŝĞƚǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶŚƵŵĂŶĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ? ? 
Next, the virtue of wisdom is considered543 and Maximus states that soldiers are wise in 
ĂĐƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ “ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĚŝƐŵĂǇŝŶŐ ?, whereas the wisdom of farmers relates to natural 
ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?ƐĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ǁĞĂƚŚĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞŚĞĂǀĞŶƐ ?dŚĞĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ?areas of wisdom cause them to 
attain another version of the Platonic telos  ‘>ŝŬĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ 'ŽĚ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĐůŽƐĞŶĞƐƐ ƚŽ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?544.  Whereas the soldiers ? area of expertise requires them to work against nature 
and also against philosophical goals; as Speusippus says that good men aim Ăƚ  “ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ
ĨƌŽŵ ĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞ ?545 and Xenocrates aůƐŽ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  “ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ăůů
causes of disturbances in life ?.546  So whereas Oratio twenty-ƚŚƌĞĞ ?ƐŽŶůǇĐůĂŝŵƚŽƚŚĞtelos 
is seen in reference to warriors being born of gods, Oratio twenty-four shows soldiers as 
defying both the telos and the work of philosophy more generally, by disregard to nature 
and the creation of disturbances, whereas and farmers are creators of tranquillity, who 
attain the telos through their daily routine. 
The remainder of chapter six and chapter seven echo a similar transformation of topic as 
was seen in Oratio twenty-three.  Oratio twenty-three ended with a cry for peace.  Oratio 
twenty-four turns surprisingly to the topic of war.  In this oration it is said that farmers are 
physically fitter than soldiers and are better trained for battle.547  However, although 
similar to parts of Oration twenty-three in its use of many examples from history; unlike 
the earlier dissertation, here we see some solid philosophical backing in echoes of 
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yĞŶŽƉŚŽŶ ?Ɛ ^ŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ĚŝĂůŽŐƵĞOeconomicus which extols the life of a farmer for physical 
fitness and training.548    
Therefore, having examined both of these dissertations in detail, it does seem that farmers 
have emerged triumphant, as the arguments put forward on their behalf have a more 
Platonic basis and are formed around eternal virtues, not historic and poetic examples.  
However, it is surprising that both dissertations change emphasis as they reach their 
conclusion: the first suddenly taking a pacifistic stance and the second, which had 
previously rejected the necessity of any war in a world of justice, arguing that farmers are a 
greater benefit because they perform the acts of soldier with greater efficiency and skill.  
This could, perhaps, show the median way of life recommended by earlier Platonic 
philosophers.  However, in other places where Maximus turns his attention to warfare, he 
often seems wholly negative.  He concludes that nothing is more disagreeable than war and 
is amazed that iƚĨŽƵŶĚĂŶǇ “ůŽǀĞƌƐ ?, for he cannot understand how war could ever be seen 
as a source of happiness.549  He regards the use of war or becoming a mercenary (along 
ǁŝƚŚŵŽŶĞǇ ?ĂƐƐĂƵůƚ ?ďƌŝďĞƐ ?ƐŽŶŐĂŶĚĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ )ĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐĨŽƌŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐĂƐ “ƚƌeacherous and 
dangeƌŽƵƐ ƉĂƚŚƐ ?.550  Moreover, the inability of men to distinguish a correct route to 
happiness is the cause of wars, cavalry charges, and naval battles, as well as men becoming 
mercenaries, so the rejection of the Platonic telos, as performed by the soldiers in 
Orationes twenty-three and twenty-four, are the cause of man ?s ills.551  Even the gods are 
attacked for their inadequacy in preventing wars.  ƉŽůůŽ ?ƐŽƌĂĐůĞƐĂƌĞĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞǇ
can only tell of the coming of wars, but a truly great oracle, like philosophy, would tell how 
to prevent war, not when to plan for one.552 
The group of five dissertations collectively entitled The True End of Life: Virtue or 
Pleasure?
553 also show an interestingly contradictory attitude to war and peace, similar to 
that seen in the pair concerning farmers and soldiers.  In Oratio thirty-two, the Epicurean is 
given a chance to reply to the accusations made against his hedonism.  His arguments 
include two centred on warfare: firstly that pleasure must be a virtue because men are 
willing to go to war for pleasure554; secondly, that pleasure can be gained through warring 
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acts.  The Spartans, for example, drew pleasure from the eradication of fear brought about 
by constant battle and military training.555  However, these arguments are intended to be 
found wanting.  The purpose of allowing the Epicurean to speak at this point is not so that 
he can convince the audience, but rather to allow him to show his own deficiencies as a 
philosopher, and the Platonist is able to attack the Epicurean with a military image of his 
ŽǁŶ “ƵƚƉŝĐƵƌĞĂŶƐ ? ? ?/ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĂƌ ?ŶŽƌǁŝůů/ƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƉůĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂŶƚŽŶ ?ĂŶǇ
more than I will tolerate a ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ǁŚŽ ĂďĂŶĚŽŶƐ ŚŝƐ ƉŽƐƚ ?.556  Also the Epicurean 
argument is turned on its head: far from proving that pleasure is a virtue, the pursuit of 
pleasure conducted through warfare is seen as a folly and a curse brought about by greed 
and lust.557 
Philo of Alexandria (Judaeus)  
 
Philo of Alexandria spends a great deal of time not only debating the ethics but also the 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝƚǇŽĨǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ?dŚŝƐŵĂǇďĞĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞĨĞĞůƐ “ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
human race lives rather [than in peace] in war ĂŶĚĂŵŽŶŐĂůůƚŚĞĞǀŝůƐŽĨǁĂƌ ?.558  He often 
returns to the topic of the causes of wars, and also what will bring about the end of war.  In 
De Praemiis et Poenis he divides wars into two types -  ‘ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ? ?   ‘ŶĐŝĞŶƚ ?
wars are those with beasts ? ǁŚŝůĞ  ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ? ǁĂƌƐ ĂƌĞ ďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ďǇ ŵĂŶ ?s 
 “ĐŽǀĞƚŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ? ?559  However, despite the differences in these wars, they will be ended by 
the same phenomenon, namely the taming of the animals.  Once the animals have been 
ƚĂŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƌƐǁŽƵůĚŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇĞŶĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘modern ? wars would also end, as 
men would not want to appear more barbarous then the animals which they used to 
fight.560  In Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Philo also differentiates between two types of war; 
ŶŽƚ ‘ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ?ďƵƚ,  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ? ?ǆƚĞƌŶĂůǁĂƌƐĂƌĞĐĂƵƐĞĚ ?ĂƐŽŶĞ
would expect) by desire for reputation or for the improvement of status, but domestic are 
caused by weakness, or evils of the soul, such as passion, disease and injustice.561  The end 
of these wars is brought about by the prosperity of all things surrounding an individual, 
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allowing for glory and wealth through great abundance.562  However, the peace Philo refers 
ƚŽ ŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ  “ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĞŶũŽǇ ?.  Abraham, for example is said to have 
triumphed in many wars and yet he still enjoyed peace, because he was able to live with an 
 “ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?.563  Here, Philo starts with a Platonic principle, which he then 
adapts through his knowledge of the Pentateuch, but by doing this he has arrived at a 
strongly Stoic conclusion about the extirpation of the passions and the internal peace of 
God.  That true peace comes from internal affairs is also seen when Philo says that the only 
men who accord with divine laws can live at peace.564 
In De Specialibus Legibus 4 Philo does not consider the general causes of wars but rather 
uses a specific biblical example from Deuteronomy 20:1: in preparation for war the young 
men should arm themselves and fortify the city, but while doing this the herald should be 
senƚƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĨŽƌ “ƉĞĂĐĞ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚďĞǀĞƌǇƵŶĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ?ŝƐŵore advantageous 
ƚŚĂŶ ǁĂƌ ?.565  Again here we see an example from the Pentateuch, leading Philo to a 
conclusion most fervently echoed in Stoicism rather than middle-Platonism.  However, this 
Stoic ideal is quickly pushed aside as it is concluded that if peace can still not be reached 
then it will be necessary to fight, and to fight well.566  Then, the subject becomes more 
ethical than practical, and it is decided that the Jews are a race allied with justice and 
friendship.  AƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶǇƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŝƐĂůƐŽ “WĞĂĐĞĨƵůŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŝůů
live at peace with the Jews.567  Again, it is swiftly clarified that this is not a sign of weakness 
but that Jewry is ǁŝůůŝŶŐ ƚŽ  “ŐŽ ĨŽƌƚŚ ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?  Ƶƚ ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ǁŝůůŝŶŐ ƚŽ
defend themselves they do so in a just way, not killing indiscriminately and not taking the 
women into slavery.568  So, although the more Stoic attitude towards warfare is seen as an 
ideal state, the more practical Platonic militarianism still allows for justice to be maintained 
through temperance of aggression.  De Opificio Mundi also has a similar Stoic resonance; 
Philo says that when the violence of passions succumbs to justice and temperance then 
ambition and vice will be overcome by virtue.569  dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚĞŶĚƚŚĞ “ǁĂƌŽĨƚŚĞƐŽƵů ?ĂŶĚ 
create a lasting tranquillity.570  There are also other elements of Stoic influence in De 
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Opificio Mundi, for example Philo twice describes the creation of Genesis in a cosmopolitan 
manner.571  Most surprising about this Stoic-influenced cosmopolitism is the way that it 
causes Philo to reconsider one of the most fundamental principles of Judaism; the idea of 
 ‘ĐŚŽƐĞŶŶĞƐƐ ? ?  tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ? ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů :ĞǁŝƐŚ thinking, as typified in Deuteronomy and 
Exodus, stated that the Jews were the people chosen by God as first among the peoples of 
the world572, Philo altered this to accept a more philanthropic and universal idea of man.573  
Therefore, although Philo still maintained that the Jews were the chosen people, he 
believed ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞĐŚŽƐĞŶƚŽ “ŽĨĨĞƌƉƌĂǇĞƌƐŽŶďĞŚĂůĨŽĨƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŚƵŵĂŶƌĂĐĞ ?.574 
We have seen that the Stoics, while occasionally praising the bravery of a warrior from 
distant history or mythology, were much more pacifistic when discussing contemporary 
conflicts.  However, the converse seems to be the case for Philo.  While the biblical 
example prompts Philo to promote unfavourable peace over violence575, when it comes to 
more immediate examples he seems to push for more military solutions.  In De Virtutibus 
 ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐWŚŝůŽ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂŶĞŵďĂƐƐǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ŵƉĞƌŽƌ'ĂŝƵƐĂĨƚĞƌĂƐƚĂƚƵĞ
of the emperor has been erected in the Temple); first it is considered whether the present 
problem has been sent by God to test the virtue of a new generation576, then it is hoped 
that this could cause a deeper long lasting peace.577  However, despite these hopes for 
peace and virtue, it soon becomes apparent that Philo feels that there should be no doubt 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ :ĞǁƐ  “ǁŝůů ĨŝŐŚƚ ŽŶ ďĞŚĂůĨ ŽĨ ŽƵr laws, and die in defence of our national 
ĐƵƐƚŽŵƐ ?.578  However, as this war would be for the preservation of divine laws, rather than 
eliminating peace it would, in fact, be promoting a deeper, truer tranquillity similar to that 
described in De Specialibus Legibus, and to that of Abraham.  This more military attitude is 
also apparent when Philo lists the legal reasons why a man may be exempt from the army 
in the Jewish levy according to the laws of Deuteronomy 20.4-7 in De Agricultura 34.149.  
The accepted reasons are these; if a man has built a house but not dedicated it, if a man 
ŚĂƐ ƉůĂŶƚĞĚ Ă ǀŝŶĞǇĂƌĚ ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚ ŚĂƌǀĞƐƚĞĚ ŝƚŽƌ ŝĨ ŚĞ  “ŚĂƐ ĞƐƉŽƵƐĞĚ Ă ǁŝĨĞ  ? ĂŶĚ ŚĂƐ ŶŽƚ
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚ ŚĞƌ ǇĞƚ ? ?  WŚŝůŽ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ, felt that these men would most likely become loyal 
soldiers, ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞǇ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ ƚŽ ůŽƐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĞĨĞĂƚ ŝŶ ǁĂƌ ?  ,Ğ ƐĂǇƐ  “ŝƚ ŝƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ
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fitting that those, whom the danger chiefly concerns, should seize their arms and stand in 




All works that consider the philosophical schools in the period of the late republic and early 
empire are faced with the same problems when it comes to the Peripatetics; this is because 
very few original treatises survive from the followers of Aristotle on any subject.  The 
Peripatetics seem to have preferred the commentary and doxographical methods to larger 
more original treaties.580  This problem is compounded when the treaties that do survive 
are surveyed.  The largest Peripatetic treaties extant from the relevant period are the 
pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo, usually thought to be from the later 1st century AD and the 
Geography, Almagest, and Harmonics by the Egyptian Ptolemy at the end of the 2nd 
century.  All four of these works are dedicated to the problems of mathematics and 
astronomy and contain no political or ethical philosophy of any serious nature.  The greater 
group of peripatetic works from this age are the commentaries and summaries.  The three 
most complete summaries are those of Nicolaus of Damascus which have survived in 
Syriac581, the fragments of books 7 and 8 ŽĨƌŝƐƚŽĐůĞƐŽĨDĞƐƐĞŶĞ ?ƐOn Philosophy582, and 
that of Arius Didymus whose handbook was preserved in the anthology of Stobaeus.  
However, the summaries and handbooks show the same inclination towards physics and 
logic as the treaties of Ptolemy and De Mundo with the categories ŽĨƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
being the most popular subject for the commentators and doxographers to examine, 
followed by the physical works.583  Therefore, when it comes to the political and ethical 
issues of war and peace, there are few works that can be of any genuine use.  Of those that 
remain, it is only the Epitome of Peripatetic Ethics of Arius Didymus, the summary of 
WĞƌŝƉĂƚĞƚŝĐĞƚŚŝĐƐŝŶŝĐĞƌŽ ?ƐDe Finibus (that shows the theories of Antiochus), and the two 
commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics  W one by Aspasius and one by an anonymous 
commentator, which although usually believed to be from the 2nd century may be from a 
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later period  W that may broach the topic, and even then only from an ethical rather than 
political perspective.  
One section of commentary which could perhaps be expected to provide some pertinent 
information is that from AspasŝƵƐ ? ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ŽŶ ďŽŽŬ3 of ƌŝƐŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐNicomachean 
Ethics.  It is in book 3 of that work ƚŚĂƚƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?Ɛ views on the honourable acts of soldiers 
and the demonstration of courage are found.  However, Aspasius is more concerned with 
defining what Aristotle meant by courage and how this impacts on other elements of 
ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?ƐĞƚŚŝĐƐ ?EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐŽĨĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
wars and soldiers.  Aspasius states that an act is only courageous if it is carried out for a 
noble purpose which forces the perpetrator to endure a terrible situation.584  The most 
explicit example that Aspasius gives for this is the courage found in the noblest deaths, 
such as ĂƚǁĂƌĨŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽƌŽŶĞ ?Ɛ “ĚĞĂƌĞƐƚŽŶĞƐ ?.585  This is expanded further when 
he says that experience can often be mistaken for courage and again soldiers are used as 
the example here.586  He says that the experienced soldier who holds the line can often be 
mistaken as courageous and emphasises the fact that, for Aristotle, a soldier was a hired 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ǁŚŽ ŚĂĚ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  “ǀĂŝŶ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ŽĨǁĂƌ ?.587  Therefore, the 
professional soldier will not be frightened by what would appear to most to be a 
threatening situation ?ƚŚƵƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽůĚŝĞƌ ?does not perform any noble act.588  Aspasius, in that 
case, does not differ in any way from Aristotle on the act of war; in as much as it is defined 
by courage, although this examination of courage does seem outdated by the time of 
Aspasius, as it is so heavily influenced by the city-state system and the idea of the free 
Greek soldier. 
There is another important aspect on his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics where 
Aspasius places an outdated importance on the polis and the anonymous commentator of 
books 8 and 9 does the same.  When both commentators discuss the idea of love and 
concord, they begin with what sounds like a universal vision of mankind.589  Aspasius says 
that love is natural between all human beings and gives an Aristotelian example of the 
traveller being directed by a stranger590, whereas the anonymous commentator begins with 
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a description of consensus which he says can exist between any people, even strangers 
with no common bond.  Nevertheless, soon it becomes apparent that they have drawn the 
same divide as Aristotle himself, that morality and justice are very different for those 
within the polis compared to those from without.591  Although Aspasius starts from a 
universally binding concept of love he quickly turns this to concord, which he confines 
within a group of loving friends or a city.592  Concord and love become civic and familial 
virtues that impart justice, forgetting the universal standing that began this line of 
thought.593   The same is even more correct for the anonymous commentator, who has 
started from the weaker position of consensus, rather than love, and quickly moves 
towards a civic concord based on ĂŵƵƚƵĂů ůŽǀĞŽĨŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐ in a city or group of 
friends.594  
It is apparent then that the Peripatetic commentators did not develop or evolve any ethical 
doctrine that could affect their attitude towards war and peace.  However, the 
doxographical worŬŽĨƌŝƵƐŝĚǇŵƵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐƐŽĨŶƚŝŽĐŚƵƐƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚŝŶŝĐĞƌŽ ?ƐDe 
Finibus, show an important development of Peripatetic ethics absent in Aspasius and our 
anonymous commentator - ƚŚĞĂĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ^ƚŽŝĐĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞŽĨ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ?ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌ-directed 
oikeiosis.
595  For the Stoics and early Peripatetics, Oikeiosis starts from the natural affection 
felt towards ourselves and our children from birth,596 as our rationality is better 
understood, then our affection spreads outwards until it becomes an affection for all 
humanity.597  Antiochus and Arius Didymus take the opposite approach to the 
commentators, starting from the polis and then pushing its boundaries out, rather than 
starting with a human affinity and localising it in the city walls.  Antiochus says that human 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŚĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶŶĂƚĞ ĐŝǀŝĐ ǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĂŶĚ Ăůů ǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ĂƌĞŶŽƚ  “ŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
ŚƵŵĂŶĨĞůůŽǁƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĞŵďƌĂĐĞƚŚĞ “ǁŚŽůĞŚƵŵĂŶƌĂĐĞ ? ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇƌŝƵƐďĞŐŝŶƐ
with the idea of immediate family but then expands this idea to the tribe or city before 
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ending with all humans, because he says it makes no difference if people are near or 
strangers.598  Arius moves even further from the ethical system based on the polis, by his 
emphasis on the communal nature of human affairs, which, is in strange contrast to the 
strictly demarcated boundaries of the polis.599  Annas clearly defines the crucial ethical 
outcome of the Stoic other-directed oikeiosis ĂƐ  ‘ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ forces the agent 
not to weigh their own interests higher, purely bĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ, and 
also not to do the same with their own attachments and commitments.600   
Before the final effects of this development are considered, it will be of value to take a step 
back and examine the theories of Dicaearchus of Messana, who is believed to have studied 
directly under Aristotle at the Lyceum.  In one of his works De Interitu Hominum, which, like 
Antiochus, has been preserved in part by Cicero, he notes that the most deadly force on 
earth is man, who has killed more in wars and revolutions than floods, disease, famine and 
wild beasts.601  Baldry believes that, like Cicero, Dicaearchus must have thus concluded that 
men should try to minimise this damage by winning co-operation and friendship in order to 
benefit humanity rather than destroy it.602  Furthermore, ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŝĐĂĞĂƌĐŚƵƐ ?ǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞ
early stages of man from his work Bios Hellados preserved in Porphyry ?ƐDe Abstinentia, 
4.2.603  In this we see an attitude familiar from Plato in which, before the acquisition of 
wealth and possessions worth fighting for, ŵĞŶ ůŝǀĞĚ Ă ůŝĨĞŽĨ  “ůĞŝƐƵƌĞ ? ĞĂƐǇ ĨƵůĨŝůŵĞŶƚŽĨ
their essential needs, good ŚĞĂůƚŚ ?ƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ?.604  However, Baldry noted that 
ƚŚĞ ƚŝƚůĞ ŽĨ ŝĐĂĞĂƌĐŚƵƐ ? ǁŽƌŬ ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐ that the life of early man and its 
development was centred in Greece and was unlikely to include a wholely universal notion 
of mankind605 and, as such, ǁĂƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂ^ƚŽŝĐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ?oikeiosis. 
Therefore, it seems that of the Peripatetic philosophers who considered ethical issues, 
there is a divide between those that based their ideas firmly on the polis based political 
structure used by Aristotle and those that were able to look to the larger world of the 
empire.  The more progressive thinkers, embodied by Antiochus and recorded by Arius 
Didymus and Cicero, saw that the inward looking ethical theory of Aristotle was no longer 
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viable, and they adopted some of the universalising attitudes of the Stoics, in order to 
correct this inconsistency and to make their philosophy more relevant to the political 
realities of the day.  Despite the fact that this theory is never directly applied to war and 
peace, perhaps the more humanitarian attitudes found in Dicaearchus, in relation to 
concord and violence, suggest that if they had also accepted this earlier Peripatetic 
compassion, and combined it with the newer Peripatetic oikeiosis, then they could have 
reached a similar conclusion to the Stoics who also shared both of these elements and 
were more explicit in relating them to ideas of war and peace.  
Scepticism 
 
The nature of Scepticism (also known as Pyrrhonism) and its focus on the metaphysical and 
logical qualities of knowledge and reality means that little time is spent on ethical issues.  If 
it can never be decided whether an action that appears virtuous is really so, it becomes 
nearly impossible to draw ethical conclusions on any topic.  The most important trope for 
the issue of Sceptical ethics is the tenth.606  But war and peace do not only have to be 
considered in relation to ethics.  As we have seen the metaphysical theory of the Stoics and 
Cynics could be used just as powerfully as their ethical and political doctrines in order to 
reject warfare.  Consequently, the lack of ethical attention does not mean that the tenth is 
the only trope that can be used to examine the Sceptical attitude to war and peace.  
Therefore, I will examine each of the ten tropes in turn and see how each could be applied 
to the question of war and peace. 
 The first trope607 considers the different perceptions of animals to different stimuli.  Man 
can only decide his impression of an object and cannot know the way in which any other 
animal perceives the same object or situation.608  This provides us with little or no 
information on an ethical level, but merely considers the nature of reality.  However, it is 
still possible to apply the concept of war to this trope.  Although the human perception of 
violence cannot be judged as either evil or good, the possibility that any issue can be 
qualitatively judged by an animal alters the very nature of these judgements.  If we assume 
that man would usually perceive wars as either worthy or corrupting then this does not 
affect the way in which other species could perceive them.  If any form of scavenger insect, 
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mammal or bird is considered, it is probable that a war between men would be seen as a 
possible food supply and therefore undoubtedly positive.  This being so, even if Sextus 
would expect rational humans to dismiss war, then they could not do so with confidence, 
since their own awareness is not the only way of perceiving this topic. 
The second trope609 is centred on the different perception between different groups of 
people.  There are more examples than in the first, however these examples again do not 
focus on ethical issues, but rather on physical phenomena and the senses.  Sextus does not 
refer to any race as explicitly more violent or warlike than others, but this does not mean 
that they would not perceive violence in different terms to other races or individuals, as 
the idea that some races naturally find war more pleasurable, or are generally more violent 
than others; is common in ancient literature. 
The third trope610 examines the ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶĞ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞŶƐĞƐ ŵĂǇ
provide.  Sweet oils please the sense of smell but not taste, honey is pleasant to eat but not 
to the eye, or a painting can appear to have depth but feel flat to the touch.  It seems less 
straight-forward to apply this to concepts of peace and violence.  Surely any man that 
objects to war would object to the image as much as the sound of war, and equally the 
war-lover would embrace every aspect of the battle lines, the hardships as much as the 
glory.   
The fourth trope611 becomes more relevant, however.  It argues that circumstances change 
the perception of the same event or object.  Hunger changes the importance of food when 
compared to an overly full stomach.  In the same way conditions ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĂů Žƌ
unnatural, waking or sleeping, motion or rest, hatred or love, drunkenness or sobriety... 
fear ŽƌũŽǇ ?612 will alter the appearance of many different objects.  Although little new is to 
be gained by comparing the effects these varying dispositions would have on the 
perception of war and peace, it is interesting to note that they are themselves states of 
circumstance.  So while some acts would seem barbaric in times of peace, they would seem 
heroic in war, and what may appear moderation in peace could be construed as cowardice 
in war.  
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Again, the fifth trope takes all its examples from the physical world.613  It is said that relative 
distance and location change the perception of certain objects.  Closer objects appear 
larger than those farther away, objects viewed from the middle can appear straight but 
curved if seen from a corner.  Like the fourth trope this also contains similarities to ethical 
issues of warfare in another ancient philosopher, this time an Epicurean.  Lucretius says 
there is no greater pleasure than watching a battle from afar614, but in all other instances 
he condemns wars.  Thus it could be argued that rather than showing the aversion to pain, 
or the distance the Epicureans felt could be achieved from society through self-sufficiency, 
Lucretius instead is commenting on how the perspective can greatly alter the perception of 
the qualities of war.  However, this would be hard to confirm as he shows little sympathy 
with the Sceptics in the De Rerum Natura and, as we have seen, the description of the 
soldiers is similar to that which is used to illustrate the detachment of the gods from men.  
As such it is more likely that for the Sceptic the perspective has changed the perception.  
For the Epicurean the reverse is true; it is the altered perception of what is and is not 
important that has changed the perspective he has of the battle lines. 
 The sixth trope615 ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĂĚŵŝǆƚƵƌĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽ ŽďũĞĐƚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ŝŶ
isolation but is always perceived in conjunction with others.  Weight is altered by water, 
hot still air will increase the intensity of certain smells, and smell and taste work in 
conjunction, each influencing the other.  This again does not immediately appear relevant 
to the issues of warfare, but if this is expanded to the political world then there is some 
correlation.  Conflicts cannot be examined in isolation but the background and political and 
social context will inevitably influence the perception of each violent event.  So it is not 
only the physical context of each object that influences the appearance but also the 
historical and social context.  A war started through aggression may be perceived very 
differently than one started for self-defence, for example. 
The seventh trope616 examines quantities rather than qualities.  Iron filings will look black 
on their own but silvery in large piles, small amounts of wine will not cause damage but in 
large quantities they will paralyse.  It is plainly possible to apply the issues of quantity to 
violence.  As we have seen at times Cicero and even Caesar limit levels of violence, and in 
Sallust soldiers are reluctant to limit their violence if they are in a dominant position.  This 
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does not, however, bring us any closer to a general theory of Sceptic violence.  Inevitably 
we must again suspend judgement. 
The eighth trope617 is very similar to the fifth and sixth, in that it relies on the concept of 
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ďƵƚĐŽŵďŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨ “ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚũƵĚŐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚŽĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƐ ? ?/ŶĨĂĐƚ^ĞǆƚƵƐĂĚŵŝƚƐƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĐŽŶsidered the idea 
of relativity618, but combines both here as part of a larger idea of related objects and 
perceptions. 
The ninth trope619 returns to the issue of quantity addressed in the seventh, but here in 
relation to time and number of occurrences.  For example, earthquakes seem less fearsome 
if you live in an area where they occur often.  This could easily be applied to wars or battles 
as well, and the battle-hardened soldier will not shirk from the fight as much as a new 
recruit might, a point that the Peripatetic commentators frequently made in relation to 
bravery.  They said that a soldier would often appear brave because he was used to the 
situation of battle.  But this does not allow us to draw any ethical conclusions. 
As mentioned above, the tenth trope620 is that most associated with ethical issues.  It says 
that the customs, habits, laws and legends of a people will influence their attitude towards 
ethical situations, whereas the second trope compared different cultural backgrounds to 
physical perceptions.  Matters related to violence are considered.  It is said that the 
Scythians would commit human sacrifice, but the Greeks would not621; the anger and 
violence of the gods is also said to be subjective.  SĞǆƚƵƐƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚŚĞ ŝƐ ŝŶƚŚĞ  “ŚĂďŝƚ ?ŽĨ
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ŵǇƚŚƐ ƐŝŶĐĞ ŚĞ  “ƌĞǀĞƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŐŽĚƐ ĂƐ ďĞing good and immune from 
Ğǀŝů ?622; some customs allow the striking of a free born man and some do not623; though 
homicide is forbidden, gladiators kill each other without retribution624; and whereas some 
philosophers see glory as worthless, athletes compete purely for this goal.625  However, 
Sextus does not tell us his own perception of all of these situations.  Even when he does so 
(as with the violent images of the gods), he does not allow himself to even hint at the 
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correct attitude, but rather records both possibilities and suspends judgement.  As we have 
shown, though, the schools that believed the gods lived in a state of peace were most likely 
to accept violence among men, but Sextus does not insist that his concept of divine peace 
is correct in the same manner as the Stoics and Epicureans did, so his judgement would 
have been suspended on this issue too, meaning that he would be less likely to insist on 
non-violence in human relationships also.    
So, unsurprisingly, the tropes leave the ethicist interested in warfare in a state of 
suspended judgement.  The issues of violence are evident in the tenth trope but no final 
judgement is made, as Weidhorn says in his own attempt to conclude on violence through 
modern sceptical examples:  “tŚĞƚŚĞƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ŝŶĂŶǇŐŝǀĞŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐtance is justified is ... 
yet another matter to be added to the scĞƉƚŝĐ ?ƐŐƌŽǁŝŶŐůŝƐƚŽĨŝŶƐŽůƵďůĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ?.626  But 
despite this, ƚŚĞƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂůůŝĨĞŝƐŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨŽŶĞĚĞǀŽƚĞĚƚŽƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůůŝƚǇ ? “tĞĂƐƐĞƌƚ
ƐƚŝůůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĐĞƉƚŝĐ ?ƐŶĚŝƐƋƵŝĞƚƵĚĞŝn respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling 
ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ ƵŶĂǀŽŝĚĂďůĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůůŝƚǇ ĨŽůůŽws on suspension of 
ũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?.627  Although the Sceptics are not able to conclude the worthiness of any given 
situation, they do seem to withdraw from all conflict by the suspension of judgement.  As 
such, although they cannot and will not draw ethical conclusions about the nature of 
conflicts, they have fully removed themselves from such conflicts by the means of this very 
refusal, living a life of quietude, without concluding if this life is indeed the correct way to 
live. 
Philosophers and Peace ± Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it seems that Sidebottom, Ferguson and Downing were all correct in their 
attributions of pacifistic beliefs to the Stoics, Epicureans and Cynics respectively.  All of 
these groups held much stronger beliefs than merely a vague notion that peace was a 
preferable state compared to war.  They advocated non-violence in both personal and state 
relationships; they rejected any reason for entering into violence, including in some 
instances self-defence and freedom; warfare was rejected on both ethical and 
metaphysical grounds; and soldiers are treated with contempt and mistrust.  It is also 
interesting to note that, although the Epicureans ? theoretical basis was different to that of 
the Stoics and Cynics, these anti-war attitudes are always set in the context of the relevant 
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school; Stoics and Cynics drawing these conclusions from a belief in oikeiosis, 
cosmopolitanism, and the unimportance of material and physical virtues; and the 
Epicureans in divine self-sufficiency, the avoidance of pain, and the importance of 
friendship. 
What is perhaps most surprising is the way in which some Roman thinkers would willingly 
reject more traditionally Roman values because they conflicted with the philosophical 
antipathy to warfare.  This is particularly true of Lucretius and Seneca, both of whom 
condemned gloria as a cause worth fighting for, despite its role in the traditional 
aristocratic virtues expounded by most Romans of this period.628  Seneca and Lucretius, 
who have here been influenced by their Greek predecessors into questioning Rome ?ƐŽǁŶ
ethical framework, are convinced to such an extent that they are willing to dismiss warfare 
as a legitimate tool.  This development is admittedly more complete for Lucretius than for 
Seneca, but even the chief advisor to Nero at times sees gloria as overrated, while in others 
he still acknowledges its importance for aristocratic families. 
Although, it is the Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans who are most totally condemning of 
violence and wars, the other schools also seem to have been influenced in this area.  For 
example, the more eclectic nature of all the schools in this period seems to have produced 
a more peace-loving attitude than was present in the works of Plato and Aristotle.  Some of 
the Peripatetics, for instance, adopted oikeiosis, one of the most relevant ethical theories 
from the Stoics.  Interestingly it seems to have been the Peripatetics, a group most 
interested in the political realities of the day, who adopted oikeiosis as a core doctrine.  The 
more backward looking commentators, like Aspasius, still based their ethical and political 
doctrine on the outmoded importance of the polis.  Arius Didymus and Antiochus, who 
ŵŽĚŝĨŝĞĚ ƌŝƐƚŽƚůĞ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ, were more willing to accept the 
universal nature of man.  Therefore, while it may have been expected that pacifistic beliefs 
would be most likely to exist in the works of those who looked back to an idealised state, 
they are actually found more in the philosophers who considered the full implications of 
new political systems.  Thus this universal image of man was accepted more by the 
practical than the theoretical philosophers.  This eclecticism is also equally present in the 
ƚǁŽWůĂƚŽŶŝƐƚƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?DĂǆŝŵƵƐƌĞǀĞƌƐĞƐƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽůĚŝĞƌĨŽƵŶĚŝŶWůĂƚŽ ?Ɛ
Republic: he sees them not as Plato did, as the best men and guardians of the state but as 
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corrupted by violence and unjust in their actions as a result.  Philo even transforms one of 
the cornerstones of Judaism in order to broaden his area of concern.  The Jews are not only 
God ?s chosen people, they are those chosen by God to help and protect and benefit all 
humanity through acts of universal kindness.629  Even the Sceptics, who are so relentless in 
their refusal to make a judgement, find themselves believing in the basic peaceful nature of 
the life of the gods and, through their refusal to judge, live a life of peace through non-
involvement.  
Finally, it seems that not only were all schools in this period moving towards a more 
pacifistic ethical and political theory, but the accusation of war-lover is an insult used 
between different schools in an attempt to discredit their opposition.  Maximus of Tyre 
chooses to illustrate the doctrinal problems of the Epicureans by putting a pro-war 
argument into the mouth of an unnamed Epicurean who argues that there is pleasure to be 
had from taking part in battles, because it can eradicate fear.  Maximus does this despite 
the fact that Lucretius specifically rejects battles as a misinterpreted way of vanquishing 
fears. Plutarch uses a similar argument to attack the Stoics; in De Stoicorum Repugnantiis 
he says that Chrysippus found positive elements in warfare through the eradication of 
surplus population.630  A conclusion, which given the evidence examined above, seems a 
highly unlikely conclusion for a Stoic to reach. 
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Having analysed the attitudes towards peace of the major philosophical schools of the late 
republic and early empire, the major Latin historians of this period will now be studied.  
This analysis will consider the passages of the texts that record the conclusions of treaties 
and debates about war and peace, and will use these parts of the texts in order to examine 
attitudes towards peace.  These attitudes may represent those of the authors of the texts, 
or those of the historical figures they purport to record.  However, even if the ideas found 
within the histories are not accurate records of the beliefs of the authors or historical 
figures the presence of these arguments in the texts can still provide evidence that beliefs 
of this type were held at the time the works were written.  I shall also examine and analyse 
the context of the uses of words related to peace (for example pax, concordia, and quietus) 
in order to determine how uniform the use of these words was and if that can tell us 




ĂĐŚŽĨ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐƚŚƌee works opens with a moralising preface that focuses not on what the 
work will cover, but rather on why history is written at all.  Each work also contains long 
digressions on the decline of virtue and the corruption of the city.  Although the purpose of 
this could be to act as an apologia ĨŽƌ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶ ƚŽ
historian632, they nevertheless show plausible approximations of just causes for this 
migration, even if they do not show genuine personal reasons.  
DŽƐƚ ŶŽƚĂďůĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ, as well as 
political career.  Sallust says that intellectual pursuits are as worthy and as difficult as public 
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efforts.633  This is an idea which seems to evolve in the period between writing the Bellum 
Catilinae and the Bellum Jugurthinum.  In the Bellum Catilinae, ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶďĞŐŝŶƐ
with a general analogy on the dual nature of man.  The mind is shared with the gods, but 
the body has more bestial qualities634, and in both the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum 
Iugurthinum the efforts of the intellect aƌĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ Ă  “ƐƉůĞŶĚŝĚ ĂŶĚ ůĂƐƚŝŶŐ ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?
(virtus clara aeternaque habetur )ĂŶĚ  “ůŝŬĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŽƵů ĞǀĞƌůĂƐƚŝŶŐ ?  ?sicuti anima immortalia 
sunt).635  However, Sallust laments that kings do not use their intellects as effectively in 
peace as in war, although he is willing to accept the validity of both paths leading to 
glory.636  Although the mind is more effective than physical strength, action and eloquence 
are both seen as noble ways to serve the state, and both of these noble paths will find 
fame through an admirable gift.  It is particularly worth noting that Sallust expresses part of 
his apologia in terms of war and peace:  “ŽŶĞŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵĞĨĂŵŽƵƐ ŝŶƉĞĂĐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ŝŶ
ǁĂƌ ? ?vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet).637  So Sallust considers the act of writing history 
as an act of peace, even though he is concerned with the recording and describing of acts 
of warfare and mass political violence.   
However, despite all of this, Sallust only finds a personal rejection of the political life in the 
Bellum Catilinae.  He says that he allowed himself to be corrupted and, as we have seen, 
did not reject the path of politics altogether.638  By the time Sallust began to write the 
Bellum Iugurthinum, either his attitude had developed639 or he felt more confident in his 
position, as he is more willing to make broader, wide-ranging remarks on the subject.  He 
ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŚŽůĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ Ăůů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ŝƐ  “ůĞĂƐƚ ĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŝŵĞƐ ?
(minume hac tempestate cupiunda)640 because ruling by force is the cause of revolution, 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶƚƵƌŶĐĂƵƐĞƐŵĂƐƐĂĐƌĞƐ ?ďĂŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ “ŽƚŚĞƌĂĐƚƐŽĨǁĂƌ ? ?aliaque hostilia).641  
This is perhaps the most significant point of all.  In the Bellum Catilinae, Sallust rejects 
politics due to the corrupting influence it had on his own virtue, but by the Bellum 
Iugurthinum he rejects any political and military office because of the violence they inflict 
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and cause.  Therefore, by rejecting political office, Sallust claims he is rejecting the path of 
violence, not merely the path of corruption.  In the Bellum Iugurthinum Sallust also widens 
the scope of the passive life, which in the Bellum Catilinae is only framed in his own 
circumstances and political career.  After describing the acts of the Gracchi and the 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŵŚĞƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ŐŽŽĚŵĞŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƐƵďŵŝƚĞǀĞŶƚŽŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĚŽǁƌŽŶŐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞĨĞĂƚŝƚ ? ?bono vinci satius est quam malo more iniuriam 
vincere).642  
As Sallust has aged, he has rejected the military as a legitimate source of gloria, his youthful 
misjudgements have now been put aside and a life of pax and scholarship lie ahead.643  
That the wisdom of an older generation results in a less bellicose outlook is also seen 
elsewhere in the works of Sallust.  Book 2 of the Historiae contains two examples that 
reflect this theme.  Firstly, fr. 69644 contains the details of the defeat of two towns in the 
Isaurian campaigns of Servilius.  After the first, unnamed town is destroyed, the inhabitants 
of Isaura Nova send envoys to arrange terms of surrender to Servilius.  These are accepted 
ĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞďĞŐƵŶƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀ ƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐƉůŝƚŝŶƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?Ɛ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ǇŽƵŶŐ  “ĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƐ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇhad breath they would never 
surrender their ĂƌŵƐ Žƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂůůŝĞƐ ?  ?neque se arma neque socios, dum animae essent, 
prodituros firmabant)645, whereas the elder of the townsfolk are more intent on peace, 
even if it means surrender.646  Secondly, fr. 75647 tells of the events in a Celtiberian town 
during PomƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ^ĞƌƚŽƌŝĂŶ ǁĂƌ ?  KŶ ŚĞĂƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ
elders canvass for peace, the men agree, but the women (who we have been told at fr. 
2.73McG = 2.91M are particularly fond of the acts of war, so much so that it was the sole 
attribute desired in a husband) take up arms themselves and are successful in convincing 
the younger men to enter battle, while the elders are scorned.  That age brings a distaste 
ĨŽƌ ǁĂƌ ŝƐŵĂĚĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞůĚĞƌƐ ĂƐŽĨ Ă  “ůĞƐƐ ǁĂƌůŝŬĞ ĂŐĞ ? (aetas 
imbellior).648  Therefore, this shows that for Sallust it is not merely the elders of these 
towns that are less favourable to warfare, but he associates advanced years with loss of 
appetite for war.  Further, this phenomenon is not peculiar to Sallust.  As we have already 
seen, iŶ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐThyestes and Troades individuals become weary of warfare as their years 
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advance.  Thyestes and Agamemnon both wish to see an end of violence, as one has drawn 
this conclusion while in exile rather than at war, it is perhaps the years that have taught 
this lesson as much as the horrors of war themselves.649  
This pacifist argument by Sallust is, however, weakened by elements of the introductions of 
the Historiae and the Bellum Catilinae.  In fr. 1.8 of the Historiae650 Sallust says that wars 
are caused by a defect of human nature, thus they are inevitable.  If there is no necessary 
struggle for liberty, man will fight for glory, and once glory is lost, then man will fight for 
power.651  This is an idea also present in the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum Iugurthinum: 
Sallust states that after the fall of Carthage the lack of an external enemy caused Rome to 
look inwards for an enemy and to fight for profit not defence.652  It is, however, vital to 
note that this is not purely human nature, but a defect in human nature.  This is part of the 
animal element that Sallust attributes to man in the Bellum Catilinae, rather than part of 
the godly intellect.653  Therefore, if man chooses the intellectual path, as Sallust has 
himself, and as he advocates others to do in the Bellum Iugurthinum 654, then perhaps this 
could defeat this defective element and avoid conflict and discord.  As Scanlon notes, 
 “^ĂůůƵƐƚƐŚŽǁƐĂĚŝƐĚĂŝŶ ĨŽƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂƐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŽƌŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ
changing situation of events recommends a reliance on the spiritual ingenium by which 
fame and ĞƚĞƌŶĂůůŝĨĞŵĂǇďĞƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞĚ ?.655 
The moral decline of Rome from 146 BC evident in Sallust ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ has caused some to 
suggest that, unlike Cicero (his contemporary), and Thucydides (his main stylistic influence), 
Sallust sees history as a linear progression rather than a cyclical pattern.656  Or, as Earl 
suggests, in the monographs Sallust sees history as a linear decline but this view is modified 
in the Historiae to alternating periods of peace and discord.657  However, both of these 
ǀŝĞǁƐŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĞĂƌůŝĞƌĚĞĐůŝŶĞĂŶĚƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨĚŝƐĐŽƌĚŝŶ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐŵŽŶŽŐƌĂƉŚƐ ?
For example, in the Bellum Catilinae Sallust records two versions of the myth of the 
development of man that are similar to those of the golden age in other ancient 
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literature.658  In the first he says that man used to be free from covetousness and it was 
CǇƌƵƐ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĂƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŶƐ ĂŶĚ ^ƉĂƌƚĂ ? ĚƌŝǀĞŶ ďǇ  “ůƵƐƚ ĨŽƌ ĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶ ?
(lubidinem dominandi), that first drove men into wars.659  However, this historic sixth 
century dating for the decline of man is quickly rejected and instead it is seen that wars 
ďĞŐĂŶŝŶ/ƚĂůǇǁŚĞŶƚŚĞƌŽĂŵŝŶŐdƌŽũĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ƌƵƐƚŝĐĨŽůŬ ? ?genus hominum agreste) of 
Italy had united together creating envy from neighbouring tribes.660  Hence the decline of 
man seems to stem from the wars between Rome and her rivals in Italy.  Therefore, a date 
of somewhere in the 12th or 11th century is meant here to also contain a period of decline 
and discord after a more peaceful period in which the foreign Trojans worked closely with 
the native Latins.  Further to this, Sallust is evidently aware that it has been the Trojan War 
that has caused the Trojans to flee to Italy.661  Consequently, the wars in archaic Italy 
cannot be meant as the inception for the decline of man, for Sallust certainly knew of the 
Trojan War that predates the Trojan settlement in Italy and therefore knows that wars have 
existed before this time.  So, like Cicero and Thucydides, Sallust also sees a recurring, if not 
cyclical, pattern of history and perhaps we have these examples (Cyrus, the Peloponnese 
and the early Roman wars) to illustrate the inherent defect in human nature that is stated 
more explicitly in the Historiae.   
The prologue of the Bellum Catilinae, as well as containing ideas common to the Bellum 
Jugurthinum and Historiae noted above, also involves a large digression on the earlier glory 
of Rome in which Sallust contrasts the behaviour of the historic Romans with that of the 
Rome he knew.662  In this digression it is apparent that Sallust has no reservations regarding 
wars, and the actions within wars, from the distant past.  It is the early entry into military 
service, the discipline and the attitudes within the army that Sallust sees as one of the 
cĂƵƐĞƐ ŽĨ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ ƉĂƐƚ ŐƌĞĂƚŶĞƐƐ.663  ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ďĞůŝĞĨ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ǁĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
glorious past, coupled with his laudation of gloria664, means that he praises violent acts in 
battle.  He admires the bravery of the young men, who strove to be the first over ramparts 
and strike the first blow to the enemy, but only because this was done to win gloria.665  
^ĂůůƵƐƚ ĂůƐŽ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ŐŽŽĚ ŵŽƌĂůƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ Ăƚ ŚŽŵĞ ĂŶĚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ?  ?domi 
                                                          
658
 Hesiod, Works and Days, 109-201; Ovid Met. 1.89±150. 
659
 Cat. 2.1-2. 
660
 ibid 6.1-5. 
661
 ibid 6.1. 
662
 Cat. 2-13. 
663
 ibid 7.3-5. 
664
 Earl 1967, 7-11. 
665
 Cat. 7. 6-7. 
Andrew Crane  108 
 
militiaeque boni mores colebantur)666, so it is apparent that Sallust did not see wars as an 
obstruction to virtus, a concept which he often links to boni mores.667  It is more important 
ƚŽ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƋƵĂƌƌĞůƐ ? ĚŝƐĐŽƌĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌŝĨĞ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƌĞƐĞƌǀ Ě ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ?  ?iurgia, 
discordias, simultates cum hostibus exercebant).668  This, he says, allowed concordia to 
reign in Rome669, so it seems that concordia, is a peace that only requires stability between 
fellow Romans and is not reliant on relationships with outsiders.  Wars actually help 
maintain concordia at Rome.  The benefits of the metus hostilis are seen throughout 
^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚĂƌĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝth the destruction of Carthage.670  This 
can be seen further by examining the other places in which Sallust uses concordia rather 
than pax to explain ideas related to peace.   
Sallust specifically uses concordia independently from pax671 in seven places672 and uses 
both terms together in four.673  In all eleven of these cases either Sallust, or the character 
whose words Sallust purports to record, is clearly referring to an internal situation.  In the 
speech of Micipsa that was delivered to Jugurtha and his own sons, for example, the peace 
(concordia) that is threatened is an internal one and the speech is intended as a warning to 
Jugurtha not to disrupt the stability of Numidia.674  In the speech of Memmius, concordia is 
used to describe a state of peace between the mob and the nobles675 and Philippus says 
that Lepidus has claimed that restoring the powers of the tribunes, an undoubted internal 
matter at Rome, would return concordia.676  Even the one instance of concordia being used 
for different nationalities supports, rather than weakens this argument.  The Trojans and 
native Italians are not described as living in concordia ƵŶƚŝů “ĂĨƚĞƌthey had come together 
behind a single wall ? ĂŶĚ ŚĂĚ  “easily ŵĞƌŐĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?  ?Hi postquam in una moenia 
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ĐŽŶǀĞŶĞƌĞ ? ĞƐƚ ƋƵĂŵ ĨĂĐŝůĞ ĐŽĂůƵĞƌŝŶƚ).677  Therefore, Sallust refrains from attributing 
concordia to the Trojans and Italians until they had become one people.   
It is also of interest that when Micipsa is encouraging his heirs towards concord, he does so 
in a way that echoes ideas seen in some of the more pacifistic philosophers.  He says that 
 “EĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĂƌŵieƐ ŶŽƌ ƚƌĞĂƐƵƌĞ ĨŽƌŵ ƚŚĞ ďƵůǁĂƌŬƐ ŽĨ Ă ƚŚƌŽŶĞ ? ďƵƚ ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ?  ?non exercitus 
neque thesauri praesidia regni sunt, verum amici).678  This speech is also recalled by 
Adherbal, when he appeals to the Roman Senate for assistance in the Numidian civil wars.  
However, although he speaks of both peace and friendship, he does not merely draw the 
philosophical conclusion that friendship will bring concord, as Micipsa did.  Rather, the 
friendship in which he hopes to find peace and security is that of a political alliance and 
friendship with Rome.  He says his father told him to strive to be of use to Rome; if he did 
ŚĞ “ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŬŝŶŐĚŽŵ ?ƐĂƌŵǇ ?ƌŝĐŚĞƐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŽŶZŽŵĞ ?ƐĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? ?in 
vostra amicitia exercitum, divitias, munimenta regni me habiturum).679   
ůůďƵƚŽŶĞŽĨ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐƵƐĞƐŽĨdiscordia also show this rule.680  The Numidian people are 
said to be prone to discordia in a section that tells of them betraying the Roman leaders 
within a captured town.  Therefore, although this is discordia between two peoples, they 
are at this point both living within the same walls in what the Romans believed was a state 
of mutual agreement.681  In a further example, the Sidonians had been forced from their 
land by discordias civilis, which emphasises the internal nature of the problems they had 
fled from.682  Catiline is a figure who is, unsurprisingly, often discussed in relation to issues 
and accusations surrounding internal disputes, and in two passages where he and his 
followers are characterised, the discordia of the earlier civil wars and proscriptions are 
recalled.683  Also, in both instances that discordia is used in the extant sections of the 
Historiae, it is agaŝŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĐŝǀŝůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŝƐDĂĐĞƌ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĞ
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rebukes the accusations that his motive is to stir the Roman mob into rebellion.684  The 
second is within a similar context but from further back in the annals of Roman history, 
when Sallust recalls the successions of the plebs and the confrontations on the Mons Sacer 
and the Aventine.685 
The possible exception to the way that Sallust uses concordia comes in the prologue to the 
Bellum Catilinae.686  Sallust is recounting the golden age of Rome and says that Iurgia, 
discordias, simultates cum hostibus exercebant, the Loeb edition translates this as 
 “YƵĂƌƌĞůƐ ? ĚŝƐĐŽƌĚ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌŝĨĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŝƌĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ? ?  dŚŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ
example of discordia is used in an external rather than internal context.  McGushin has 
noted that discordia and simultates are not necessary here but are merely an example of 
^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐůŽǀĞŽĨůŝƐƚƐ ?ďƵƚũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ?
But another possible meaning of exerceo is to practice, or to train for something.  Sallust 
uses this himself in other places, for example at Iug. 63.3 when he says that Marius had not 
trained himself in eloquence but in active service. And at Cat. 2.1 where he says some kings 
trained their minds others their bodies.  If this is the case, then perhaps this is not real 
discordia but rather training or practice for the genuine discords that will inflict Rome as 
this example comes as part of a longer section on the importance of concordia to the early 
Romans.    But even if this example of discordia used in an external context can be partly 
explained away, it still shows Sallust extending the use of discordia to an external enemy: a 
context that it is apparently never used in.687 
It has previously been noted that concordia is an important theme in the works of Sallust.  
Scanlon identifies this importance with that which Thucydides places on stasis688, and 
Weidemann takes this idea further, stating that not only is the idea of discordia central to 
^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ689 but also shows that the three digressions in the Bellum Iugurthinum are all 
designed to illustrate the themes of concordia and discordia.690  Of these three digressions 
it is the second691 that is easiest to identify as illustrating the theme of concordia692, as it 
purports to record the history of political factions and hostilities in Rome after the 
                                                          
684
 Hist. fr. 3.34.19McG = 3.48.17M 
685
 ibid 1.10McG=1.11M.  As recorded in a slightly different version by Livy (3.52). 
686
  Cat. 9.2. 
687
 Rosenstein 2007, 232. 
688
 Scanlon 1980, 99, 122 & 174-5. 
689
 Which Sallust tells us himself at Iug.,5.1. 
690
 Weidemann 1993, 48-57. 
691
 Iug., 41.1-42.5. 
692
 Weidemann 1993, 51. 
Andrew Crane  111 
 
destruction of Carthage.  Weidemann notes that Sallust relates the earlier ethnographic 
digression693 to discordia and concordia by using an alternative version recorded in Numidia 
by King Hiempsal.694  This version emphasises the role played by the followers of 
Hercules695 in the discordia found in north Africa and is used purely because ŽĨƚŚĞ “ŵŽƌal 
ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƚ ŵĂŬĞƐ ?.696  This theme is revisited throughout the latter stages of the Bellum 
Iugurthinum when the varying degrees and times of discord are emphasised.697  The third 
digression698 tells the story of the Philaeni, the Carthaginian brothers who allowed 
themselves to be buried alive in order to end the war and help their country.  Weidemann 
ŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĨŽŽƚƌĂĐĞƚŚĂƚƉƌĞĐĞĚĞĚƚŚĞďƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽŶůǇŽŶĞ participant 
from each army and Sallust picks brothers at this point so that he can contrast them with 
the brothers Albinus, Aulus and Spurius.699  The fraternal element is key as it represents the 
highest form of virtue700, and the idea of cooperation between brothers is one used by 
Sallust elsewhere when Micipsa reminds Jugurtha of the importance of the sibling bond.701  
Weidemann sees parallels also in the dysfunctional relationships between other pairs of 
supposed collaborators, including Metellus and Marius, Marius and Sulla, Jugurtha and 
Bomilcar and Jugurtha and Bocchus.702  So it is clear that even the history of an external, 
rather than internal, Roman conflict is still heavily concerned with the idea of concordia.  
However, as I have stated, for Sallust concordia is usually a purely localised state and as 
such probably cannot be said to show any general ethical objection to warfare (such as 
those seen in some of the philosophers considered earlier) and should not be used to 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŝƐĞĂďŽƵƚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶĂŵŽƌĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝĚĞĂŽĨƉĞĂĐĞĂƐƐĞĞŶŝŶ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨ
pax. 
As concordia and discordia are then used for purely internal and civil struggles, so perhaps 
pax should be expected to be used for only external circumstances.  In its various forms pax 
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is used in 62 places703, and on many of these occasions it is, indeed, used to express a 
situation existing between two different peoples.  For instance, in the Bellum Iugurthinum, 
pax is always used rather than concordia whenever an end to hostilities between Rome and 
Numidia is suggested or achieved.704  However, as I have noted above, pax is also used on 
occasions with concordia when Sallust is focused on an internal dispute so cannot be 
referring to an external enemy.   Interestingly, each of these is taken from an oration, one 
from Lepidus705 and three from Philippus.706  The example that best illuminates the 
intention in these passages iƐƚŚĞůĂƐƚŝŶWŚŝůŝƉƉƵƐ ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? Philippus states ƚŚĂƚ “ŶŽǁĂĚĂǇƐ
peace and harmony are disturbed openly, defended secretly; those who desire disorder are 
ŝŶĂƌŵƐ ?ǇŽƵĂƌĞŝŶĨĞĂƌ ?(nunc pax et concordia disturbantur palam, defenduntur occulte; 
quibus illa placent in armis sunt, vos in metu).707  Pax is directly contrasted with men at 
arms (quibus illa placent in armis sunt), so rather than referring to an internal peace in the 
same way that earlier uses refer to an external treaty, pax is rather used as a contrast to 
men at arms708 so refers to a practical absence of war and battles.  This is supported by 
some of the other occasions when pax is used as an antonym for war.  In the Bellum 
Iugurthinum it is said ƚŚĂƚ “Ăll the Moors were ruled by King Bocchus, who knew nothing of 
the Roman people save their name and was in turn unknown to us before that time either 
in peace or in ǁĂƌ ? (Mauris omnibus rex Bocchus imperitabat, praeter nomen cetera 
ignarus populi Romani itemque nobis nomen bello neque pace antea cognitus)709, and in the 
Bellum Catilinae ŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚĂƚŝůŝŶĞĂŶĚŚŝƐĨŽůůŽǁĞƌƐ “ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇƚŽƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?
war ƚŽƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?bellum quam pacem).710  So it seems that although concordia always refers 
to a situation within one nation, city or peoples, pax can refer to either a treaty between 
two peoples, or merely an absence of war between any groups either nationally or 
internationally.  Sadly, this very practical second use of pax, as an antonym of bellum, 
makes it difficult to discern if there is any more general or ethical purpose in mind. 
In some cases this issue is easily resolved.  For example the normally warlike attitude of 
:ƵŐƵƌƚŚĂŵĞĂŶƐŝƚŝƐŚŝŐŚůǇƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚǁŚĞŶ^ĂůůƵƐƚƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ:ƵŐƵƌƚŚĂ “ĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐ
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ŚŽƉĞŽĨŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?in maxumam spem adductus recuperandae pacis)711 that the peace 
wanted is anything more than an immediate end to this particular period of battles and to 
suggest this was a more general rejection of warfare and longing for peace would be 
erroneous.  However, there are uses of pax that could imply more than an absence of wars 
ĂŶĚďĂƚƚůĞƐ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?^ƵůůĂ ?ƐƐĞĐƌĞƚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽĐĐŚƵƐǁŚĞƌĞ^ĂůůƵƐƚƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ^ƵůůĂ
 “ƐƉŽŬĞ Ăƚ ůĞŶŐƚŚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?  ?de pace et de communibus 
rebus multis disseruit)
712, which suggests an element of cooperation and understanding 
involved in pax ŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶĞŶĚƚŽďĂƚƚůĞƐ ?ŽƌǁŚĞŶDĞŵŵŝƵƐƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞǇƚƌĞĂƚŽƵƌ
allies as enemies and our enemies as allies.  Are peace and friendship compatible with 
sentiments so unůŝŬĞ ? ? (postremo sociis nostris veluti hostibus, hostibus pro sociis utuntur. 
potest ne in tam divorsis mentibus pax aut amicitia esse?).713  Again it seems that friendship 
and alliance are as much a part of pax as treaty and armistice.  Further, the verb used with 
pax can have a co-operative implication.  For example when Aulus found he was in an 
untenable situation  “Ɖeace was accepted on the kings terms ?  ?sicuti regi libuerat pax 
convenit).714  This is not only the case when the Romans find themselves in a position of 
weakness.  While Metellus was prosecuting the war with more success he is said to have 
 ‘ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ? ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚŽ :ƵŐƵƌƚŚĂ.715  Peace can even be made with an enemy most plainly 
expressed in pax cum Romanis fieret, a situation that implies a certain amount of mutual 
respect and agreement.716   
Considering the greater variety of meanings that pax implies, it is hardly surprising that the 
attitude that it presents towards peace is more complex.  As I have noted above, at times 
Sallust seems critical of pax.  The creation of pax in 146BC by the destruction of Carthage is 
ƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞƚŝƉƉŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚZŽŵĞ ?ƐƐůŝĚĞƚŽdiscordia.717  However, in the speech 
of Adherbal, 146BC ŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨĂŐŽůĚĞŶĂŐĞŝŶEƵŵŝĚŝĂ ? “ĨƚĞƌĨƌŝĐĂŚĂĚ
been freed from the pestilence [war with Carthage], we were delighted to pursue peace, 
since we had no enemy save any whom you might have ordered ? (postquam illa pestis ex 
Africa eiecta est, laeti pacem agitabamus, quippe quis hostis nullus erat, nisi forte quem vos 
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iussissetis).718  So the Numidians were able to prosper in the aftermath of the fall of 
Carthage, and do not seem to have suffered the same moral bankruptcy as occurred at 
Rome.  As Earl notes, the virtus of Jugurtha is not corrupted until his ambition is enflamed 
by his time spent amongst the Roman generals during the war in Numantia.719  As 
Balmaceda and Comber state,  “ZŽŵĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞŚŽŵĞŽĨvirtus, appears as the 
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?.720  It is the corruptive influence of the already corrupted 
Romans that starts Numidia on its road to discordia, not the creation of pax after 146BC.  It 
is problematic to compare these two concepts: One is reported directly and repeatedly by 
Sallust, the other is in what purports to be direct speech from Adherbal and is only 
mentioned once and then only briefly. Yet ?ǁŚĞŶƵƐĞĚŝŶĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂƌů ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ
on the influence of young Romans on the virtus of Jugurtha, as well as the consequent 
discordia this new immorality caused, it seems that perhaps it is not the absence of war in 
itself that can solely account for the decline of virtus at Rome as it did not affect the 
Numidians in the same way.  There must, therefore, have been something specific about 
the Romans that caused them to deteriorate in this way.  If this is the case then perhaps 
the metus hostilis should not be considered evidence enough on its own to suggest that 
Sallust was as wholly negative about pax as he was positive about concordia.   
However, although the negative implications of pax suggested by the metus hostilis can be 
questioned, it has already been noted that Sallust is at times very positive about certain 
aspects of warfare.  It would, then, be wrong to use this re-evaluation of pax to paint 
Sallust as a pacifist historian.  Nevertheless, Sidebottom notes that although the Stoic 
philosophers he examined were verging on the pacifistic and described soldiers from their 
own period in hostile terms, they would often exalt soldiers and generals from earlier 
eras.721  ^ŽŵĞ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ĐŽƵůĚ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŽ ƐŚŽǁ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ
difference between the soldiers of the idealised past and those from the less virtuous 
ƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨZŽŵĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?dŚĞƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŵŽƐƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŚĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶ
mentioned, namely the description of the corruption of Jugurtha during his time amongst 
the Roman Army.722  Also, none of the Generals during the Jugurthan war are seen as an 
archetype of virtus in the same way that the soldiers from before 146 are.  Nonetheless, 
Caesar is depicted as an archetypal virtuous Roman and is compared with the other 
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pinnacle of morality, Cato.  In the passage that compares the two men, ĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌ
military life and success is noted and this is not intended in any way to reduce the power of 
the praise that Sallust freely allots both men.  If, as Mommsen would have it, Sallust is 
nothing more than a political pamphleteer for the Caesarian cause723, then this could 
explain the fact that Caesar is the only military leader of this period to not be seen in an 
ambiguous light.  It must be noted, though, that as Cato and Caesar are the only leaders of 
any kind that Sallust allows to escape criticism, it is more likely that it is not warfare that 
has tainted the Romans.  Rather, the Romans in the army are, like all other Romans, 
already tainted by the luxury and immorality that Sallust believed were rife in this period.  
So the possibility that Sallust shared a distrust of the military similar to that of the imperial 
Stoics is unlikely, thoƵŐŚ ŶŽƚ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝĨ DŽŵŵƐĞŶ ŝƐ ƌŝŐŚƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
chief purpose. 
If a final term derived from pax ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ? ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ƚŽ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ?/ŶŚŝƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞĨĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ>ŝŶĚĞƌƐŬŝƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “Zepublican 
Latin is rich in words pertaining to war, poor in praise of peace.  Its equivalent of peaceful is 
pacatus, subdued.  In Rome even peacĞ ǁĂƐ ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?.724  However, the one use of 
pacatus in Sallust is not explicitly connected with military victory, but rather used merely to 
describe friendly countries that have been plundered by poorly disciplined Roman troops.   
 “tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶĂƚZŽŵĞ ?ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶůĞĨƚďǇĞƐƚŝĂwere in 
command of the army in Numidia, and, ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ƐĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁĞƌĞ
ŐƵŝůƚǇŽĨŵĂŶǇƐŚĂŵĞůĞƐƐŵŝƐĚĞĞĚƐ QƉĂƌƚƉůƵŶĚĞƌĞĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĂƚƉĞĂĐĞ
with us: so strong was the love of money which had attacked their minds like a 
ƉĞƐƚŝůĞŶĐĞ ? ?
Dum haec Romae geruntur, qui in Numidia relicti a Bestia exercitui praeerant, 
ƐĞĐƵƚŝŵŽƌĞŵŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŽƌŝƐƐƵŝ ?ƉůƵƌƵŵĂĞƚĨůĂŐŝƚŝŽƐŝƐƐƵŵĂĨĂĐŝŶŽƌĂĨĞĐĞƌĞ ?ƉĂƌƐ
ex pacatis praedas agebant; tanta vis avaritiae in animos eorum veluti tabes 
invaserat.
725 
As well as describing an area at peace with Rome, the condemnation of the troops that 
exploit the pacified areas (the accusations of greed, the disease of the mind that caused 
ƚŚĞƐĞĚĞĞĚƐ ?ƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂŶŝŵŵŽƌĂůŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂŶĚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚƐ
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ĂƐ ‘ƐŚĂŵĞůĞƐƐ ? )ƐŚŽǁƐĂŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ726, or at least an empathy, with the areas described that 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŐŝǀĞŶ>ŝŶĚĞƌƐŬŝ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨpacatus. 
Another point of interest found in Sallust is the use of non-violence as a means of direct 
action as seen in the speeches of the tribunes of 111 and 73 BC, Memmius727 and Macer.728  
Each of these tribunes argues for the rights of the plebs and bases their rhetoric on the idea 
that libertas and pax ĂƌĞŵĞƌĞůǇĚŝƐŐƵŝƐĞƐĨŽƌƐůĂǀĞƌǇĂŶĚĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?DĞŵŵŝƵƐ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ
motive is reported to be the prosecution of those nobles who have either, entered into 
peace with Jugurtha due to personal profit, or have acted heinously in Africa towards 
towns with which Rome was at peace.  To achieve this he suggests that Jugurtha be 
brought to Rome to give evidence against the guilty.  Memmius says that to achieve this 
ŐŽĂůƚŚĞƉůĞďƐƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚƵƐĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ? “/ĚŽŶŽƚƵƌŐĞǇŽƵƚŽƚĂŬĞƵƉĂƌŵƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
your oppressors, as your fathers often did; there is no need for violence, none of secession.  
They must go to ruin their owŶǁĂǇ ? ?729  He goes on to say  “ůĞƚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞƚƌĂǇĞĚ
their country to the enemy be punished, not by arms or violence, which is less becoming 
for you to inflict than for them to suffer, but by the courts ĂŶĚ :ƵŐƵƌƚŚĂ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ
ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ? ?730  Macer in very siŵŝůĂƌ ƚĞƌŵƐ ƐĂǇƐ ?  “/ ĚĞŵĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
laws of nations...I do not advise war or secession, but merely that you should refuse longer 
ƚŽ ƐŚĞĚ ďůŽŽĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞŵ ?.731  The similarity between the two speeches could either show 
that this non-violent argument was a standard piece of rhetoric for the tribunes to employ, 
ŽƌƌĂƚŚĞƌ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚconcordia ?DĐ'ƵƐŚŝŶďĞůŝĞǀĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ
and form...probably reflect in a significant way tŚĞŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚďǇDĂĐĞƌ ?732, so this 
would suggest that perhaps the appeal to concordia in tribunicial speeches was a common 
theme in this period.  The possibility of this being a traditional element of plebeian rhetoric 
is added to by the fact that both Memmius and Macer relate the current struggle at Rome 
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to the events of third century BC when the plebeians conducted a non-violent strike at 
Rome on the Mons Sacer would force the Senate to improve their position in society.733 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ DĞŵŵŝƵƐ ? ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ǁŝƚŚ :ƵŐƵƌƚŚĂ, 
this does not appear to be his intention; he only wishes to see the guilty punished for 
robbing the people of their role in the important decisions of the Republic.  Jugurtha is 
even invited to Rome under a promise of immunity, and Sallust presents Memmius as a 
strong protector of this promise even in the face of public anger.734 
There are, however, possible reasons to ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚDĞŵŵŝƵƐ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶŶŽŶ-violent 
means could be more for effect than crucial to his, or other plebeian, beliefs.  For example, 
the matter at hand is not one that must be addressed; it does not affect the people at 
Rome directly, but rather only weakens their political position by the reduction in their 
standing.  This being the case, it would be extraordinarily inflammatory to provoke the mob 
to violent uprisings to rectify this matter alone.  It would also prove very dangerous for 
Memmius personally if he were considered to be acting with revolutionary intentions.  The 
issue at hand for Macer is more serious however; the powers of the tribunes had been 
seriously reduced by Sulla and had been a contentious issue at Rome since 78 BC.  The 
argument around personal safety still applies as a possible reason for the insistence on 
non-violence, but in this instance the appeal to tradition is even more relevant.  It was the 
passive resistance on the Mons Sacer that had led to the creation of the tribune of the 
plebs originally and the appeal to the traditions of the creation would remind the people of 
its importance. 
A speech by an ex-tribune can also be considered relevant here, despite the fact that the 
circumstances and contents of the speech are not closely related in the same way those of 
Memmius and Macer are. In the Catilinarian debate735 Caesar appeals to a tradition of non-
violence and restraint736, however as he is addressing the Senate rather than the assembly 
the tradition he recalls is senatorial rather than plebeian and as a result is more focused on 
laws and proclamations than mass action.  Yet the product is the ultimately the same: 
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Caesar, Memmius and Macer all use the rhetorical appeal to tradition in order to elicit a 
pacifistic response.  So within the works of Sallust we have three examples of plebeian 
orators appealing for peaceful means to the current situation which perhaps either 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚŚĞŵĞ ŝŶ ƉůĞďĞŝĂŶ ŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ Žƌ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
own attitude to concordia.  
The final aspect of war and peace in Sallust that I will examine is just war and justifications 
for war.  As a historian, albeit one with strong philosophical and moralistic leanings, it is not 
surprising that Sallust does not present a structuralised form of the just war.  However, the 
reasons given for the causes of wars in his works follow some of the same standards 
presented in other sources.  In the Bellum Catilinae the early Romans are said to fight for 
liberty, out of necessity, brought about by the covetousness of their neighbours who 
envied the new wealth in Rome.737  After the moral decline of Rome, however, the reasons 
Sallust gives for Rome to enter wars are not created by necessity.  Catiline and his followers 
are said to want bloody revolution because they are struck by the same greed that once 
ĨŽƌĐĞĚZŽŵĞ ?ƐĞŶĞŵŝĞƐƚŽĂƚƚĂĐŬƚŚĞŵ ?dŚĞƌĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƚŝůŝŶĞ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚƐƉĞĞĐŚŝƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ
ƵŶƚŝůŚĞƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƐƚŚĞ “ĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĚĞďƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌŝĐŚ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƐ ?ƉƌŝĞƐƚŚŽŽĚƐ ?
plunder and all the other spoils that war and the liceŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĐƚŽƌƐ ĐĂŶ ďƌŝŶŐ ? (tum 
Catilina polliceri tabulas novas, proscriptionem locupletium, magistratus, sacerdotia, 
rapinas, alia omnia, quae bellum atque lubido victorum fert).738   Equally, as we have seen, 
Jugurtha only lusts for war once he has been corrupted by the greed and immorality of the 
Roman army, so again it is greed that is said to cause these immoral and unjust wars, just 
as Cicero, and many other philosophers, see greed as an unjust reason to enter a war.   
One way that Sallust however differs from some philosophers on what constitutes a just 
reason to go to war is related to the concept of gloria.  Sallust sees the desire for gloria as 
part of the model of virtus.739  Although Sallust notes that gloria can be won in ways other 
than military service to the state740, he says that in the golden age of Rome it was the 
desire for gloria that helped Rome to achieve its preeminent position in the world.  This 
was the case both in wars, where Sallust is proud of the young men who strove to be first 
into battle to gain gloria from their general, or in politics, where the gloria of the council 
was such that the greatest men in Rome increased the speed of progress by their 
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achievements.741  Equally, even in ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐŽǁŶƚŝŵĞ ? both Caesar and Marius are praised 
for their desire to become generals in order to win gloria, because this was their main goal, 
not the spoils or power that would accompany their success.742  As we have seen, the idea 
of war for glory was rejected by the majority of the first century imperial Stoics as well as 
the Epicurean Lucretius, and also by Augustine, as it would contradict the key foundation of 
his just war theory that all wars must be defensive and waged to redress a moral 
imbalance.  The importance that Sallust places on gloria, as well as the fact that for Sallust 
glory itself seems to be a just reason to enter warfare, is probably related to the aristocratic 
tradition of virtus that is a prominent influence on SalůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ.743  
This purely Roman version of what is, and is not, virtuous means that gloria has a greater 
significance than is afforded glory in either modern western society or the world of Greek 
ethics.  Even Cicero, who owed his renown to public speaking and judicial excellence rather 
than military skill, admits that the greatest glory is that won in warfare and as such would 
seem to agree with Sallust on the significance of gloria to military service.744  This could 
explain why it is that while Musonius Rufus, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, the three most 
prominent first century Stoics, reject glory as a reason to enter violent disputes, Seneca, 
their closest Roman equivalent, does not dispense with the idea altogether.  It becomes 
apparent from an examination of the letters and speeches of Catiline that Sallust also sees 
gloria as an acceptable reason to participate in a war.  Catiline tells his followers in both 
addresses that this revolution will return the gloria that is currently denied them by the 
monopoly of the oligarchy.745  So Sallust not only sees gloria as a just aspect of warfare but 
also uses it as the justification for the revolutionary battle of Catiline. 
One way in which Sallust may prove more interesting than the philosophers on the topic of 
just war, is that he has included several speeches and letters that concern the reasons and 
justifications for wars.  Although these are almost certainly rhetorical inventions on the 
part of Sallust, they will at least provŝĚĞ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ĂŶĚ
possibly also highlight genuine Roman propaganda methods from this period.  Most 
notable, due to its frequency of use, is the idea of libertas, which is often related to 
defence.  As we have already noted, the protection of libertas is seen by Sallust as an 
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admirable reason for his ancestors to have participated in the early Italian wars.746  The 
claim to be the protector of libertas is seen again and again in the speeches and letters of 
both generals and politicians.  Catiline stresses the necessity that has forced him to resort 
to violence in both of his speeches and the intercepted letter.  His first speech both opens 
and closes with the concept of libertas747 and, although he also mentions the wealth and 
power that will also be won, Catiline stresses that they have only been denied this because 
they have been first denied their liberty through the greed and selfishness of the oligarchy.  
The letter of the conspirator Manlius also insists that the loss of status they have suffered is 
in fact an attack upon their liberty and as such has forced their hand, he says thaƚ “ŶŽŶĞŽĨ
us has been allowed to resort to the law according to ancestral customs nor, retain our 
personal liberty after being stripped of our patrimony, such was the inhumanity of the 
ŵŽŶĞǇůĞŶĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĞƚŽƌ ? (neque cuiquam nostrum licuit more maiorum lege uti 
neque amisso patrimonio liberum corpus habere: tanta saevitia faeneratorum atque 
praetoris fuit).748  Again, this is stated in terms of division and seen as having been created 
by the greed of the nobility.  The second speech of Catiline, given before his final battle, 
again returns to the same themes it is liberty that his army fight for749, and they must fight 
now because they have no other option750, the opposing army fight only to uphold the 
powers of a minority at Rome and so will not fight as fiercely as those who have liberty at 
stake.751   
In the Historiae the revolt of Lepidus provides a parallel with the conspiracy of Catiline, and 
ƚŚĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ>ĞƉŝĚƵƐĂƌĞƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŽĂƚŝůŝŶĞ ?Ɛ ?>ĞƉŝĚƵƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ
^ƵůůĂŚĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨZŽŵĞŝŶƚŽƐƋƵĂůŽƌƐŽƚŚĂƚ “ǇŽƵƌǁƌĞƚĐŚĞĚŶĞƐƐŵĂǇǁŝƉe out 
your concern for freedom ? (quo captis libertatis curam miseria eximat)752 ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ^ƵůůĂ ?Ɛ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĚŽŵŝŶŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞƉŽŽƌĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂƐƚŚĞǇ “ƉƌĞĨĞƌ
this state of affairs to living as free men according to the ŚŝŐŚĞƐƚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?.753  
Then Lepidus directly appeals to Roman tradition when he argues, just as Sallust did in the 
preface to the Bellum Catilinae, that their forefathers fought for no other reason than to 
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defend their liberty.754  In his insistence on libertas there is one key difference between 
Lepidus and Catiline and Manlius: Lepidus does not associate this slavery with the power of 
the few old noble families, he sees it as the result of one man alone, Sulla.  There are two 
reasons this might be the case firstly, Lepidus is speaking as a consul, and so was unlikely to 
claim that there was a monopoly on these positions, as this would turn him into a figure of 
hatred.  Secondly, the constant reminders of the power of one man would exploit the 
deep-seated fear of kings that was prevalent at Rome and would thereby strengthen his 
own argument by aůůƵƐŝŽŶƐƚŽ^ƵůůĂ ?ƐŬŝŶŐůǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?dŚĞƌĞďƵƚƚĂůƚŽ>ĞƉŝĚƵƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚŽĨ
Philippus again uses the Idea of libertas as one of its core ideals.  In the speech of Philippus 
Rome is already enjoying the fruits of liberty, and Lepidus is not seen as the liberator but 
rather as a possible slave master755 and Lepidus is not motivated by the just cause of liberty 
but by the universally unjust cause of greed756, so Philippus says that he has been forced 
into war by Lepidus and must fight from necessity. 
In the just war doctrines of Augustine and Cicero, restoring or maintaining peace is equal in 
importance to the just cause of liberty, and again we find that many of the generals who 
Sallust purports to record are keen to show that they fight for peace.  Catiline, in his final 
speech, reminds his men that if they are victorious they will enjoy the benefits of peace, 
but if they are unsuccessful then they will not as they will continue in their wretched 
state.757  So Catiline uses peace (pax) as a means to spur on his army and not in the same 
way that he used libertas as a justification ? “ŶŽŶĞƐĂǀĞƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŽƌ ?ŚĞƐĂǇƐ ? “ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁĂƌ
ĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ?  ?nemo nisi victor pace bellum mutavit).758  Lepidus and Philippus, however, do 
use pax as a justification, not merely a motivation.  Lepidus, for example says that he does 
not wish to start a war but merely to return the rights of peace759, and he says that the 
peace that Sulla claims to have restored is in fact not a true peace but ratŚĞƌ  “ŐƵŝůƚĂŶĚ
ƚƌĞĂƐŽŶ ? (sceleri et parricidio).760  Nevertheless, the restoration of a true peace is obviously 
secondary to the rights of libertas ĂƐ ŚĞ ƐĂǇƐ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ŚĞ  “ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ƵŶŝƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ
danger preĨĞƌĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƉĞĂĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƐůĂǀĞƌǇ ? (potiorque visa est periculosa libertas quieto 
servitio)761, although he does claim that by fighting for libertas both libertas and a true pax 
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can be restored.  Philippus, places even more weight on the preservation of peace, his first 
words tell us that  “I wish above everything, Fathers of the Senate, that our state might be 
at peace ? (Maxume vellem, patres conscripti, rem publicam quietam esse).762  He tells the 
Senate repeatedly that the only way to preserve peace is by taking to the field, Lepidus has 
given them no choice and the longer they wait the bloodier the war will be.763 
In summary, the speeches and letters examined so far show that whenever a Roman is 
given the chance to defend his war he does so by following just war arguments found in 
other ancient authors, relying heavily on libertas, pax and the notion of defence as well as 
the more Sallustian justification of gloria.  In contrast, Sallust also professes to record a 
letter of one of the enemies of Rome, written from Mithridates to King Phraates III of 
Parthia.  This letter follows the same three justifications seen in the Roman generals.  
Firstly he cites libertas; this is not the clear central justification as it is in the other 
speeches, it is only mentioned briefly.  Mithridates says that it was his refusal to be a slave 
to Roman that caused them to provoke him into war764 and that, in strong contrast to the 
ZŽŵĂŶƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐ ?  “ĨĞǁŵĞŶĚĞƐŝƌĞ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ŵŽƐƚĂƌĞĐŽŶƚĞƚǁŝƚŚŵĂƐƚĞƌƐǁŚŽĂƌĞ ũƵƐƚ ? 
(namque pauci libertatem, pars magna iustos dominos volunt).765  However, although 
libertas is not used as a justification, the insistence that this is a defensive war is.  
Mithridates repeatedly stresses that Rome has forced him into this position, it is they that 
have attacked him it is the unjust motivations of greed and lust for dominion that have 
inspired them.766  Pax is also a common theme for Mithridates, who urges Phraates III to 
consider his offer because it is the only way that he can enjoy a life of peace.767  As is glory, 
ŚĞ ĂƐƐƵƌĞƐ WŚƌĂĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚŝƐ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ Ă ŶŽƚĂďůĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŽ ǁŝŶ  “distinguished fame by 
ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶƐ ? (egregia fama, si Romanos oppresseris).768  So the rules of just war 
are followed by a Pontic King as closely as they were by the Roman generals. 
The Sallustian principles for jus ad bellum have been established, but what of jus in bello?  
Again we see that Sallust conforms to the system present in Cicero and Augustine.  In the 
Bellum Catilinae just actions in warfare are discussed as part of the preface.  One of the 
ǀŝƌƚƵĞƐŽĨ ‘ŽůĚZŽŵĞ ?admired by Sallust was that the soldiers were moderate in victory.  It 
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is said that they took nothing from their enemy except the power to harm Rome.769  It is 
also stated that the Romans were fair in peace-ƚŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ  “ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
rather by conferring than by accepting favours ?  ?magisque dandis quam accipiundis 
beneficiis amicitias parabant).770  They also  “in time of peace, ruled by kindness rather than 
fear, and when wronged preferred forŐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƚŽǀĞŶŐĞĂŶĐĞ ? (in pace vero quod beneficiis 
magis quam metu imperium agitabant et accepta iniuria ignoscere quam persequi 
malebant).771  However, after the fall of Carthage, and the influx of luxury into the armies 
of Sulla, Sallust says that they have become cruel and affected by greed.772  The armies 
started to pillage from the enemy as well as their allies773 even to loot shrines and 
desecrate sacred places.774  So the just actions within and at the closing of battles are seen 
as closely linked to the concept of virtus and the decline of Roman morality after 146 BC. 
A final point of interest on just wars in Sallust is the author ?s own attitude to these 
justifications.  He admits that the reasons given to enter wars after 146 BC, whether given 
by optimates or populares, were only pretexts and in fact the goals were less honourable.  
Sallust asserts that whether the public motive was defence of the rights of the Senate or 
the mob at Rome, these were merely a pretence (simulantes).775  In the Historiae this 
ƚŚĞŵĞŝƐďƌŽĂĐŚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞǁŝƚŚŽŶůǇ^ƵůůĂŝŶŵŝŶĚǁŚĞŶŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ? “Ă
return to the republican constitution had been sought for the acquisition of booty, not for 
ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? (Quo pate factum est rempublicam praedae, non libertati 
repetitam).776  Sallust then says that the justifications of libertas and the rights of the 
nobility or crowds were used only as arguments known to be acceptable and were 
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The reasons that Sallust gives for writing history could not be further from those expressed 
by Caesar.  Whereas Sallust tells us that he has taken up the pen after putting down the 
sword777, Caesar never dropped his weapon while composing the Gallic Wars, and as such, 
his attitude to peace is much more consistent with the military pax expected of a soldier 
and attributed to the Romans by the majority of modern scholars.  This is most clearly seen 
ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞ ĂŶǇ ĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŝŶ 'ĂƵů ? dŚĞ ,ĞůǀĞƚŝŝ ?Ɛ ƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ
peace is only accepted after they have given over their weapons and hostages: 
 “hƉŽŶĂƌƌŝǀĂů ƚŚĞƌĞĂĞƐĂƌĚĞŵĂŶĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŽĨŚŽƐƚĂŐĞƐĂŶĚĂƌŵƐ ?
and the slaves who had deserted him. ?778 
 
Eo postquam Caesar pervenit, obsides, arma, servos qui ad eos perfugissent 
poposcit. 
 
The same requirements can be seen in Britain, where: 
 “dŚĞenemy were overcome in the fight; and as soon as they had recovered 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌŽƵƚƚŚĞǇĂƚŽŶĐĞƐĞŶƚĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐƚŽĂĞƐĂƌƚŽƚƌĞĂƚĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?779 
 
Hostes proelio superati, simul atque se ex fuga receperunt, statim ad 
Caesarem legatos de pace miserunt. 
 
'ĂůďĂ ?Ɛcampaigns end in an identical fashion: 
 “'ĂůďĂ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĨŽƵŐŚƚ ƐŽŵĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůďĂƚƚůĞƐĂŶĚƐƚŽƌŵĞĚƐĞǀĞƌĂůŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ
forts, after deputies were sent to him from all sides and hostages given, 
concluded a peace ?.780 
 
Galba secundis aliquot proeliis factis castellisque compluribus eorum 
expugnatis, missis ad eum undique legatis obsidibusque datis et pace facta. 
 
Even when the Helvetii offered to submit to Rome and relocate wherever Caesar wishes, he 
refused to consider the offer until hostages had been presented.781 
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Further to this, when Caesar refers to bringing peace to a tribe or country, it is often 
described as the result of military victory.   
 “ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞƐe events Caesar had every reason to suppose that Gaul was at 
peace again, for the Belgae were defeated, the Germans driven out, and the 
Seduni in the Alpine region cŽŶƋƵĞƌĞĚ ? ?782 
 
His rebus gestis cum omnibus de causis Caesar pacatam Galliam existimaret, 
superatis Belgis, expulsis Germanis, victis in Alpibus Sedunis,  
 
Or, it is the fear of impending military action that compels the Gauls to seek peace?  The 
Atuatuci, in fact, waited until they had seen the approaching siege weapons before they 
 “ƐĞŶƚĚĞƉƵƚŝĞƐƚŽĂĞƐĂƌƚŽƚƌĞĂƚĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?legatos ad Caesarem de pace miserunt).783 
This militarised form of peace in Gaul is repeated by Caesar in an exhortation to his troops 
in the first book of the Civil War.  He calls on his soldiers to protect the reputation of their 
leader, who had  W alongside them  W  “ĨŽƵŐŚƚ ŵĂŶǇ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ďĂƚƚůĞƐ, and pacified the 
ǁŚŽůĞ ŽĨ 'ĂƵů ĂŶĚ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?  ?gesserint plurimaque proelia secunda fecerint, omnem 
Galliam Germaniamque pacaverint).784  So even in a reported public address Caesar 
equates success in battles with the bringing of peace: this is pacification in its most nakedly 
aggressive form.  
In the Gallic Wars, however, Caesar is much more eager to present himself as a proponent 
of peace reached through compromise.785  He repeatedly emphasises the offers he made to 
Pompey that would have seen both men disband their armies.786  Caesar makes this most 
explicit when he refers to the agreement as  “ĂĞƋƵŝƐĐŽŶĚŝĐŝŽŶŝďƵƐ ?787, and even claims that 
he delayed his levies in the hope that a peace could be agreed (1.11.1).  As an end to 
hostilities here would mean not only a civil peace between two Roman armies, but also a 
personal peace between Caesar and Pompey, it is surprising that this is never described as 
concordia, but rather Caesar uses pax788, pactum789, quietus790, and even otium791 when the 
possibility of peace is presentĞĚ ?  dŚŝƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ďĞ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ
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emphasise his position as the embodiment of Rome and the republic while stressing the 
 ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ďĂƌďĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ĞŶĞŵŝĞƐ ?792  Like the Gauls, this enemy can only be 
brought to peace after military victory (even one Caesar tried to avoid), and like the Gauls 
the Pompeians are contrĂƐƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ZŽŵĂŶ ĂƌŵǇ.793  Therefore, like the Gauls, 
these are a foreign enemy794 and as there can be no concord between Rome and 
barbarians, then there can be no concord between Caesar and Pompey. 
Caesar further emphasises his personal desire for peace with Pompey by repeatedly 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ĂƐ ŚƵŶŐƌǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ŚĞ ŝƐ ƐŽ ĚĞƐƉĞƌĂƚĞ ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?
Labienus makes this clear in a barbarous threat; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax 
esse nulla potest  ? “dŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽƉĞĂĐĞĨŽƌƵƐƵŶƚŝůĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐŚĞĂĚŝƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶ ? ).795  In 
contrast, ĨƌĂŶŝƵƐĂŶĚWĞƚƌĞŝƵƐĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ “ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŽĨĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
nor of truce, and with utmost cruelty have slain men who through want of experience were 
ĚĞĐĞŝǀĞĚďǇĂƉƌĞƚĞŶĚĞĚĐŽůůŽƋƵǇ ? ?eos neque colloquii neque indutiarum iura servasse et 
homines imperitos et per colloquium deceptos crudelissime interfecisse).796  This has the 
purpose of contrasting CaĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐƌƵĞůƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WŽŵƉĞŝĂŶ
generals797, who not only refuse conferences but kill men through treachery and urge 
decapitation, both traits that will be seen in the barbarian slaying of Pompey in Egypt.798 
ĞƐƉŝƚĞ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ĂƐ ŝŶƚĞŶƚ ŽŶ ǁĂƌ, he portrays the 
Pompeian troops as enthusiastic for reconciliation.  For example, at Bellum Civile 1.74799, 
ƚŚĞĂƌŵǇŽĨĨƌĂŶŝƵƐĂŶĚWĞƚƌĞŝƵƐŵŝǆǁŝƚŚĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐĂƌŵǇ ?“ƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚǁŽĐĂŵƉƐƐĞĞŵĞĚ
already fused iŶƚŽ ŽŶĞ ?  ?adeo ut una castra iam facta ex binis viderentur).  When this 
happened, ƚŚĞůŽǁĞƌůĞǀĞůŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŚĞ^ƉĂŶŝƐŚĐŚŝĞĨƚĂŝŶƐĂŶĚĨƌĂŶŝƵƐ ?ƐŽŶďĞŐĂŶ
to negotiate terms of peace.  However, when Afranius received news of the fraternising he 
immediately dispersed the meeting in his camp and executed the Caesarian troops.  It is 
only by intimidation, punishment and forced oaths that Afranius and Petreius are able to 
convince their soldiers to continue the war (Sic terror oblatus a ducibus, crudelitas in 
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supplicio, nova religio iurisiurandi spem praesentis deditionis sustulit mentesque militum 
convertit et rem ad pristinam belli rationem redegit).800  In this episode we not only see the 
Pompeian generals contrasted with their soldiers, but we see a further contrast between 
ƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂĞƐĂƌ ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞĂĞƐĂƌŝĂŶƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶĨƌĂŶŝƵƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂƌĞĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ
ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ŝŶ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ĐĂŵƉ ĂƌĞ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĂŶĚ ĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
punishment, or stay with Caesar and retain their rank.801  Caesar makes the cruelty of 
ĨƌĂŶŝƵƐ ?ĂŶĚWĞƚƌĞŝƵƐ ?ĂĐƚƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚǁŚĞŶĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ ĨŝŶĂůůǇĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚ between 
the generals, and he specifically contrasts their cruelty with his desire, and that of his 
soldiers, for peace.802  This means that in this single incident Afranius and Petreius are not 
only distanced from Caesar and his troops, who acted with honour and restraint, but also 
from their own officers, soldiers and tribal chieftains, who were willing to attempt 
reconciliation with Caesar.  The only people who act for Petreius are his personal guard, 
slaves and barbarians (Armat familiam; cum hac et praetoria cohorte cetratorum 
barbarisque equitibus paucis) so their otherness is again associated with their refusal to 
seek peace. 
However, while it is not surprisŝŶŐƚŽƐĞĞWŽŵƉĞǇ ?ƐƚƌŽŽƉƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǇ
would, after all, ďĞũŽŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƐŝĚĞďǇĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ) ?ǁŚĂƚ
ŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƌĞƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŝƐƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞŽĨĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐƚƌŽƉƐĨŽƌďĂƚƚůĞ ?/ŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇďĞĨŽƌĞ
the mingling of the armies (discussed above) Caesar is urged from many within his own 
ranks to push for decisive victory.   “Legati, centuriones tribunique militum ? Ăůů ĐƌŽǁĚ
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around him and encourage Caesar to strike.803  However, Caesar refuses to enter open 
battle, not only because he does not want to risk the lives of his own men804, but also 
because he did not want to inflict a massacre on Roman citizens.805  This point is repeated 
ŝŶ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĂƚƚůĞ ŽĨPharsalus, where he reminds his army (again 
clamouring for battle) that he has made every effort not to expose his troops to bloodshed 
or destroy either army.806  ŐĂŝŶ ?ƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚŝƐĐůŽƐĞůǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ Ž
make a bloodless peace.  We are told the speech consisted of three parts, the loyalty and 
services they had done him807, and his desire for peace and to avoid battle.808  The reasons 
for Caesar presenting his army in this way are uncertain.  However, it is possible that it is 
used to furtŚĞƌ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ŝŶ ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ƚŽ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ǁŚŽ
refuse negotiations and are not concerned for the safety of their troops or the armies of 
ZŽŵĞ ?  ĂĞƐĂƌ ĂůƐŽ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ ĂƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ĨŽƌ ďĂƚƚůĞ ŝƐĐĂƵƐĞĚ ďǇ their loyalty to 
him809 ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞ ďǇ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ĂƌŵǇ ŝƐ ŝŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ?ǁŝƐŚĞƐ ?This ĂůůŽǁƐĂĞƐĂƌƚŽŶŽƚŽŶůǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞŚŝƐĂƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ůŽǇĂůƚǇƚŽŚŝŵ ?ďƵƚ
also his ability to control an army calling for blood.810  Again we are presented with a Caesar 
who embodies virtus in stark contrast to the Pompeians.811 
Returning to Bellum Gallicum, there are three places where Caesar refers to peace in ways 
that are less military and more co-operative and, therefore, much more similar to the way 
he refers to peace when describing his desire to end the civil war on equitable terms.  The 
first of these examples is at 1.3.  The Helvetii are preparing to march out of their old 
territory and decide they need first to spend two years stock-piling resources for the march 
ĂŶĚ  “ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŵŝƚǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĂƌĞƐƚ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?cum proximis civitatibus 
pacem et amicitiam confirmare).812  The second example is in a brief ethnographic 
digression on the Aduatuci.  Caesar says that they were descended from a small group of 
Cimbri and Teutoni settlers, who  “ǁĞƌĞŚĂƌĂƐƐĞĚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇǇĞĂƌƐďǇƚŚĞŝƌŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ
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fought sometimes on the offensive sometimes on the defensive; then by general 
ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵƉĞĂĐĞǁĂƐŵĂĚĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĐŚŽƐĞƚŚŝƐƉůĂĐĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞŝƌŚŽŵĞ ? (Hi 
post eorum obitum multos annos a finitimis exagitati, cum alias bellum inferrent, alias 
inlatum defenderent, consensu eorum omnium pace facta hunc sibi domicilio locum 
delegerant).813  The third example is very similar to the first and describes an envoy sent 
from the Aedui to Vercingetorix to secure peace and friendship.814  These are the only 
places in the Bellum Gallicum where peace is explicitly connected with ideas of agreement; 
amicitia at 1.3.1 and 7.55.4, and consensu at 2.29.5.  However, in all these examples Rome 
is nowhere to be seen, although peace can be connected with friendship and consensus in 
Gaul, this is only the case when it is a civil peace, and in the context of the Bellum Gallicum 
this must be a peace between Gauls.   
&ŽƌĂĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞĂĐĞƚŽďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚǁĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ
return to Sallust.  As stated above, when Sallust uses the term pacatus, he seems to imply a 
sense that the area is not merely pacified by force but has become an ally and should be 
treated with respect by Roman citizens.815  However, in Caesar it is clear that in the 
majority of its uses pacatus refers to an area brought to peace through force, and nowhere 
is any resulting respect for that area suggested.  For example, ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ƚŽůĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ
military achievements created peace through all Gaul816, or that because of the defeats of 
the Belgae, Germans and Alpine tribes Caesar believed all Gaul was pacified.817  Thus, like 
pax, pacatus is essentially a military status. 
The only times Caesar refers to foreign tribes and lands using words derived from pax in a 
way that does not express dominance is when he gives details of troop numbers supplied 
by pacified tribes.  Caesar, unlike Sallust, does not even display any obvious sympathy for 
the pacified areas in this context.  In the Bellum Civile the troops from Gaul are only 
mentioned as part of a list when we are told that troops also came from Gaul quam ipse 
pacaverat (which he had himself pacified).818  Therefore, here it seems that the use of 
pacare is about Caesar emphasising his own achievements in Gaul, not the protected status 
of the peaceful area.  In the other two examples of this type it seems that pacare is used 
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for the practical purpose of differentiating the conquered tribes from those still at arms.  
 “Decimus Brutus the younger was put in charge of the fleet and of the Gallic ships already 
ordered to assemble from the territory of the Pictones, the Satoni and the others now 
ƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?Decimum Brutum adulescentem classi Gallicisque navibus, quas ex Pictonibus et 
Santonis reliquisque pacatis regionibus convenire iusserat).819  tŚŝůĞ ĂĞƐĂƌ  “ƐĞŶƚ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ
the Rhine into Germany to the states which he had reduced to peace in previous years, and 
ĨĞƚĐŚĞĚŚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂŶĚůŝŐŚƚĂƌŵĞĚŝŶĨĂŶƚƌǇ ? ?trans Rhenum in Germaniam mittit 
ad eas civitates quas superioribus annis pacaverat, equitesque ab his arcessit et levis 
armaturae pedites).820  So in each case it is made clear that only tribes already conquered 
by Caesar are supplying troops.  These are not an independent barbarian force or 
mercenaries.  It should also be noted that it is unlikely that these troops were sent by the 
Gauls voluntarily.  The supply of troops was a common condition imposed on a defeated 
enemy by Rome.  This is evident in the use of iubere (to order) and arcessere (to summon).  
These are supplied at Caesar ?Ɛ command and the imposition of this levy is a statement of 
Gallic subservience, not of any amicable relationship between them and Caesar.   
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐĂŶĚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ, there is 
one event in BG that shareƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ
march to Bratuspantium to face the Bellovaci.  When the army was five miles from the 
town all the old men surrendered to Caesar and promised not to take up arms against 
Rome.821  This passage shares striking similarities with the descriptions at fr. 2.69 and 2.75 
ĨƌŽŵ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐHistoriae, where it is the elders of Isaura Nova and an unnamed Celtiberian 
town that are the first to ask Rome for peace. However, whereas Sallust associates 
advanced age more generally with distaste for war822, Caesar does not make that 
connection.  In fact as his army continues its approach towards Bratuspantium, more pleas 
ĂƌĞŵĂĚĞ ĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚŽǁŶĂŶĚĂůƐŽďǇŝǀŝĐŝĂĐƵƐ ?ĂƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ
Gallic retinue, and the town is allowed to surrender without battle.823  So this episode is not 
used by Caesar to make a general point about increasing age causing a dislike for war, as no 
one from the town, whatever their age, ultimately shows any military resistance.   
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At the opening of this chapter, ĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐƌĞƉĞĂƚĞĚŽĨĨĞƌƐŽĨƉĞĂĐĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĂŶĚ
agreement during the civil war were contrasted with the peace he created in Gaul through 
military victory and dominance.  The possible reason for this dissimilarity will now be 
considered.  The most likely reason for Caesar to appear open to peace (and therefore 
reluctant for war) in the Bellum Civile is that the Romans had a well-established fear and 
hatred of civil wars.824  Knowing this, therefore, Caesar needed to present himself as being 
forced into battle.  Every time he offered to end the war, one of the Pompeian generals 
made this an impossibility825 and Caesar could not surrender to allow a Pompeian victory to 
prevent the war because this would result in the end of the Republic.826  However, there 
was no similar need to appear desperate for peace during the pacification of Gaul.   
Opinion is divided on whether or not Caesar had any interest in justifying his conquest of 
GaƵů ?^ŽŵĞĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĂĞƐĂƌ ?ƐĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĞůĞĨƚŚŝƐƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌďĂƚƚůĞ, before 
ZŽŵĞ ?ƐĂůůŝĞƐŚĂĚĂƐŬĞĚĨŽƌŚĞůƉ827, shows he had no interest in justifying his actions, but 
rather wished to highlight his initiative and skill.828  While others contenĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ
reasons for his refusal to allow the Helvetii passage through the province (namely, the 
Helvetii defeat of Lucius Cassius in 107 BC, and to protect Roman territory from possible 
harm)829, are ample evidence that he did wish to provide justification for his actions.830  If 
the first possibility is correct, then it is clear that if Caesar felt he could provoke this war 
without just cause, he need show no remorse in his execution of it.831  Yet if Caesar did in 
fact wish to justify his actions, it must be noted that he was justifying them to his audience 
at Rome, not the Gauls or Germans832, so even this justification shows no reason to think 
that Caesar should shy-away from this war as he must the civil war. 
A final point of interest can be found in the contrasting ways that Caesar treats a defeated 
enemy in the BG and the Bellum Civile.  As has already been stated, in many cases Caesar 
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secures peace with an enemy in the BG by first demanding arms and hostages be 
surrendered to him before peace is declared833, and in situations where he feels this will 
not suffice, he is willing to commit massacres to prevent further revolts.834  In the Bellum 
Civile Caesar was much less destructive in his treatment of a defeated enemy and 
enthusiastically recorded his acts of clemency.835  Nonetheless, it has frequently been 
asserted by modern scholars, such as Braund, Milnor and Earl, ƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĂƚǁĞŵŝŐŚƚƌĞŐĂƌĚ
ĂƐĂZŽŵĂŶĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚŽĨ ‘ĨŽƌŐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚƵƌŶƐŽƵƚƚŽďĞŝŶĞǆƚƌŝĐĂďůǇĂssociated with absolute 
poweƌ ?.836  To accept ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛoffers of clementia acknowledges his position of power over 
his fellow senators837, and by offering his personal clemency to Roman generals Caesar 
subverted the concept of clementia which, until his time, had been a benefaction of the 
Roman state.838  In so doing, Caesar lowered the status of those he forgave to that of 
defeated barbarians839, while once more equating himself with the governance of Rome 
and raising his own status above that of other senators.  He emphasised this point further 
by creating the cult of Clementia Caesaris840 therefore suggesting his clemency had divine 
authority.841   
In conclusion, Caesar envisions a much more militaristic and dominant peace than Sallust 
does in his writings.  In Gaul peace is always on his terms, either allowed only after his 
dominance has been acknowledged by the giving of arms and hostages or after the enemy 
has been all but wiped out in a crushing defeat.  Even once these areas have been 
conquered by brutal means, they are only referred to as pacatus in contexts that highlight 
the obligation these tribes must fulfil now that they are subject to Roman imperialism.  
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ǁŚŝůĞZŽŵĞ ?ƐŚĂƚƌĞĚŽĨĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌŵĂĚĞŝƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌĂĞƐĂƌƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶƚĞŶƚŽŶ
finding a bloodless solution for the impending war with Pompey, his presentation of his 
enemy is such that the war must still be fought in order to save Rome from tyranny.  Then, 
once the Pompeians are defeated, peace is granted because of his clementia, which again 
allows Caesar to use pax to call attention to his own dominance, both militarily (as in Gaul) 
and also politically. 
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>ŝǀǇ ?ƐAb Urbe Condita originally consisted of one hundred and forty-two books covering 
over seven hundred years of history.  It comprises events from before the founding of the 
ĐŝƚǇ ?ƚŽ>ŝǀǇ ?ƐŽǁŶ ůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ ?842  However, of the original work, only books 1-10, and 21-45 
survive in near complete condition: books 1-10 cover the early history of the city to the 
Samnite Wars; and books 21-45 record the wars with Hannibal and Macedon.  This accident 
of survival means that a direct comparison with the earliest history of Rome, as recorded in 
Sallust, will be possible.  This can then be used not only to consider how standardised the 
role of peace was in the legends surrounding the formation of the city, but, if a stark 
difference is noted, how the authors use of peace in this period may be representative of 
their attitudes found elsewhere in their works.   
Before examining the details of these myths it should be noted that there are several 
purported similarities in the reasons Sallust and Livy wrote histories and why they selected 
the topics they did.  Livy, like Sallust, saw part of the purpose of history as providing a 
moral lesson for the reader.  Just as Sallust chose the Catilinarian Conspiracy for the topic 
of his monograph because it highlighted the depth of immorality to which the Roman 
nobility had sunk and acted as a warning from recent history, so Livy believed 
contemporary readers should welcome his own work because it could provide examples of 
great men from the past who should be remembered and imitated.843  Both authors also 
believed that Rome had undergone a sharp decline in morality since the strong principles of 
ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚĞƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁŚŝůĞ^ĂůůƵƐƚĨŝǆĞĚthis decline in 146BC and the destruction 
of Carthage that allowed Rome to luxuriate in the safety that came from having no 
ĚĂŶŐĞƌŽƵƐ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĞŶĞŵǇ ? >ŝǀǇ ĂĚŽƉƚƐ ƚŚĞ ůĞƐƐ ĐŚƌŽŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ  “ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ Ă
progressive degeneration of society from primitive purity of manners and simplicity of 
ůŝĨĞ ? ?844 
ƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶŶŽƚĞĚĂďŽǀĞ ?ŝŶ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐŽĨZŽŵĞŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĞĂƌůǇ
man lived in peace, free from greed and is at pains to emphasise the importance of 
concordia, while minimising the rolĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĞĂƌůǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ ? ŝŶ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ĂŝŵƐ ĂŶĚ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?
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ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶ>ŝǀǇ ?/ĨǁĞĨŝƌƐƚĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ>ŝǀǇ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
ĞŶĞĂƐ ? ĨůŝŐht from Troy and his time in Italy peace is indeed an important factor in this 
legend.  Aeneas and Antenor were the two Trojans allowed to leave the city uninjured 
 “because they had always been advocates for peace and the return ŽĨ,ĞůĞŶ ? ?quia pacis 
reddendaeque Helenae semper auctores fuerunt).845  It is pax that Livy says has allowed 
Aeneas to depart for Italy, and he also states that his sources are in general agreement on 
this matter.846  Once Aeneas arrives on the shore of Italy Livy tells us that the agreement in 
the sources has ended and there are two available traditions from which he could draw.847  
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŝƐĂŵƵĐŚĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵǇƚŚƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚŝŶsŝƌŐŝů ?ƐAeneid books 7-12, 
which tells of a battle between Latinus and Aeneas, which the Trojan wins, followed by 
ƉĞĂĐĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ŽĨ ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĞŶĞĂƐ ĂŶĚ >ĂƚŝŶƵƐ ? ĚĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ?848  The 
second account has Latinus approach Aeneas between the battle lines and question him on 
ŚŝƐ ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƉůĂŶƐ ?  >ĂƚŝŶƵƐ ŝƐ ƐŽ ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ďǇ ĞŶĞĂƐ ? ŶŽďŝůŝƚǇ  “ĂŶĚ Ăƚ ŚŝƐ ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ?
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĂůŝŬĞĨŽƌǁĂƌŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?et animum vel bello vel paci paratum)849, that they make 
a mutual alliance without bloodshed and the armies saluted each other before this 
agreement was sealed with the marriages, common to both descriptions.850  So it seems 
that by providing the reader with two versions of this myth - ŽŶĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ ĞŶĞĂƐ ?
military supremacy, the other the agreement of the two sides  W Livy has not allowed for an 
evaluation to be made.  However, not only is the second account noticeably longer, which 
in itself could add credibility to the tale851, but it also reaffirms the characterisation of the 
first description of Aeneas at 1.1.1 and his connection with the civilised world of the 
'ƌĞĞŬƐ ?  tŚŝůĞ ? ďǇ ƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ >ĂƚŝŶƵƐ ? Ğǀaluation of Aeneas (as both ready for war and 
ƉĞĂĐĞ ) ? >ŝǀǇ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƐ ĞŶĞĂƐ ? ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĐŽƵƌĂŐĞ  ?ǁŚŝůĞ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ
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 Livy, 1.1.1 (adapted from Foster, 1919). 
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 ibid, omnium satis constat. 
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 Livy, 1.1.8. 
850
 Livy, 1.1.7-10. 
851
 The first account being only 11 words long (alii proelio victum Latinum pacem cum Aenea, deinde 
affinitatem iunxisse tradunt; 1.1.6), while second is 115 (alii, cum instructae acies constitissent, 
priusquam signa canerent processisse Latinum inter primores ducemque advenarum evocasse ad 
conloquium; percunctatum deinde qui mortales essent, unde aut quo casu profecti domo quidve 
quaerentes in agrum Laurentinum exissent, postquam audierit multitudinem Troianos esse, ducem 
Aeneam, filium Anchisae et Veneris, cremata patria domo profugos sedem condendaeque urbi locum 
quaerere, et nobilitatem admiratum gentis virique et animum vel bello vel paci paratum, dextra data 
fidem futurae amicitiae sanxisse.  inde foedus ictum inter duces, inter exercitus salutationem factam; 
Aeneam apud Latinum fuisse in hospitio; ibi Latinum apud penates deos domesticum publico 
adiunxisse foedus filia Aeneae in matrimonium data.  Ea res utique Troianis spem adfirmat tandem 
stabili certaque sede finiendi erroris. oppidum condunt; 1.1.7-10). 
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that set him apart from most other Trojans, and indeed from most of the heroes in the 
Hellenic tradition his readiness for peace".852  Livy echoes the development of this co-
operation seen in Sallust, ǁŚĞŶŚĞ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚƌƵƐƚŝŶŐin these friendly spirits of the two 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĞĂĐŚĚĂǇŵŽƌĞƵŶŝƚĞĚ ? ?fretusque his animis coalescentium in 
dies magis duorum populorum Aeneas).853  Further, also following the same path as Sallust, 
Livy explains how this new alliance was crucial to the Latins (as the Trojans settlers now 
called themselves and their Italian allies)854 in their ability to defend themselves 
militarily.855 
The next passage of ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂďƌŝĞĨƐƵŵŵĂƌǇŽĨĞŶĞĂƐ ?ĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĂŶƚƐ856, is the 
life and reign of Romulus and the associated myths.857  We are told very little about the 
early life of Romulus and his twin, except for their fondness for hunting and how it helped 
train them physically and mentally for attacking bandits, which quickly became their 
favoured pastime (1.4.8 W9).  From their rustic beginnings Livy emphasises their strength 
and aggression, as well as their ability to lead men858, and it is this strength and aggression 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ZĞŵƵƐ ? ĚĞĂƚŚ ?  Ɛ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ
Latinus and Aeneas, Livy once more provides his reader with two conflicting versions of 
ZĞŵƵƐ ?ĚĞĂƚŚ ?859  The first version sees the twins take up positions on separate hills waiting 
ĨŽƌƵƐƉŝĐĞƐ ?ZĞŵƵƐƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂƐŝŐŶŽĨƐŝǆǀƵůƚƵƌĞƐ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ƐŝŐŶŝƐŽĨƚǁĞůǀĞ ?/ŶƚŚĞ
dispute between the two groups of followers over which was more important: the number 
or occasion of the vultures, Remus was killed.860  The second account has Romulus kill 
ZĞŵƵƐŝŶĂĨŝƚŽĨƌĂŐĞĂĨƚĞƌZĞŵƵƐŵŽĐŬŝŶŐůǇũƵŵƉĞĚŽǀĞƌZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ŚĂůĨ-built walls.861  It is 
less clear in this instance which of the two versions is favoured by Livy (if, indeed, either is 
favoured), although Miles again believes the second myth in intended by Livy to be the 
most likely as it supports the characterisation we have seen of Romulus in the account of 
his early life as aggressive and reckless.862  DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝŶ>ĞǀĞŶĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚŝŶƚĞƌƚĞǆƵĂů
analysis of these myths he also concludes that the purpose of these parallel accounts is to 
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 “ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚZŽŵƵůƵƐĂƐĂǁĂƌƌŝŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?ǁŚŽƐĞǀŝĐĞƐĂƌĞŽŶĞƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚŚĂƐƚĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ĚĞĐĞŝƚ ? ?863 Therefore, whichever of these accounts Livy intended his readers to favour864, it 
seems that he has highlighted the militaristic and aggressive aspects of his reign and 
character.865  The emphasis of Romulus as a warrior king is further achieved by removing 
non-military religious aspects from his reign.866  It is generally accepted that by magnifying 
ƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌĂŶĚ ƌĞŝŐŶ ?ǁŚŝůĞĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚŝŶŐŚŝƐ ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐ ƌŽůĞ ? 
Livy has created a stark contrast between Romulus (the warrior king) and Numa Pompilius 
(the priest king).867  Therefore, it is necessary to contrast the reign and character of 
ZŽŵƵůƵƐǁŝƚŚEƵŵĂŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞǁŚĂƚ>ŝǀǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
to his presentation of peace.  However, before turning to Numa, there is one more event 
ĨƌŽŵ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞŝŐŶ ŽĨ ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚered in any examination of peace in 
ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ PƚŚĞ ‘ZĂƉĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĂďŝŶĞƐ ? ?868 
dŚĞďŽŶĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚŽƌǇĂƌĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶĂůůƚŚĞĂŶĐŝĞŶƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ PZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ŶĞǁƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ
had an abundance of men but lacked the required number of women to grow as a 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐŽ ƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĂďĚƵĐƚĞĚǁŽŵĞŶ ĨƌŽŵŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐ ƚƌŝďĞƐ ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽŵĞĞƚ
ƚŚŝƐŶĞĞĚ ?DŝůĞƐƐĞĞƐ>ŝǀǇ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐŵǇƚŚĂƐĂƌĐŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨZŽŵĂŶŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞďƌŝĚĞ
is separated from her old family and inculcated into her new family, a process by which 
authority is passed from the father to the husband.  As well as acknowledging the 
importance of intermarriage in the forming of alliances that aided the spread of Roman 
power in Italy, it also echoes the political importance of political marriage uŶŝŽŶƐŝŶ>ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ
own time.869  He then focuses on the versions in Livy and Ovid, who provide much more 
detail on the induction of the women into the Roman community than Cicero, Dionysius 
ĂŶĚ WůƵƚĂƌĐŚ ?  /Ŷ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚǁŽ ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ DŝůĞƐ ŶŽƚĞƐ Ă ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĂůĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĨĞŵĂůĞ ?
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 /HYHQH/HYHQHUHDFKHVWKLVFRQFOXVLRQE\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ/LY\¶V
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Ennius (Annals 72-91Sk = 77-96V.) or on the relief on the Temple of Quirinus (ibid 130; Evans 1992, 
97-100), and by excluding elements that involve Romulus attempting to trick his brother by lying 
about what auspices he has received Livy removes the possibility that Romulus could be accused of 
deceit (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.86-7; Diodorus 8.5).  While in the second Livy has Romulus as the 
unjustified murderer of Remus, rather than the more conventional choice of Celer (Diodorus 8.5; 
Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.87.4; Ovid, Fasti 4.837-48; Plutarch Romulus 10.1-2) or seek to justify 
RomulXV¶DFWLRQV3OXWDUFKQuaest. Rom. 27; Levene 1993, 129-132.). 
864
 If, indeed, either is intended to be favoured; Stem 2007, 446-7. 
865
 Levene 1993, 131; Miles 1995, 145-6.   
866
 Levene 1993, 131-2.   
867
 Levene 1993, 131; Blair DeBrohun 2007, 260; Penella 1987, 234-5; Liebeschuetz 1967, 48. 
868
 Livy 1.9-13.  Also found in varying forms in Cic. Rep. 2.12-14; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2.30-47; 
Ovid Fasti 3.167-258; Plutarch Romulus 14-20; Brown 1995, 291-319; Milnor 2012, 101. 
869
 Miles 1995, 179-219. 
Andrew Crane  137 
 
perspective highlighted by Ovid and Livy respectively.  Miles concludes ƚŚĂƚ KǀŝĚ ?Ɛ
dehumanising of the Sabines is meant as a challenge to the ideology of marriage based on 
ƵŶĞƋƵĂů ĨŽƌĐĞ ? ǁŚŝůĞ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĞnd shows an 
ĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ZŽŵĂŶ ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ? ďƵƚŽŶĞ ƚŚĂƚ  “ĞǆƉŽƐĞƐ
limitations inherent in the Roman practice of trying to base ideal social and political unions 
ŽŶ Ă ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŵĞŶ ĂŶĚ ǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?870  However, although Miles 
convincingly argues that Livy increases the focus on the experience of the women, the 
reason he chose to do this may not purely be as an attempt to make a judgement about 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ?DŝůŶŽƌ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƐĞĞƐ>ŝǀǇ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞĞǆƉerience of the Sabine 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ĂƐ  “ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨĞŵĂůĞ ĨŽƌŐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ
originating in the private world of women but having profound effects on the public world 
ŽĨŵĞŶ ? ?871 
Brown focuses more fully ŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ>ŝǀǇ ?s promotion of the women to the heart 
of the legend.872  Brown notes that as well as maximising the importance of the role of the 
women, Livy also contains several other disparities with other accounts on the abduction.  
He minimises the political element of ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ873, ignores the possibility that 
Romulus was motivated purely by a love of war874 ?ĂŶĚ “ƉůĂĐĞƐƚŚĞƐƉŽƚůŝŐŚƚƉƵƌĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞ
ǁŽŵĞŶ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?875  Once the women are abducted there are further contrasts 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ŝŶ ŽƚŚĞƌ ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ƚĞǆƚƐ ?  >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ŝƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
much less with justification and more with healing and reconciliation with the women876, 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŵƵĐŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ  “ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ ŝŶƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?877 between the Roman men and Sabine 
women, and the role of private desires is all but eliminated878 ? ǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƐ  “ ?ŵ ?ĞŶ ĂŶĚ
ǁŽŵĞŶŝŶĞĂĐŚĐĂƐĞďƌŝĚŐĞƚŚĞŐƵůĨďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞŵ ? ?879  Most importantly of all, only Livy 
 “ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ,ĞƌƐŝůŝĂ880 ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐWůƵƚĂƌĐŚ ?Ɛ
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ĂŶĚ ŝŽŶǇƐŝƵƐ ? ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐ ďŽƚŚ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ? ŽǁŶ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐ ƉƌŽǁĞƐƐ881, unlike Livy who 
shows Romulus still exulting in his victories when Hersilia approaches him.882  Hersilia is the 
first person in Livy to use the word concordia ǁŚĞŶƐŚĞ  “ďĞŐs [Romulus] to forgive their 
parents and receive them into the state; which would, in this way, be able to gain in 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚďǇŚĂƌŵŽŶǇ ? ?orat ut parentibus earum det veniam et in civitatem accipiat; ita rem 
coalescere concordia posse).883  The way that the women instigate the peace also allows 
the negotiations to be entered on equal terms.884  Thus, Romulus can create the concordia 
Hersilia has requested without showing any military weakness in a request for peace that 
would have contradicted the characterisation Livy had been at pains to emphasise from 
ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ? ĞĂƌůǇ ůŝĨĞ ?885  Livy has moved the first concordia in Rome from the early 
settlement of the Trojans886, to the Rape of the Sabines in order to present it as an 
exemplary lesson on the importance of harmony and unity both in marriage and at socio-
political level.887 
It has already been stated that the non-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ZŽŵƵůƵƐ ? ƌĞŝŐŶ ǁĞƌĞ
ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚǁŝƚŚEƵŵĂWŽŵƉŝůŝƵƐ ?ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
second, and most peaceful, kiŶŐ ?>ĞǀĞŶĞƐĞĞƐƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĂƐŽŶĞ “ďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁĂƌƌŝŽƌ-king 
and priest-ŬŝŶŐ ? ?888  However, it can be demonstrated that Livy carefully selects the 
available traditions surrounding Numa in order to increase the importance of peace in his 
reign, even at the expense of the importance of religion.  For example, the fetial priesthood 
and all associated rituals were often described as instigated by Numa.889  /Ŷ ŝŽŶǇƐŝƵƐ ?
account of the founding of the fetials he explicitly states that Numa established the 
priesthood when he was on the verge of making war with Fidenae890, and while Plutarch 
does not include this detail, his description of the role of the fetial priests as only required 
when war was expected means that Dionysius explains, and Plutarch implies, that at least 
once in his reign Numa was considering undertaking a war.  However, the fetials do not 
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appear in Livy until the Reign of Tullus.891  It seems peculiar that Livy, who more often 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ EƵŵĂ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ of Roman religion892, should choose to 
remove this priesthood from the mythic tradition, unless he did so in order to remove even 
ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨǁĂƌĨƌŽŵEƵŵĂ ?ƐƌĞŝŐŶ ? 
dŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨEƵŵĂ ?ƐƌĞŝŐŶ ?ƚŽĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ
with the era of war under Romulus, is not only an argumentum e silentio.  The most striking 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĂƚEƵŵĂƐĞĞƐ “ǁĂƌŝƚƐĞůĨ  ?ĂƐ ?ĚĞŐƌĂĚŝŶŐ ?893 ?ƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶƐ ?ŚĂĚŐƌŽǁŶ
 “ǁŝůĚĂŶĚƐĂǀĂŐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁĂƌĨĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐĨŝĞƌĐĞƌĂĐĞ “ŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞƐŽĨƚĞŶĞĚďǇĚŝƐƵƐĞŽĨ
ĂƌŵƐ ?  ?efferari militia animos...mitigandum ferocem populum armorum desuetudine 
ratus).894  This is the antithesis of the more common prevailing attitude in antiquity that the 
ƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ĐĂƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŚĂĚ Ă ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽŶ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛvirtus.895  However, 
Numa accepts that prolonged periods of peace can have a negative impact on discipline, 
even if the military is not required for virtus.896  Therefore, he decided that the citizens 
must be kept occupied so as not to become idle: the first example given for this is the 
building oĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞŵƉůĞ ŽĨ :ĂŶƵƐ ĂƐ  “ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ǁĂƌ ?  ?indicem pacis 
bellique).897  Numa does not believe that a bellicose nation, such as the Romans, can 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂƉƌŽůŽŶŐĞĚƉĞĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĨĞĂƌ ?ďƵƚŚĞƐĞƚƐŽƵƚƚŽƌĞƉůĂĐĞĂ “ĨĞĂƌŽĨƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?
(metus hostium )ǁŝƚŚĂ  “ĨĞĂƌŽĨ ƚŚĞŐŽĚƐ ?  ?metus deorum), in order to create peace and 
stall the degrading nature of warfare.898  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ũƵƐƚ ĂƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ ŶĞǁ ƉŝĞƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ
subdues their anger and maintains discipline, it also prevents her neighbours from 
attacking, as they would consider it sacrilege to harm such a place.899   
Livy closes his account of Numa with a reminder of the double foundation of Romulus and 
Numa: 
                                                          
891
 Livy 1.24; Penella 1987, 233. 
892
 Liebeschuetz 1967, 48. 
893
 Ogilvie 1965, 95. 
894
 Livy 1.19.2. 
895
 Ogilvie 1965, 95; cf Tacitus Hist. 6DOOXVW¶VEHOLHIWKDWDIRUHLJQHQHP\ZDVHVVHQWLDO
see, Cat. 10-11; Iug.,41; Hist. fr. 1.12, 13 & 14McG =  1.12, 16, 14M; Earl 1967, 13, 15, 52; Levene 
2000, 78-9; McDonnell 2006, 375-7. 
896
 Livy 1.19.4; Ogilvie 1965, 94-5; Blair DeBrohun 2007, 261. 
897
 Livy 1.19.2 (my translation). 
898
 Livy 1.19.4. 
899
 Livy 1.21.2. 
Andrew Crane  140 
 
 “dŚƵƐƚǁŽƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞŬŝŶŐƐŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐ ?ŽŶĞďǇǁĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌďǇƉĞĂĐĞ ?
promoted the nation's welfare... The state was not only strong, but was also 
ǁĞůůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌƚƐďŽƚŚŽĨǁĂƌĂŶĚŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?900 
ita duo deinceps reges, alius alia via, ille bello, hic pace, civitatem auxerunt... 
cum valida tum temperata et belli et pacis artibus erat civitas. 
This makes the contrast between the first two kings of Rome as one between war and 
peace even more explicit than it had been in the original descriptions.  Moreover, it shows 
Livy emphasising neither war nor peace, but insisting on the necessity of balance between 
the two forces for the survival of the state.  Therefore, perhaps Blair DeBrohun is right in 
suggesting ƚŚĂƚ  “>ŝǀǇŽĨĨĞƌƐĂ ƐƵďƚůĞ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ?ǁŚŽƐĞŽǁŶƌĞĐĞŶƚĐůŽƐƵƌĞŽĨ
:ĂŶƵƐ ?ŐĂƚĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐƉƌŽĐůĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůƉĞĂĐĞ ?ƌĂŝƐĞĚŚŽƉĞƚŚĂƚŚĞ
would now himself follow the example of Numa ?.901 
Staying with Numa and the temple of Janus ?ǁĞĐĂŶƐĞĞĂǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ>ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ
use of pacatus ƚŚĂƚ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐ Śŝŵ ĨƌŽŵ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂůůǇ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝƐƚƐ  ‘ƉĂĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  >ŝǀǇ
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ǁŚĞŶŽƉĞŶ ?ƚŚĞƚĞŵƉůĞ ?ŵŝŐŚƚƐŝŐŶŝĨǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐŝŶĂƌŵƐ ?ǁŚĞŶĐůŽƐĞĚ
that all the peoples rouŶĚ ĂďŽƵƚ ǁĞƌĞ ƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚ ?902 (apertus ut in armis esse civitatem, 
clausus pacatos circa omnes populos significaret).903  He then recalls that this has occurred 
ƚŚƌĞĞƚŝŵĞƐ ŝŶZŽŵĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ŽŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƌĞŝŐŶŽĨEƵŵĂ ?ŽŶĐĞǁŚĞŶDĂŶůŝƵƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ
the First Punic tĂƌ ? ĂŶĚ ŽŶĐĞ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ? ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ Ăƚ ĐƚŝƵŵ ?904  Admittedly, two of 
these three examples do indeed refer to the military pacification of an enemy by a Roman 
army (Carthage in the First Punic War and Mark Antony and Cleopatra at Actium).  
However, this should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that the first time the gates of 
the temple were closed was during the uniquely peaceful reign of Numa.  Furthermore, Livy 
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇƐƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “EƵŵĂĐůŽƐĞĚƚŚĞƚĞŵƉůĞĂĨƚĞƌĨŝƌƐƚƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞŐŽŽĚǁŝůůŽĨĂůů ƚhe 
ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐ ƚƌŝďĞƐ ďǇ ĂůůŝĂŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐ ?  ?clauso eo cum omnium circa finitimorum 
societate ac foederibus iunxisset animos)905 and that the neighbouring tribes maintained 
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their peace with Rome due to their piety not their military prowess.906  Thus the peoples 
around Rome have become pacatus due in no way to any military intervention on behalf of 
Numa.907  Pacatus, then, can in this instance have no implicit military or forceful 
requirement, but can be built on a purely political and religious footing.  That a state of 
pacatus can be created both through peaceful, equal negotiations and through military 
dominance is even more explicitly stated when Livy states:  
 “/ƚ ǁĂƐ Ă ĐƵƐƚŽŵ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ZŽŵĂŶƐ ? ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶĐŝĞŶƚ ƚŝŵĞƐ ? ŶŽƚ ƚŽ
exercise any authority over others, as subject to them, in cases where they did 
not enter into friendship with them by a league and on equal terms, until they 
ŚĂĚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂůůƚŚĞǇƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ?ƐĂĐƌĞĚĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĂŶĞ ?908 
Mos uetustus erat Romanis, cum quo nec foedere nec aequis legibus iungeretur 
amicitia, non prius imperio in eum tamquam pacatum uti quam omnia diuina 
humanaque dedidisset, obsides accepti, arma adempta, praesidia urbibus 
imposita forent. 
Here it is suggested that a community would be considered pacatus either if they entered 
 “ŝŶƚŽĂ ĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŵďǇĂ ůĞĂŐƵĞĂŶĚŽŶĞƋƵĂů ƚĞƌŵƐ ? Žƌ ? ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇĐŚŽƐĞ ƚŽ ĨŝŐŚƚ ?
 “ƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƐƵƌƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂůůƚŚĞǇƉŽƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ? ? 
The dual use of pacatus in this passage to refer to situations of military victory and 
negotiated peace maintained through mutual respect can be seen elsewhere in Livy.  For 
example, after a series of Latin revolts in 338 BC, the Fundani and Formiani were offered 
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉ  “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ƚŚĞǇŚĂĚĂůǁĂǇƐĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚĂ ƐĂĨĞĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?quod per fines eorum tuta pacataque semper fuisset via).909  Therefore, these 
tribes are offered benefits because they had stayed pacatus without the need to violence 
or aggression.  However, a more military form of pacatus, like that found in Caesar, and 
those created by Manlius and Augustus, is also present at times in Livy.  When Hannibal is 
ŝŶ /ƚĂůǇ  “the [other tribes] were ƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĨĞĂƌŽƌďƌŝďĞƌǇ ?  ?ceteris metu aut pretio 
pacatis)910, and when the Sabines were chased from the Capitol it is said to be pacatus.911  
The most common use in Livy of terms derived from paco helps explain why he can see it as 
both a forced, military state and one peacefully negotiated.  This is when Livy uses pacatus 
in a neutral sense, simply to differentiate a place or people as not at war, or not violent.  
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This includes those instances when Livy is using it purely as an adjective for peaceful, or an 
ĂĚǀĞƌď ĨŽƌ ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇ ?  &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ “ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵů ĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Etruscan king (pacatae profectioni)912 ?ǁŚĞŶĂĐĂŵƉŝƐƉŝƚĐŚĞĚŽŶ “ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůĂŶĚ ? ?pacato 
agro)913 ? Žƌ ? ^ĐŝƉŝŽ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞĞĐŚ ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĐĂƌƌŝĞĚ ƚŽ ĂƌƚŚĂŐĞ because 
while Italy is at stake, Africa ŝƐĂƚ “ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?Africam pacatam esse)914, meaning simply, free 
from the violence that Italy had experienced.  Therefore, Livy is content to use forms of 
paco to describe both military and non-military peace because he uses it elsewhere to 
mean any peaceful, non-violent, or undisturbed condition or place. 
Despite Livy using pacatus in a more neutral way than Caesar, the Ab Urbe Condita ?Ɛ
account of the Battle of the Caudine Forks shows the most sustained, negative 
presentations of pax in any of the Latin historians.  The Roman army, finding themselves 
surrounded and unable to offer any resistance, surrender six hundred equestrian hostages, 
hand over all their weapons, and pass under a yoke to symbolise their submission.915  Livy is 
at pains to emphasise that this capitulation was only a sponsio not a foedus, and therefore 
only a personal guarantee by those who made the peace and not binding, politically or 
religiously, because the names of the fetials were not included on the treaty.916  However, 
whatever the technical aspects of the legal form the treaty took, Livy and the speakers he 
purports to record all refer to the event as a pax.917  Further, this pax is the cause of great 
ƐŚĂŵĞĨŽƌZŽŵĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĐĂůůĞĚ “ĚŝƐŚŽŶŽƵƌĂďůĞ ? ?ignominiosae pacis)918 ĂŶĚ “hateful ? ?obnoxia 
pace).919 Moreover, those who negotiated the peace are not praised for saving the lives of 
the soldiers but are punished for agreeing to the terms.920  However, it should be noted 
ƚŚĂƚ>ŝǀǇ ?ƉƌŽďĂďůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŶĞŽĨŚŝƐƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?ƐĞĞƐƚŚĞĂƵĚŝŶĞ&ŽƌŬƐĂƐ “ƌĞƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽn for 
ƚŚĞĂƌƌŽŐĂŶƚƌĞĨƵƐĂůŽĨĂ^ĂŵŶŝƚĞŽĨĨĞƌŽĨƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?921  This means that it is not peace with 
the Samnites that Livy finds distasteful, nor even the equality of the peace, merely the way 
in which this peace was forced upon the defeated and disgraced army.  As Herennius 
                                                          
912
 Livy 2.14.1. 
913
 Livy 2.59.9, no specifics are given here to explain how this land became friendly. 
914
 Livy 28.44.12. 
915
 Livy 9.5-6. 
916
 Livy 9.5.2-3; Liebeschuetz 1967 46; Bederman 2001, 224; Crawford 1973, 1-7; Salmon 1929, 12. 
917
 Livy 9.3.10, 9.4.2, 9.4.3, 9.7.4, 9.7.6, 9.7.9, 9.8.1, 9.8.3, 9.8.11, 0.9.12, 9.8.15, 9.9.9, 9.9.12, 
9.9.13, 9.10.3, 9.10.7, 9.11.5, 9.11.7, 9.11.8, 9.12.3.  
918
 Livy 9.7.6 & 9.8.2. 
919
 Livy 9.10.4. 
920
 Livy 9.8-10. 
921
 Liebeschuetz 1967, 46; Bederman 2001, 224.  Livy 9.1; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 15.9; Dio 8.8-10; 
App. Sam. 1-2. 
Andrew Crane  143 
 
Pontius says; if the Roman army is allowed to leave equally and respectfully they may 
 “ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚůĂƐƚŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚĨƌŝĞŶĚƐŚŝƉ ? ?perpetuam firmare pacem amicitiamque).922 
Apart from the event of the Caudine Forks, Livy can often present pax as a one sided 
consequence of a Roman military victory.  The most common formulations used in Livy at 
the end of a war is either an enemy seeking or asking for pax with Rome (using forms of 
patere pax)923, or the enemy sending legates about peace in order to admit their defeat and 
negotiate terms (using variations on legatos de pace mittunt).924  In reply to this request for 
peace the Romans, acting from a dominant position, grant peace to their enemies (most 
commonly with forms of dare pax).925  Often Livy makes this Roman dominance in 
negotiations explicit in the same way that Caesar did: with the demand of arms and 
hostages, or even more forceful acts like the carving up of Macedon.926  It is in these more 
traditional, military forms of pax that the reason for the shame caused by the Caudine 
Forks is found.  Rome, in Livy, are the setters of terms, the rejecters of advances for peace, 
the victors who take arms from the defeated, but the Caudine Forks have left them in the 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŽǁůǇĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ ?ZŽŵĞ ?ƐŚĂƚƌed for this status is seen again in the Hannibalic 
War.  NŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁĚĞƐƉĞƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ƚŚĞ  “ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
falling away of the allies could not move ƚŚĞ ZŽŵĂŶƐ ĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŽ ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ?  ?nec 
tamen eae clades defectionesque sociorum moverunt ut pacis usquam mentio apud 
Romanos fieret)927 
ŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨpax, he introduces a concept (or at least 
phrase) that is not present in Sallust or Caesar: pax deorum.  First it should be noted that 
for Livy the normative state of the gods was peaceful, or benign.928  However, Livy still saw 
the maintenance of the pax deorum, through correct religious observance, as essential to 
                                                          
922
 Livy 9.3.10. 
923
 Livy 1.15.5, 1.37.5, 2.49.12, 3.1.8, 8.36.11, 9.43.20, 9.45.2, 10.14.3, 10.16.5, 10.37.4, 10.46.12, 
21.13.1, 22.20.8, 27.21.8, 30.16.15, 30.22.4, 30.22.5, 30.23.3, 30.28.10, 30.30.23, 30.30.29, 30.31.7, 
30.36.4, 31.11.16, 34.41.10, 36.27.1, 37.49.6, 38.3.2, 38.8.7, 40.25.1, 40.27.8, 41.10.4, 42.62.10, 
43.4.2. 
924
 Livy 2.18.10, 2.39.10, 5.23.12, 9.1.3, 9.16.3, 9.37.12, 9.43.21, 9.45.1, 10.5.12, 30.21.11, 42.46.1, 
42.62.12. 
925
 Livy 3.2.3, 5.27.15, 30.43.1, 30.43.3, 31.5.1, 31.13.6, 33.24.7, 34.40.7, 37.34.1, 37.36.9, 37.55.1, 
38.15.5, 39.2.6,. 
926
 Livy 4.10.3, 30.37.6, 32.33.3, 34.16.4, 37.1.5, 38.8.9, 39.3.1, 40.25.3, 45.30.7. 
927
 Livy 22.61.13 (adapted from Foster, 1929). 
928
 Davies 2005, 99; Livy 5.20.3, 7.13.5, 8.5.3, 8.13.11, 24.38.2, 26.41.14, 28.25.7, 29.15.1, 31.31.20, 
37.54.10, 39.9.4, 41.24.8, 45.23.1.  The innate peacefulness of the gods has already been seen in the 
Stoics and Epicureans.  Walsh believe that Livy demonstrates Stoic beliefs throughout his work but 
does not use this attitude as one of his examples, Walsh 1958, 355-375; 1963, 46-82. 
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ƚŚĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨZŽŵĞ ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?929  For example, before the war with Perseus 
 “ŝƚǁĂƐĚĞĐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚportents should be expiated and prayers offered to win the peace of 
the gods, namely, those who were mentioned in the books of fate ?  ?priusquam id 
susciperetur prodigia expiari pacemque deum peti precationibus, qui editi ex fatalibus libris 
essent, placuit).930  Moreover, as we have already noted, military defeat could be attributed 
to a lapse of the pax deorum.931 
There is also a term related to concordia present in Livy that has not been used by Caesar 
or Sallust: concordia ordinum.  Livy was probably influenced in his use of this concept by 
Cicero, who is the only other surviving source from this period in which concordia ordinum 
occurs, and was probably the originator of the term.932  However, whereĂƐ ŝĐĞƌŽ ?Ɛ
concordia ordinum seemed to be limited to the wealthy and influential (the equites and 
senators)933 ? >ŝǀǇ ƚĂŬĞƐ ŝĐĞƌŽ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞ ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ ŝĚĞĂů ĂŶĚ ƵƐĞƐ ŝƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ^ƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Orders in the early republican period.934  However, because all of LiǀǇ ?Ɛ ůĂƚĞƌďŽŽŬƐŚĂǀĞ
been lost, it is impossible to ascertain whether he would have adopted a more Ciceronian 
use of concordia ordinum when he turned to the late republic, and as such it is impossible 
to decide if any significance should be given to Livy using concordia ordinum for 
relationships between the plebs and senators.   
Other than his unique adoption and interpretation of concordia ordinum ? >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛuses of 
concordia are often similar to its use in Sallust.935  His occasional tendency to specify that 
                                                          
929
 Orlin 2003, 16. 
930
 Livy 42.2.3 (adapted from Sage, 1938). cf 3.5.14, 3.8.1, 7.7.2; Orlin 2003, 16. 
931
 The events at Caudine considered above, Livy 9.1-10.  See Rosenstein 1990, 54-91 for the relation 
between the breaking of the pax deorum and military defeat. 
932
 Lobur 2008, 51. 
933
 Scullard 1963, 115; Lobur 2008, 50; Eagle 1949, 15. 
934
 Livy 3.58.4, 3.68.11, 3.69.4, 4.7.5, 4.60.3, 5.3.5, 5.7.1, 5.12.12, 6.42.12, 7.21.4, 7.22.7, 7.27.1. 
935
 /LY\¶VXVHVRIconcordia and discordia always refer to an internal relationship, except in two cases 
which will be discussed below.  For example, he uses con/dis-cordia twenty-four times for personal 
relationships between Romans (1.13.8, 3.33.8, 4.26.6, 4.26.7, 4.32.1, 4.45.8, 6.6.17, 8.29.10, 
10.13.12, 10.22.3, 10.22.4, 10.22.4 10.24.2, 10.24.6, 22.44.5, 22.32.1, 22.41.5, 27.38.10, 32.7.3, 
38.57.7, 40.40.14, 40.46.10, 40.51.1, 42.10.4); eight times for personal relationships between non-
Romans (21.31.6, 26.41.20, 40.7.7, 40.8.11, 40.7.16, 42.16.8, 45.12.7, 45.19.9, 45,19,9); eighty-seven 
times for within the Roman state or army (concordia 1.11.2, 2.1.11, 2.9.7, 2.31.9, 2.32.7, 2.33.1, 
2.33.11, 2.39.7, 2.48.1, 2.57.3, 2.60.2, 3.1.4, 3.16.3,  3.24.11, 3.52.1, 3.54.7, 3.57.7, 3.58.4, 3.65.7, 
3.67.7, 3.68.11, 3.69.4, 4.2.6, 4.7.1, 4.7.5, 4.10.8, 4.43.11,  4.60.3, 5.3.5, 5.3.10, 5.7.1, 5.7.8, 5.9.4, 
5.12.12, 5.18.2, 6.42.12, 7.21.4, 7.21.5, 7.22.7, 7.27.1, 7.40.4, 7.41.7, 7.42.5, 7.42.6, 9.19.15, 9.46.12, 
23.35.9, 34.49.9, 34.54.4, 40.8.15; discordia 2.1.6, 2.23.1, 2.24.1, 2.25.1, 2.29.8, 2.31.10, 2.34.2, 
2.39.5, 2.42.3, 2.43.1, 2.44.7, 2.45.3, 2.54.2, 2.57.2, 2.60.4, 2.63.1, 3.17.12, 3.19.5, 3.38.3, 3.40.10, 
3.65.6, 3.66.2, 3.67.6, 3.67.10, 4.2.12, 4.43.3, 4.46.4, 4.47.7, 4.48.14, 4.52.8, 4.56.9, 5.17.10, 6.31.6, 
23.35.7, 6.42.10, 8.18.12, 34.49.10); fifteen times within a non-Roman state or army (4.58.2, 5.1.3, 
24.22.16, 28.20.10 , 34.62.1, 35.39.6, 39.48.5, 41.25.2, 42.2.2, 42.4.5, 42.5.11, 9.14.5, 9.20.5, 
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concord or discord is domi could perhaps suggest that there could be such a situation as 
international concord in contrast to domi concordia.  However, Moore notes that Romans 
often used domi in order to distinguish domestic affairs from military ones.936  This certainly 
seems to be the case with Livy, as his uses of domi concordia or domi discordia are always 
contrasting a situation at home and abroad; for example it can be contrasted with a foreign 
peace or war, often with the explicit use of foris or externus in order to differentiate the 
internal discord or concord from the lack or existence of foreign wars.937   
Despite his unremarkable use of concordia Livy does often note an interesting relationship 
between concordia and pax.  Whenever there is a respite from foreign wars Rome has to 
contend with either disease or discord.938  dŚŝƐŝĚĞĂƐŚĂƌĞƐƐŽŵĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
conclusion that when there are no necessary wars, man will fight for glory.939  However, 
whereas Sallust associates this with a defect of human nature, Livy seems to imply that this 
is in some way an inevitable situation, often passing from war to civil disturbance with a 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ŚŝƐ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ĨŝŶĂů ĐůĂƵƐĞƐ ?.940  For example, Livy 
States:  “EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?that tranquillity might not be found everywhere, a quarrel among 
the first men of the state was stirred up by the plebeian tribunes Quintus and Gnaeus 
Ogulnius ?ďŽƚŚƉĂƚƌŝĐŝĂŶĂŶĚƉůĞďĞŝĂŶ ? ?tamen ne undique tranquillae res essent, certamen 
iniectum inter primores civitatis, patricios plebeiosque, ab tribunis plebis Q. et Cn. 
Ogulniis).941 
As well as this connection between the end of wars and the start of concord, there are also 
several examples that show internal disputes being overcome by threats from outside.  For 
example, Livy states that in 488 BC Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus ? ƉůĂŶ ƚŽ ƌĂǀĂŐĞ ŽŶůǇ ůĂŶĚ
owned by plebeians would have turned them against the SĞŶĂƚĞ  “ďƵƚ ĚƌĞĂĚŽĨ ŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶ ?
the strongest bond of harmony, tended to unite their feelings, however they might suspect 
ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐůŝŬĞ ŽŶĞ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?  ?sed externus timor, maximum concordiae vinculum, quamvis 
suspectos infensosque inter se iungebat animos)942, and in 484 BC  “domestic strife was 
interrupted by war, while with one mind and purpose patricians and plebeians met the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
24.22.2, 33.48.11); and eight times when referring to the goddess Concordia or her temple (9.46.4, 
22.33.7, 23.21.7, 24.22.1, 24.22.13, 26.23.4, 39.56.6,  40.19.2). 
936
 Moore 2010, 76. 
937
 Livy 2.34.1, 2.43.1, 2.60.4, 2.63.1, 4.7.1, 4.47.7, 4.52.8, 7.27.1. 
938
 Walsh 1958, 359.  Livy 10.6.3, 6.34.5, 6.43.3. 
939
 Cat. 10-11; Iug.,41; Hist. fr. 1.12, 13 & 14McG = 1.12, 16, 13M. 
940
 Walsh 1958 359-360. 
941
 Livy 10.6.3 (adapted from Foster, 1926); cf 6.34.5. 
942
 Livy 2.39.7. 
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rebellious Volsci and Aequi and, led by Aemilius, defeated them in a successful action ?
(bello deinde civiles discordiae intermissae, uno animo patres ac plebs rebellantes Volscos 
et Aequos duce Aemilio prospera pugna uicere).943  Further, it is clear that both Rome and 
her enemies were aware of the advantages to be gained from attacking opponents while 
there was discord in their ranks. This is most apparent when the Volsci decided to ravage 
all the land surrounding Rome, but leave the farms of the patricians untouched in order to 




Despite the initial lacuna Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ sĂůůĞŝƵƐ WĂƚĞƌĐƵůƵƐ ?Historiae it seems clear 
from the surviving remains that, like Sallust, Velleius began his work with a brief synopsis of 
history until the period that will be the focus of his narrative.  As his work survives 
however, Velleius begins with Greece rather than the founding of Rome.  Despite the 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŽƉŝĐ ?sĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞŝƐĐůĞĂƌĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐ
^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚconcordia and the rejection of politics and the military are 
clear from the openings for both the Bellum Iugurthinum and the Bellum Catilinae.  For 
example, 1.1.1-3 of Valleius ?Historiae clearly shows an unquestioned acceptance of violent 
vengeance as a motivating force.  Telamon is not chastised for disowning his son after 
Teucer has failed to avenge his brother, and the vengeance of Orestes is also passed over 
with full but swift approval.  EǀĞŶĂǁĂƌŽĨƉƵƌĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇ “ĂǁĂƌůŝŬĞǇŽƵƚŚ
ŶĂŵĞĚdŚĞƐƐĂůƵƐ ? ?belli iuvenis nomine Thessalus) is not judged as a foolish or vainglorious 
act.945  This emphasis may be due to the speed at which Velleius covers this introductory 
passage, but Sallust still found time when moving at a similar pace to chastise when he felt 
the need was great.  This digression on Greek history also provides an interesting parallel to 
the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, who both blame the collapse of Sparta on its single-
minded constitution  W unable to sustain in peace what it had won in war.946  Velleius takes 
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 Livy 2.42.3. 
944
 Livy, 2.39.5 cf 2.25.1, 2.44.7, 3.38.3, 3.65.6, 6.31.6, 22.41.5. 
945
 Vell. Pat. 1.3.1. 
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 Plato, Leg. 1. 628d-e; Aristotle, Pol. 2. 9. 1271b1-6. 
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the polar opposite view, stating that it was its traditional constitution that led to the period 
of Spartan supremacy.947   
When Sallust turned to the topic of the founding of Rome, his focus was on the concordia 
created among neighbouring tribes that allowed Rome to flourish.  Velleius, himself, greatly 
praises Sallust later in his work, when he describes the epoch of Roman talent.  Most men 
are merely listed by name, including Cicero, Hortensius, Crassus, Cotta, Brutus and even 
ĂĞƐĂƌ ?sĂƌƌŽ ?ĂŶĚ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƐŵĂƌŬĞĚŽƵƚĂŵŽŶŐƚŚŝƐůŝƐƚĂƐ “ƚŚĞƌŝǀĂůŽĨ
dŚƵĐǇĚŝĚĞƐ ?  ?aemulumque Thucydides Sallustium).948  So perhaps the stark difference 
between his version of early Rome and that of Sallust should come as some surprise, as 
rather than emphasise the passive elements that allowed for greatness, he instead stresses 
the military and aggressive details that are minimised by Sallust. Velleius even goes much 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŝŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌZŽŵĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĂŶ>ŝǀǇ ?
ǁŚŽŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?ZŽŵƵůƵƐĂŶĚEƵŵĂ ?ǁĞƌĞĂŶĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
success.  Firstly, Romulus is described with only two specific qualities, namely that he is the 
son of Mars, and the avenger of his grandfather, both of which recall the violent aspects of 
his character.949  tŚĞƌĞĂƐ>ŝǀǇŚĂĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞƚĂůĞŽĨZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ancestry, instead saying 
that Rhea Silvia was raped, and that she claŝŵĞĚDĂƌƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĂƐƐĂŝůĂŶƚ “whether actually 
believing so, or because it seemed less wrong if a god were the author of her fault ? ?seu ita 
rata, seu quia deus auctor culpae honestior erat, Martem incertae stirpis patrem).950 
Secondly, rather than conclude that it was the co-operation and concordia with the local 
tribes thĂƚůĞĂĚƚŽZŽŵĞ ?ƐƉƌĞ-eminence951 ?sĞůůĞŝƵƐŝŶƐƚĞĂĚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶZŽŵƵůƵƐ ?ŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵ>ĂƚŝŶƵƐ ?ƚƌŽŽƉƐ ?ĨŽƌ “ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞsĞŝĞŶƚŝŶĞƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƚƌƵƐĐĂŶƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞ
Sabines, in such close proximity, he could scarcely have established his new city with an 
ƵŶǁĂƌůŝŬĞ ďĂŶĚ ŽĨ ƐŚĞƉŚĞƌĚƐ ?  ?cum aliter firmare urbem novam tam vicinis Veientibus 
aliisque Etruscis ac Sabinis cum imbelli et pastorali manu vix potuerit).952  This, again, 
although allowing for the inclusion of the co-operation between Romans and Latins, 
accentuates the importance of the military in the founding and stability of the city.   








 Livy 1.4.2; Miles 1995, 138-141. 
951
 Sall. Cat. 6.2-3; the importance of which is also recalled by Livy in the Rape of the Sabines 1.9-13. 
952
 Vell. Pat. 1.8.5. 
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Further, following Sallust ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ>ŝǀǇ ?Ɛdepiction of a more general decline in morality, 
Velleius Paterculus views the fall of Carthage as the turning point in the Roman Republic.953  
On this issue Velleius and Sallust are closer than on the founding of Rome.  Velleius also 
saw the destruction of Carthage as the end of the period of Roman virtue and the start of a 
ůƵƐƚ ĨŽƌ ůƵǆƵƌǇ ?  “dŚĞ ŽůĚĞƌ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ǁĂƐ ĚŝƐĐĂƌĚĞĚ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ ƉůĂĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ?  dŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ
passed from vigilance to slumber, from the pursuit of arms to the pursuit of pleasure, from 
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇƚŽ ŝĚůĞŶĞƐƐ ?  ?vetus disciplina deserta, nova inducta; in somnum a vigiliis, ab armis 
ad voluptates, a negotiis in otium conversa civitas).954  Both Sallust and Velleius Paterculus 
see the personal lusts for luxury and glory as part of the cause of the start of civil 
bloodshed.  Sallust had identified the removal of fear with the beginning of strife between 
the orders.955  Yet, while Velleius is less interested in the clash between nobles and plebs, 
he still associates freedom from fear and increased luxury with the start of political 
violence.  He is, however, more interested in the individual than the social.  For Velleius it is 
ŵĞƌĞůǇ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů ŝŵŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?  “ĨŽƌ ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚƐ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ƐƚŽƉ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞǇ
ďĞŐŝŶ QĂŶĚǁŚĞŶŽŶĞƉĂƚŚŽĨƌŝŐŚƚŝƐĂďĂŶĚŽŶĞĚ ?ŵĞŶĂƌĞŚƵƌƌŝĞĚŝŶƚŽǁƌong in headlong 
ŚĂƐƚĞ ?  ?ŶŽŶ ĞŶŝŵ ŝďŝ ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ĞǆĞŵƉůĂ ? ƵŶĚĞ ĐŽĞƉĞƌƵŶƚ ? et ubi semel recto deerratum 
est, in praeceps pervenitur).956  Thus, the precedent of luxury and excessive wealth means 
that anything that may maintain this wealth is seen as a good in itself.  As a consequence, 
civil violence which helps an individual is considered a desirable thing by the now luxury 
obsessed political class at Rome ? “nor does any man think a course is shameful for himself 
which ŚĂƐ ƉƌŽǀĞŶ ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďůĞ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? (nec quisquam sibi putat turpe, quod alii fuit 
fructuosum).957  Although the importance that Sallust places on the nobles and plebs as 
groups is not present in Velleius, the fate of Tiberius Gracchus allows for one of the most 
Sallustian passages in Velleius.    
 “dŚis was the beginning in Rome of civil bloodshed, and of the licence of the 
sword.  From this time on right was crushed by might, the most powerful now 
took precedence in the state, the disputes of the citizens which were once 
healed by amicable agreements were now settled by arms, and wars were now 
begun not for good cause but for what profit there was in them. ?958 
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Hoc initium in urbe Roma civilis sanguinis gladiorumque impunitatis fuit. Inde 
ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus prior, discordiaeque civium antea 
condicionibus sanari solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque non causis inita, sed 
prout eorum merces fuit.  
This passage not only contradicts the sections of the preface where aggressive wars were 
ĐŽŶĚŽŶĞĚ ?ďƵƚŝƐĂůƐŽŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĂƌĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨsĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?use of discordia (an important 
point which will be discussed further below).   
sĞůůĞŝƵƐ ĂůƐŽ ƐĂǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨĂůů ŽĨ ĂƌƚŚĂŐĞ ? ZŽŵĞ ĞŶƚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ Ă  “ĚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ
ĚŝƐŐƌĂĐĞĨƵů ?ǁĂƌ959 (triste deinde et contumeliosum bellum).960  However, it is clear from the 
description that follows that it was not the motive for the war, or the evils inherent in war 
ŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚŚĂƚŵĂĚĞƚŚŝƐĂ “ĚŝƐŐƌĂĐĞĨƵů ?ĂĐƚ ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǁĂƌǁĂƐ
waged.  Although the war with Viriathus is passed over only briefly, it is associated with the 
same attitudes that the contemporary war in Numantia roused in Velleius, in which it is the 
leniency of the terms reached and the lack of vigour with which the war is conducted that 
are the source of ZŽŵĞ ?ƐƐŚĂŵĞ.961  This recalls the Samnite War recorded in Livy, where 
the terms reached and the manner in which they were accepted caused great shame for 
the army and indeed the whole city.962  Therefore, a disgraceful war for Velleius is not filled 
with slaughter or waged for aggressive purposes, but rather it is fought with a lack of valour 
and ends with unfavourable terms for the Senate.  There is an important distinction 
between this and the Caudine Peace seen in Livy, namely that Livy saw this disgrace as a 
ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌZŽŵĞ ?ƐĞĂƌůŝĞƌƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĞƋƵĂůƉĞĂĐĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐsĞůůĞŝƵƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
suggest that any peace should have been previously concluded.963   
In contrast to >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ ŽŶĞ ŚƵŶĚƌĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĨŽƌƚǇ-four, and ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ƚǁenty-two (twenty-five if 
the spurious works are included) uses of the term, the works of Velleius contain only nine 
instances of the varying forms of concordia964, and when these examples are examined in 
more detail it can be seen that not only does he use concordia much less frequently than 
Sallust and Livy, he also uses it in different ways.  Sallust will only use concordia if the 
dispute is raised above the personal to the state or city level.  tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ?ŚĂůĨŽĨsĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?
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uses refer to a personal conflict, in compaƌŝƐŽŶ ůĞƐƐ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ƚŚŝƌĚ ŽĨ >ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ do so.965  For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?sĞůůĞŝƵƐƐĂǇƐ “ƐƵĐŚǁĂƐƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ?discordante) of fortune in this 
case, that he who but a short time before had found no more lands to conquer now found 
ŶŽŶĞĨŽƌŚŝƐďƵƌŝĂů ? ?in tantum in illo viro a se discordante fortuna, ut cui modo ad victoriam 
terra defuerat, deesser ad sepulturum).  This use of the present participle form of the verb 
discordo is not found in Sallust and stresses the more uncommon meaning of 
 ‘ŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ?between the two parties, rather ƚŚĂŶ ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƌĚ ? ?ůƐŽĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
and 2.95.3 we again see a usage not present in Sallust.  2.47.2 tells us of the breakdown of 
the relationship between Caesar and Pompey after the death of Julia.  2.65.1 recalls an 
offer of friendship made between Antony and Augustus, 2.95.3 states that the censorship 
of Plancus and Paulus was carried out in mutual discord, and finally 2.37.3 recounts the 
disagreements between Tigranes and Mithridates.  It is also interesting to note that 
Velleius uses a slightly different form of discord when referring to non-Romans, allowing 
them only discors, and not full discordia.  
Therefore, these four examples use concordia to demonstrate a strained personal 
relationship, rather than general states of violence or harmony between groups within a 
society, as is the case with Sallust.  This means that Velleius uses concordia in the same way 
as Sallust merely four times: for the banishing of discord from the Senate house966, when 
ƌƵƚƵƐĂŶĚĂƐƐŝƵƐŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŝƌ ?ĚŝƐŝŶŐĞŶƵŽƵƐ )ŽĨĨĞƌƚŽŐŽŝŶƚŽǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌǇĞǆŝůĞ “ĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞ
ŽĨĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐŚĂƌŵŽŶǇǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?dum rei publicae constaret concordia)967, when it 
is said that Cicero tried to preserve the harmony of the republic968, and when it is used to 
describe the period of civil disorder that was initiated with the death of Tiberius 
Gracchus.969  It is this last example that is most reminiscent of Sallust, coming as it does in 
the middle of a historical digression that is used to illustrate a turning point not only 
historically, but also morally.  It was this one death that Velleius says changed the mentality 
of the people of Rome:  “From this time on right was crushed by might, the most powerful 
now took precedence in the state, the disputes of the citizens which were once healed by 
amicable agreements were now settled by arms, and wars were now begun not for good 
cause but for what profit there was in them ? (inde ius vi obrutum potentiorque habitus 
prior, discordiaeque civium antea conditicionibus sanari solitae ferro diiudicatae bellaque 
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non causis inita, sed prout eorum merces fuit).  However, it is important to note that even 
in this most Sallustian of contexts it is clear that, although the passage ends with the 
starting of wars, it begins with the idea of personal quarrels, rather than a larger 
atmosphere of societal discordia. 
Just as he uses varying forms of concordia much less frequently, Velleius also uses forms of 
pax less often, only thirty-one times compared with sixty-two uses in Sallust, which is twice 
as many times in a work only 1.37 times the length.970  Further, just as many of the usages 
of concordia are not the same as those in Sallust, pax also often has a different meaning for 
sĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?  dŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ůĞĂƐƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ ǁĂƌ ĂŶĚ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŽ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
usages, is the figurative use of pax, ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ  “ŝŶ ĚƵĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ?ǁŝƚŚ ĚƵĞ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ? ǁhich 
Velleius uses three times.971  Of the remaining times a form of pax is used in Velleius, nine 
refer to internal circumstances972, ten to external973, and for nine the meaning is neither 
definitely external nor internal.  Of these nine, two describe a state where all wars, both 
internal and external have ended974, three describe someone who is either equally good or 
evil in both war and peace975, and four are used poetically, for a state of peaceful 
prosperity.976   
Looking first at the uses of pax in external conflicts it seems that peace is something that 
the provinces are, at best, brought into and at worst subjugated to.  For example at 2.90.4 
Augustus is explicitly said to have brought peace to ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞƐ  “ĂĚ ĞĂŵ ƉĂĐĞŵ  ?
ƉĞƌĚƵǆŝƚ ?.  In Thrace Tiberius is also said to bring the provinces back to peace  “nunc 
expugnationibus in pristinum pacis redegit modum ?, and return peace to Macedon 
 “DĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂĞ ƉĂĐĞŵ ƌĞĚĚŝĚŝƚ ?.977  Even when peace is sought, rather than brought, it is 
inevitably the enemy that seeks peace and only then after they have already been defeated 
in war P “The winter brought the reward of our efforts in the termination of the war, though 
it was not until the following summer that all Pannonia sought peace, the remnants of the 
war as a whole being confined to Dalmatia ? (Hiems emolumentum patrati belli distulit, sed 
insequenti aestate omnis Pannonia reliquiis totius belli in Delmatia manentibus pacem 
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petiit).978  It should be noted that, although the provinces are brought to peace, Velleius 
does not see the subjugation as a negative influence on the inhabitants of the provinces.  
We are told that circumferens terrarum orbi praesentia sua pacis suae bona, so rather than 
peace being an imposition Augustus brings not only peace through subjugation, but also 
the benefits of peace by his own presence.979 
It has already been noted that in Sallust peace with a foreign enemy can be connected 
closely with common interest980, or can be agreed or offered981, or made on mutual 
terms.982  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĚƵĞƚŽďŽƚŚĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨvariatio there is no direct similarity 
in the Latin used for the pursuit or achievement of peace in civil conflict in Velleius and 
foreign conflict in Sallust, there is still a correlation between the two.  Civil peace in Velleius 
and foreign peace in Sallust are both often agreed or arranged; composita, inita, 
coalescens, placet in Velleius983 and convenit, nuntiatur, fiet, conventa in Sallust.984  
Therefore just as concordia is much more likely to be reduced to a personal level in Velleius 
than in Sallust, so pax is more likely to be reduced to an internal rather than external level, 
consistently used in places where we could expect Sallust to have preferred to use 
concordia.   
Although we have seen that Sallust is much more likely to use forms of pax and concordia 
than Velleius, Velleius uses forms of pacatus five times compared to only one in Sallust.  As 
Linderski told us985, pacatus, in its more common form, entails an implication that an area 
or enemy had been pacified, rather than that it has been taken as an ally, and, as such, 
ŐŝǀĞŶsĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞƵƐĂŐĞƐ of pax, it is not surprising to see that this is clearly what is 
implied: Dalmatia, the Spains, the west, the Desiadates, the Perustae and even the whole 
world are pacified.986  The aggressive nature of these pacifications is emphasised by the 
military efforts that have caused them.  The Spains are pacified after many and various 
wars987, Dalmatia is pacified to ƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐZŽŵĞ ?ƐĞŵƉŝƌĞ988, the Perustae 
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and Desiadates are pacified by the armed prowess of Tiberius989, and the world is pacified 
by TiďĞƌŝƵƐ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐ.990   
ĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŐůŽƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZŽŵĞ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŝŶsĞůůĞŝƵƐ, it must still 
be noted that he chooses to end his work with a prayer for the preservation of peace.991  
However, the prayer is made not to the goddess Concordia, or Pax or even Venus (as is the 
ĐĂƐĞŝŶ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ƐƉƌĂǇĞƌĨŽƌƚŚĞƋƵŝĞƚŝŶŐŽĨDĂƌƐ ) ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĚŝǀŝŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶǀŽŬĞĚ
are Jupiter Capitolinus, Mars Gradivus and Vesta.  These are all closely associated with the 
safety of Rome specifically, and not a more general end to war as is present in Lucretius.  
ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐƚŝŶǇ, function and permanence are symbolised in Jupiter Capitolinus992, the 
titles of auctor and stator emphasise the importance of Mars in the founding of Rome and 
also his continued role in protecting the state993 and Vesta signified the continuity of both 
ZŽŵĞ ?ƐƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞĞƚĞƌŶŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽĨZŽŵĞŝƚƐĞůĨ ?994  Therefore, each god 
emphasises the importance of Rome in the empire, while at the same time this Roman 
centric triad is again a prime example of the consistently internal nature of pax for Velleius.  
HŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐDĂƌƐ ?ĞƉŝƚŚĞƚGradivus.  As the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨDĂƌƐĂƐ “ŚĞǁho precedes ƚŚĞĂƌŵǇŝŶƚŽďĂƚƚůĞ ?ƌĞŵŽǀĞƐĂŶǇĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚpax is 
to be won and maintained through military means, and still accentuates the divide 
between Roman and non-Roman, a divide that Sallust, through his uses of pax, concordia 
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dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ƵƐĞƐ ŽĨ ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽŶconcordia seem, at first appearance, to share more in 
common with Sallust than Velleius Paterculus.  Six of the eight passages where variations of 
concordia are used refer explicitly to internal political situations above the level of the 
individual and instead within or between differing groups.995  The Roman army in Britain 
creates discordia when they become idle under Trebellius Maximus P “ďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŵƵƚŝŶy 
and trouble ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ? ĂĐĐƵƐƚŽŵĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƌŝŽƚŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ ŝĚůĞ ? (sed 
discordia laboratum, cum adsuetus expeditionibus miles otio lasciviret)996, and Calgacus 
ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽůŽŶŝĞƐ ǁŝůů ĂŝĚ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŽŶƐ ? ĐĂƵƐĞ.997  This point is 
echoed by Tacitus in the Germania, when he explains that the Germans were able to use 
the opportunity created by Roman discordia to their advantage.998  Also, unlike Velleius, 
Tacitus can also see that concordia can exist between the inhabitants of foreign nations.  
The British tribes can  “ ?ůĞĂƌŶ ? Ăƚ ůĂƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĚĂŶŐĞƌ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƌĞƉĞůůĞĚ ďǇ ƵŶŝŽ ? 
(docti commune periculum concordia propulsandum)999 or Calgacus can remind his men 
that their disunity helps the enemy ?,ĞƐĂǇƐ ? “ŝƚŝƐŽƵƌĚŝƐƐĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨĞuds that bring them 
ĨĂŵĞ P ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŶĞŵǇ ?Ɛ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƌŵǇ ?Ɛ ŐůŽƌǇ ? ?nostris illi dissensionibus ac 
discordiis clari vitia hostium in gloriam exercitus sui vertunt).1000  This idea ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚĂůŐĂĐƵƐ ?
previous example, is again repeated by Tacitus in the Germania, when he prays that if 
nations will not love Rome, they will hate each other, for  “fortune can guarantee us 
nothing better than discord among our foes ?  ?praestare fortuna maius potest quam 
hostium discordiam).1001  Tacitus only uses variations on concordia in one passage of the 
monographs, where the meaning relates to a political relationship between two individuals 
rather than in the more Sallustian way to refer to societal groups.  This occurs where the 
ŐƌŝĞǀĂŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌŝƚŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƌĞĐŽƵŶƚĞĚ ďǇ dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ŚŝƐ ƐƵŵŵĂƌǇ ŽĨ ŐƌŝĐŽůĂ ?Ɛ
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predecessors.  He says that they used to have one king but now have two forced upon 
them, the legate and procurator, and that whether concordia or discordia exists between 
the two makes no difference to the lot of the locals.1002  Therefore, although this does refer 
to two individual political offices, it does not specify two named historical figures, and so 
does not appear as personal as the use of concordia often does in the works of Velleius, 
who is more likely to see concord or discord between two named and known people.  
Despite the majority of instances falling into the pattern set by Sallust, there is one 
example where Tacitus uses concordia in a way more personal and private, even than 
sĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨŝŐƵƌĞƐ ?dŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĞŶdĂĐŝƚƵƐ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ ŐƌŝĐŽůĂ ?Ɛ ŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞ ĂƐsingularly harmonious (mira concordia).1003  When 
compared to the otherwise purely political meaning of concordia in Tacitus, Sallust and 
Velleius, it seems an odd choice for a marital bond.  However, political language is 
commonly used to describe romantic relationships, particularly in the Latin elegists, and 
Ogilvie and Richmond note that this passage is conventionally eulogistic, and that the 
themes within it are common in epitaphs.1004   
Pax is used much less often by Tacitus in the monographs than by any of his predecessors, 
but his fifteen usages of variants of pax share many similarities with the earlier historians.  
The most obvious of these is the use of pax as an absence of, or an antonym to, wars.1005  
Also, pax can be a state that exists with foreign states as well as between external enemies, 
distinguishing it from concordia.  Rome can be seen as willing to enter a battle with the 
assistance of British troops because their loyalty had been proved through years of 
peace.1006  This peace must explicitly refer to their relationship with Rome, because the 
context of an impending battle with another British tribe means that they are not at peace 
with all inhabitants of the island, only those in togas.  However, although this shows that, 
like Sallust, Tacitus can refer to a period of absence from war between Rome and a foreign 
tribe as pax, Tacitus is more like Velleius when describing peace with external enemies.  He 
never explicitly states that this pax is one between equals, made by mutual negotiation and 
compromise.  Rather, when peace is made, it is the Britons who must petition for it when it 
                                                          
1002
 Tac. Agr. 15.2. 
1003
 ibid 6.1. 
1004
 Ogilvie & Richmond 1967, 148-9; cf CIL iii. 4592 ³YL[LWFRQFRUGLWHU´; Lattimore 1962, 280. 
1005
 Tac. Agr. 11.4, 13.2, 18.5, 20.1, 20.2, 29.2, 30.4, 32.1; Germ. 13.3, 14.2, 18.3, 22.2, 31.3, 36.1, 
40.3. 
1006
 Tac. Agr. 29.2. 
Andrew Crane  156 
 
is clear that they have lost the military struggle, as was the case at the Island of Mona.1007 
ƐDĞůůŽƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ “ƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶWĞĂĐĞŝƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƉĞĂĐĞ ?WĞĂĐĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŐŽĂů ?ŝƚŝƐŵĞƌĞůǇ
the by-product of subjugaƚŝŽŶ ?.1008  Moreover, whereas Velleius saw this imposed pax as 
wholly praiseworthy, Tacitus is much more cynical about its benefits to the local 
population.  Agricola must parade the attractions of peace before the Britons but this is 
merely slavery masquerading as peace.1009  This is something that Calgacus reiterates when 
he says  “they make a desolation and call it peace ? (solitudinem faciunt, pacem 
appellant).1010  Therefore, Tacitus develops the model of enforced peace seen in Velleius by 
minimising the positive effects that this peace has on the local population and emphasising 
negative aspects of the imposition of pax and equating it to a loss of liberty.  The influence 
of Sallust is equally visible; however, just as Sallust could highlight the degenerating effect 
of years of pax, so could Tacitus.  Tacitus notes that the British have not been emasculated 
by years of peace1011, and he admires both the German youths who will leave a peaceful 
tribe in order to seek out wars1012 and also the men of the Chatti who deliberately endure 
hardships in times of peace in order not to be softened by the period of inaction.1013  
Perhaps most telling of all is the description of the Cherusci, who are described as a wilfully 
pacifistic tribe.  Whereas, similar societies are met with praise and adulation when 
recounted by philosophers, Tacitus ƐĂǇƐƚŚĂƚ “ĨŽƌůŽŶŐǇĞĂƌƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƵŶĂƐƐĂŝůĞĚĂŶĚ
have encouraged an abnormal and languid pĞĂĐĞĨƵůŶĞƐƐ ? (nimiam ac marcentem diu 
pacem inlacessiti nutrierunt).1014  He rejects this policy as pleasant rather than sound, and it 
is the embrace of peacefulness that presumably caused the fall of the Cherusci at the hands 
of the Chatti.1015  Although, it should be noted that Tacitus qualifies the foolishness of the 
Cherusci with reference to the aggressive nature of the surrounding tribes, it is only the 
lawlessness of their neighbours that means the Cherusci are wrong to place their hopes in a 
pacifistic policy P  “between lawlessness and powerful men, peacefulness is vanity ? (quia 
inter inpotentes et validos falso quiescas).1016 
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dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ŚĂƐ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉĞĂĐĞ
(the enervating effects) and expanded upon them.  In Sallust it is only the Romans who are 
corrupted by the loss of an external enemy, while the Numantians are able to benefit from 
the collapse of Carthage.  However, in Tacitus all races can become indolent in times of 
inaction, be they British, German or Roman armies.  Added to this he has also adapted 
sĞůůĞŝƵƐ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƚŽƐĞĞpax as a Roman imposition, not something gained by cooperation 
as in Sallust, yet this is made more extreme in the works of Tacitus.  Whereas, Velleius 
seems to genuinely exalt the glories of pax and the benefits it can bring to the whole 
empire, Tacitus views pax Romana more cynically and sees it as incompatible with libertas.  
However, this attack on pax is coupled with an obvious admiration for the local population 
of Britain and Germany, so perhaps we should expect the use of amicitia to imply an 
equality akin to that in Sallust that is not present in the use of pax.  At first appearance this 
seems to be the case, as amicitia is twice used to describe the relationship between the 
Britons and Romans.1017  However, in each of these cases it is apparent that neither is a 
true friendship.  The Irish prince is only kept under the pretence of friendship, (specie 
amicitiae).1018  The second example comes from Calgacus who again echoes the attitude 
already articulated by Tacitus.  Calgacus says that even if the British women escape the lust 
of enemy soldiers  “they are defiled by those called friends and guests ? (nomine amicorum 
atque hospitum polluuntur).1019  It is clear then that Tacitus and Calgacus both know that 
true amicitia cannot exist between a Roman and non-Roman, and the pretence of 
friendship is merely used as part of a larger deception.  Further, the fact that Calgacus 
associates this false friendship so closely with loss of libertas1020 again emphasises the 
negative impact the pax Romana has had on the local population. 
Dorey notes that the Agricola partially ĨŽůůŽǁƐƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐĞƚďǇ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐBellum Catilinae.  
The ŵŽƐƚƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƌĞƐĞŵďůĞƐ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŽůŽŐƵĞƐ ?
Both authors ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ  “ĂĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚ ĂŶĚ ŚŽƐƚŝůĞ ƚŽ ǀŝƌƚƵĞ ? ĂŶĚ
sets out the obstaĐůĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ƚŚĞ ǁƌŝƚĞƌ ?.1021  However, despite this point of 
similarity, each author draws very different personal conclusions and morals from these 
difficulties and failings.  Whereas, Sallust concluded in the Bellum Catilinae that retirement 
from public life into the arts can be as difficult and worthy as pursuing a political or military 
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career1022, and by the time of writing the Bellum Iugurthinum had rejected military and 
political careers fully1023 ?ŽƌĞǇƐĞĞƐdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŚĞŵĞĂƐ “ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞ ƌŽ ?Ɛ
achievements ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶŽďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚŝƐůŝĨĞ ? ?1024  It is apparent that although Tacitus begins his 
monograph with a similarly bleak attitude towards his own period, his conclusion is almost 
the polar opposite.  Tacitus, rather than reject the possibility of a good political career in a 
time so devoid of virtus, instead regularly praises Agricola for his own ability to conduct a 
virtuous and laudable career in service to the empire despite the obstacles that lay in his 
way.  In a famous passage he explicitly states that  “great men can live even under bad 
rulers ? (posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse).1025  It is this overriding theme 
in the Agricola, combined with the positive attitude towards aggressive imperialism and 
the framework of a laudatory biography of a great military governor, thus, the consistent 
praise for military men is to be expected.  When Tacitus recalls the governors who 
preceded Agricola, he notes that Vettius Bolanus was too mild for this warlike province1026, 
and he and Trebellius Maximus both allowed their own inaction to affect the soldiery in a 
negative way, leading to mutinies and riots in the camps.1027  Further, it is the most 
aggressive and expansionist governors who are afforded the highest praise; Aulus Plautius, 
Ostorius Scapula, Suetonius Paulinus, Petilius Cerialis and Julius Frontinus are all praised as 
strong soldiers who took the battle to the tribes in order to expand the empire.1028  Good 
emperors for Tacitus were also required to be good generals and have an expansionist 
outlook1029 and he is equally likely to praise the military ability and bravery of the Britons, 
Gauls or Germans as he is those of a Roman governor.1030 
As well as praising bravery in the military sphere and extolling the benefits of an aggressive 
expansionist empire, Tacitus also shows no remorse or disdain for acts of mass violence.  
Tacitus praises Agricola for his ability to use warfare to distract his mind from the sorrow of 
ŚŝƐ ƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĚĞĂƚŚ1031, and he is grateful that he was able to witness a battle between 
opposing German tribes in which sixty thousand were killed just to delight Roman eyes 
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(oblectationi oculisque ceciderunt).1032  Moreover, rather than the slaughter of innocents, 
or wars for greed or revenge, Tacitus sees the most unjust feature of wars as the allotting 
of praise and ĐĞŶƐƵƌĞ P  “this is the most unjust feature of wars: everyone claims victories; 
reverses are attributed to one man only ? (iniquissima haec bellorum condicio est: prospera 
omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni imputantur).1033   
There is only one place in the Agricola where the glory and renown of military men can be 
seen to be, perhaps, ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŽŶŐƌŝĐŽůĂ ?ƐƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽZŽŵĞǁŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚ 
 “ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŚĂƚŚĞŵight try to mitigate by other qualities the offence  W to civilians  W of a 
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌ ?ƐĨĂŵĞ ?ŚĞĚƌĂŶŬƚŚĞĐƵƉŽĨƉĞĂĐĞĂŶĚŝĚůĞŶĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĚƌĞŐƐ ? (uti militare nomen, 
grave inter otiosos, aliis virtutibus temperaret, tranquilitatem atque otium penitus 
hausit).1034  It is not made clear why Agricola would want to reduce the effect of his fame, 
particularly if his success was as great as Tacitus suggests.  However, both Ogilvie-
Richmond and Campbell state that the envy and dislike of soldiers by civilians was 
commonplace.1035  Campbell gives no other examples however, and Ogilvie-Richmond only 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐ>ĂŵĂĐŚƵƐŝŶƌŝƐƚŽƉŚĂŶĞƐ ?Acharnians, and it should also be noted that dislike is not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ŝŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇĞŶǀǇ ? ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ĚƵĞ ƚŽdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŐƌŝĐŽůĂ ?Ɛ
greatness and the envy he says was felt by Domitian, in this instance Tacitus probably does 
wish to suggest that the dislike of civilians was inspired more by envy than any other 
motivation, though this is not explicitly stated.   
Dialogue on Oratory 
 
It is apparent from the usage of pax in the Agricola and Germania that Tacitus, like Velleius 
Paterculus, predominantly saw peace as inseparable from conquest, and that despite 
recognising the negative impact this peace could have on the inhabitants of Western 
Europe, Tacitus still maintained support for an expansionist imperial policy.  Laruccia does 
not see the Dialogus as inconsistent with this view.1036  He bases this argument on two 
passages in the Dialogus; the first, 38.2, certainly takes the meaning Laruccia attributes to 
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it, that the principate and peace have limited eloquence1037, (ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ >ĂƌƵĐĐŝĂ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ
from alia pacaverat to depacaverat is accepted or not).  However, the second passage is 
not so clear.  In this passage Maternus says  “Meanwhile, only one or two persons stand by 
you as you are speaking, and the matter is dealt with in a solitudo, as it were ? (unus inter 
haec dicenti aut alter assisit, et res velut in solitudine agitur).1038  Here Laruccia takes 
solitudine to mean a wasteland or desolation, however, although in other instances it is 
clear that Tacitus does use solitudo to mean a wasteland1039, here the meaning may simply 
be the more literal loneliness, as the rest of the passage emphasises the literal emptiness 
of the courtroom in comparison with an earlier period when the room would have been 
ĨŝůůĞĚǁŝƚŚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂŶĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ? “But the orator wants shouts and applause.  
He must have what I call his stage.  This the ancient ŽƌĂƚŽƌƐĐŽƵůĚĐŽŵŵĂŶĚĚĂǇĂĨƚĞƌĚĂǇ ?
(Oratori autem clamore plausuque opus est, et velut quodam theatre; qualia cotidie 
antiquis oratoribus contingebant).1040  So this solitudo is not contrasted with a political 
freedom, but with the physical presence of a crowd, this solitudo is not enforced by the 
power of the principate but created by the practicalities of the new judicial system. 
If, then, these two passages alone cannot be used to conclude that the same attitude to 
pax is present in the Dialogus as in the Agricola and Germania, is there any other evidence 
that supports the presence of the same pessimistic attitude towards peace?  Perhaps the 
most significant point to make when answering this question is that often in the Dialogus, 
when Tacitus discusses the changing political climate and its effect on oratory, he does not 
in fact refer to pax at all, instead the emphasis is on quietus.  Orators are said to have 
achieved all that is possible in this period of quieta et beata.1041  Oratory is an art that 
flourishes in times of turbidis et inquietis1042, the decline in oratory is traced back to 
ƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ?reign postquam longa temporum quies.1043  Oratory is not an otiose et quieta 
art1044 and it is impossible to have magnam famem et magnam quietem.1045  Whereas the 
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decline of oratory is related in only two places to pax, in the first of these instances pax and 
bellum are used only analogously, pax is more beneficial than bellum but bellum produces 
more skilled fighters, while hazardous conditions will also produce more great orators than 
security.1046  The second of these instances sees the conditions for great oratory in the 
state listed; 
 “ůŝŬĞǁŝƐĞ Ăƚ ZŽŵĞ ? ƐŽ ůŽŶŐ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞĚ ? ƐŽ long as the 
country kept wearing itself out with factions and dissensions and 
disagreements, intil there was no peace in the forum, no harmony in the 
Senate, no restraint in the courts of law, no respect for authority, no sense of 
propriety on the part of the officers of state, the growth of eloquence was 
ĚŽƵďƚůĞƐƐƐƚƵƌĚŝĞƌ ? ?1047 
Nostra quoque civitas, donec erravit, donec se partibus et dissensionibus et 
discordiis confecit, donec nulla fuit in foro pax, nulla in senatu concordia, nulla 
in iudiciis moderatio, nulla superiorum reverentia, nullus magistratuum modus, 
tulit sine dubio valentiorem eloquentiam. 
From this it is apparent that it is not pax that has facilitated the decline of eloquence, but 
rather pax in the forum is but another symptom of the quietus that Maternus actually sees 
as the quality of the state that brought about this decline. 
Therefore, if the same pessimism could be found in the Dialogus as in the Agricola and 
Germania towards a state of peaceful existence, as Laruccia claims1048, then in the Dialogus 
this peace is certainly quietus and not pax.  And when pax is used it is never associated with 
forceful imposition in the same ways as it is in the earlier monographs, rather it is firstly 
spoken of merely as a state preferable to war.1049  Secondly it is used to describe the new 
tranquillity of the forum since the collapse of the republican system.1050  If, then, it is not 
pax that can be seen in this light perhaps it is quietus ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁĂƐƚĞůĂŶĚ ?
which Laruccia says is the Tacitean consequence of pax Romana.  However, although the 
decline of oratory is lamented by all the speakers except Aper, Maternus seems happy to 
forgo this eloquence in return for peace.  He sees the same conditions that allowed for 
great oratory also bringing about ƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? “In each case the state was 
torn to pieces ? (Quae singula etsi distrahebant rem publicam)1051, after listing the great 
crimes which required oratory to match the occasion he says,  “It is better, of course, that 
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such horrors should not occur at all, and we must regard that as the most enviable political 
condition in which we are not liable to anything of the kind ? (Quae mala sicut non accidere 
melius est, isque optimus civitatis status habendus in quo nihil tale patimur).1052  He also 
emphasises that he does not wish for bad citizens in ordeƌƚŽĨƵƌŶŝƐŚŵŽƌĞŐƌĞĂƚŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ P “I 
ĚŽŶŽƚŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐǁŽƌƚŚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐǁŚŝůĞ ƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞďĂĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ũƵƐƚ ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ
ƚŚĂƚŽƵƌŽƌĂƚŽƌƐŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞĂŶĂŵƉůĞƐƵƉƉůǇŽĨŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? (non quia tanti fuit rei publicae 
malos ferre cives ut urberem ad dicendum materiam oratores haberent)1053, and that  “the 
eloquence of the Gracchi did not make up for what the country suffered from their laws ? 
(nec tanti rei publicae Gracchorum eloquentia fuit ut pateretur et leges).1054  Therefore, it is 
apparent that, as Peterson states,  “ŚĞƌĞůŝĞƐĂĐŽŶƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞĐĂǇŽĨƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐ PƉĞĂĐĞ
ƌĞĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞůŽƐƐ ? ?1055   
Yet if peace, both as pax and quietus, is viewed here in far less cynical terms than in the 
Agricola and Germania, and this peace has been brought about by the change from 
republic to principate, what has happened to the Maternus from the beginning of the 
Dialogus?  The Maternus who had so proudly asserted his intentions to not only refuse to 
edit his inflammatory Cato but also to publish a Thyestes that he says will say anything left 
unsaid by his Cato?1056  This Maternus is often associated with either the Maternus who 
was executed for offending Vespasian1057 or another Maternus who was killed for 
delivering a speech against tyrants under Domitian1058 and whether either of these 
identifications is correct or not, the deaths of two Materni in recent memory, coupled with 
the clearly inflammatory nature of plays mentioned at the start of the Dialogus, would 
undoubtedly identify the Maternus of the Dialogus as an outspoken opponent to the 
principate.  This means, firstly, that the description of the principate as sapientissimus et 
unus  ?ŽŶĞǁŝƐĞĂďŽǀĞĂůůŽƚŚĞƌƐ )ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ “ƚĂŝŶƚĞĚďǇŝƌŽŶǇ ?1059 and secondly, what at first 
appears as unrestrained praise for the principate and pax becomes more difficult to 
understand.  There are several possible explanations for this seeming inconsistency.  Firstly, 
the speaker after the lacuna may not be Maternus at all but rather another of the 
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guests.1060  These arguments, however, have long since been rejected due to the lack of any 
evidence that the speaker changes between the lacuna and Finierat Maternus, cum 
Messalla.1061  Secondly, the possibility that like the description of the wise emperor, 
discussed above, this whole passage should be read ironically.  However the examples 
above of the praise of the quietus of the current era, seem unlikely to be meant in any way 
other than they are spoken.  If these are to be read ironically then Maternus would be 
wishing for a return to civil unrest and political violence, which even an outspoken 
opponent of the principate would shy away from.  The third option is put forward by 
Saxonhouse, ǁŚŽĂƐŬƐŝĨDĂƚĞƌŶƵƐ ?ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ “ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨŽƌatory in relation to 
ƚƌĂŶƋƵŝůůŝƚǇĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ? ?1062  This appears to be the case, as 
after the passage that praises peace and notes its role in the decline of eloquence1063 he 
then highlights the imperfections in the system of his own era.  He notes that provinces still 
quarrel with their governors, criminals still call upon lawyers, and countries still need 
protection from neighbours and internal strife, he says that the conditions in Rome are still 
far from perfect and that it would be better if there were no grievances and no-one sought 
redress.1064 
Therefore, although Maternus is grateful for the quietus of this period, and he knows that it 
is the principate that has brought this quietus, he is not wholly laudatory when it comes to 
the principate.  Not only has he composed tragedies to question the regime but he also 
questions its effectiveness even after praising what it has achieved.  It is clear then that 
Maternus envisages a state with the stability of the principate but without an emperor, and 
also that he does not look back to the Republic for this state, as he sees the republic as a 
more unsettled time to live than under the principate.  Saxonhouse suggests that this 
means that what Maternus wants is a philosopher-king in the Platonic mould.1065  However, 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚDĂƚĞƌŶƵƐ ?hƚŽƉŝĂ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŽƌĂƚŽƌǇŝƐƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂůůĐƌŝŵĞĂŶĚƐƚƌŝĨĞŚĂǀĞ
been banished, shares some similarities with those in the Republic and Gorgias, it seems 
unlikely that Maternus would make his plea for a philosopher-king in such veiled terms, 
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particularly as the Dialogus has already stressed the importance of examples from 
philosophy in the discussion on what made the republican oratory so successful.1066  If he 
wanted to argue for a philosopher-king surely he ǁŽƵůĚ ƚĂŬĞ ŚŝƐ ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀŝĐĞ ŽŶ
examples from philosophy.  Just as Tacitus could praise the empire without praising the 
emperor, so Maternus can enjoy the stability of the principate without praising the 
princeps.  Maternus does not put forward an alternative because that is not what the 
discussion on oratory requires; he only makes points relevant to the discussion.  The 
criticisms he does make are made in relation to the topic; reasons why oratory still exists at 
all, in a period that should have ended all strife. 
The Historiae 
 
It is noted in the introductory chapter on civil wars that a common theme in civil war 
narratives is that of the urbs capta ?/ŶŚŝƐ ‘ƐŬĞƚĐŚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞ ?WĂƵůŵĂŬĞƐƵƐĞŽĨŽŶůǇĞ
passage from Tacitus, and this is from the Annals.1067  However, like Plutarch, Appian, 
Cicero and Lucan1068, Tacitus also makes extensive use of the image of Rome, and the 
whole of Italy, as a captive city in the Historiae.  The presence of the image of Rome as an 
urbs capta is not surprising, as the extant sections of the Historiae include three examples 
ŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƚŽƉŽǁĞƌ ? dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐKƚŚŽ ?Ɛ ƐŵĂůů ƐĐĂůĞĂƌŵĞĚƌĞǀŽůƚ ? ƚŚĞ
ƐĞĐŽŶĚŝƐsŝƚĞůůŝƵƐ ?ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇŝŶŽƉĞŶďĂƚƚůĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƐƚŝƐƚŚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬŽŶZŽŵĞďǇsĞƐƉĂƐŝĂŶ ?Ɛ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐ ?dŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞurbs capta motif is the way he 
is able to use the image not only in the conventional manner for the attacks on Rome 
itself1069, but also using specific events in smaller parts of the city to create an urbs capta in 
microcosm1070, and also to extend the image in order to show all Italy as a captured city.1071 
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 Tac. Dial. 31.5-7. 
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 Plut. Marius 44; Sulla 31; App. B Civ. 71; Cic. Cat. 3.24; Lucan, 5.25. 
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 The Praetorians who revolted in order to crown Otho rushed to kill an old emperor as if they were 
invading Persia (Tac. Hist.1.40).  Vitellius approached Rome wearing a military cloak but was 
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 For example, the siege on the Capitoline in which the troops of Vitellius captured Flavius 
Sabinus, the brother of Vespasian.  This description of the siege shares many of the features of the 
urbs capta motif.  Not only are large parts of the Capitoline consumed by fire (ibid 3.71), a common 
aspect of the urbs capta motif (Paul 82, 144-8), but temples are destroyed (Tac. Hist. 3.72).  Further, 
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(ibid 3.73) increases the sense that this is not a battle but an attack on a city populace.  Once again the 
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As well as the urbs capta there is another civil war theme present in the Historiae  W the 
killing of kinsmen.  In the literary tradition of civil war, the killing of a close relation is seen 
as a reversal of natural order.  The first such incident in the Historiae does not emphasise 
this reversal of nature but rather has the accidental parricide, the Spaniard conscript, 
Mansuetus, bury his father on the field of battle after realising his crime.1072  Mansuetus 
and his dying father both recognise the cruelty of a war that causes such crimes and the 
son cries that the crime was down to the state not his own role in the war.  However, 
despite the denouncing of this crime by the nearby soldiers, Tacitus states that they did not 
slow their killing and robbing of kinsmen and brothers (nec eo segnius propinquos adfinis 
fratres trucidant spoliant).  The second such incident is even more lamented by Tacitus, for 
not only did a soldier kill his own brother, but he also tried to claim a reward for doing 
so.1073  We are told that the nature of civil war meant that the man could not be punished 
and the best that the generals could do was to avoid paying the reward.  Whereas in the 
republican civil wars a Sullan soldier committed suicide on realising that he had killed his 
brother.  Therefore, not only are civil wars an environment where the natural order can be 
overturned and brother can kill brother, or son kill father, but even the moral qualities of 
soldiers in civil wars have deteriorated since the republican civil wars.  While a republican 
soldier in civil war would commit these crimes, he would never revel in them as the 
imperial soldier does, and would recognise the gravity of his actions.  This chronological 
comparison is also matched in book 4 by cultural comparison between Roman and German.  
While the Romans are occupied with civil wars and violent disputes, the Germans, in 
contrast, are involved in negotiation and compromise.1074  This contrast is made all the 
more stark because Tacitus allows for the Germans to recognise the injustice of the very 
                                                                                                                                                                    
worst crimes are saved until after the battle is concluded, when Vitellius is unable to control his troops 
and, as a result, Sabinus is cut down in front and his mutilated body dragged towards the forum (ibid 
3.74).  The second of these urbs capta in microcosm is the attack by the Flavian troops on the 
Praetorian camp (ibid   ,Q WKLV FKDSWHU WKH FDPS LV GHVFULEHG DV WKH VROGLHUV¶ ³FRXQWU\ DQG
KRXVHKROG´ illam patriam, illos penatis) and the aggressors used weapons and tactics more 
commonly associated with the taking of a foreign city than with the slaughter of Roman troops.  There 
is also the common atrocity of pollution of religious ground.  The Praetorians know their resistance 
ZLOO  FDXVH WKH )ODYLDQ WURRSV ³WR GHILOH WKH KRXVHV DQG DOWDUV ZLWK EORRG´ domos arasque cruore 
foedare).  Furthermore, it is not until the last Praetorian is killed that Tacitus declares the city taken: 
³2QWKHFDSWXUHRIWKHFLW\9LWHOOLXVZDVFDUULHGRQDFKDLUWKURXJKWKHUHDURIWKHSDODFHWRKLVZLIH¶V
KRXVHRQWKH$YHQWLQH´Vitellius capta urbe per aversam Palatii partem Aventinum in domum uxoris 
sellula defertur).  Therefore, in ten chapters and a few days, we have moved from the image of the 
Capitoline, a captured city within a city, to the Praetorian camp as a captured city within a captured 
city. 
1071
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crimes the Romans are calling for rewards for:  “nor can we think that you are so unjust as 
to wish us to kill our own parents, brothers, and children ?  ?nec vos adeo iniquos 
existimamus ut interfici a nobis parentes fratres liberos nostros velitis).1075  Whilst it is an 
extreme case when a Roman does not recognise the repulsive nature of his own crime1076, 
the majority either cannot punish these acts1077 or still partake in them.1078 
dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨconcordia shows no change from that of his earlier works, or the works of 
Sallust and Velleius Paterculus.  For example, he uses variations on concordia and discordia 
thirty-eight times to describe the condition of a state.1079  It is used on ten occasions for 
personal relationships of particular agreement or disunity1080, twice for disagreement 
within the Senate1081, once in reference to the temple of Concord1082 and it is also used 
seventeen times for relationships between a legion or army.1083  None of these seem to use 
dis/con-cordia in any way other than for the sort of internal relationships we have already 
seen.  There are instances where it refers to two groups from different nations.  For 
example, in book 2 there is said to be discordia between the Batavian auxiliaries and the 
Legionaries, however, as the two were joined in the same army, this is still a dispute 
internalised in one group.1084  Although the way that concordia is used is not of any great 
significance, the number of times it is used and the ratio of discordia to concordia is 
perhaps more interesting.  As noted elsewhere ?^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚconcordia has often 
been commented on, but the Historiae of Tacitus uses variations on the term sixty-seven 
times compared to only twenty times in the Bella and Historiae of Sallust.  Even given that 
Tacitus Historiae is roughly 1.44 times as long as the Bella and Historiae of Sallust 
combined, this is still an impressive total.1085  This is even starker if only the uses of 
discordia are consŝĚĞƌĞĚ ? ĂƐ dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ƐHistoriae have fifty-three to only nine in Sallust.  
However, this should not be surprising, as Syme notes that  “ƚŚĞƚŚĞŵĞŽĨƚŚĞHistoriae of 
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Tacitus is the murderous stoƌǇŽĨĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌĂŶĚĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵ ?.1086  So the specifically internal 
meaning of discordia is perfect for the theme of civil conflict, and its repeated use to 
describe the state emphasises the self inflicted nature of the problems at hand.   
In the Historiae the extent to which variations on concordia were used to indicate a state of 
military mutiny is also of interest.  The causes of this discord, however, can be very distinct. 
KƚŚŽ ?ƐƚƌŽŽƉƐĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞŽŶƚŚĞďƌŝŶŬŽĨŵƵƚŝŶǇĚƵĞ to poverty and ill-discipline1087 as 
ĂƌĞ sŽĐƵůĂ ?Ɛ ĂƌŵǇ ǁŚŽƐĞ ŵƵƚŝŶŽƵƐ ĨĞĞůŝŶŐs are accelerated by their lack of pay and 
grain.1088  Despite the description of KƚŚŽ ?ƐƚƌŽŽƉƐĂƚ ? ? ? ?ĂƐ being on the verge of mutiny 
due to poverty, in the summary offered at 2.7 of the causes of the Emperor ?s death, Otho 
dies due to the mutiny (discordia), sloth (ignavia) and luxury (luxuria) of his troops.1089  
sŝƚĞůůŝƵƐ ? ĂƌŵǇwas equally affected by the luxury the soldiers experienced once their 
general became emperor.  The army that had entered Rome could face heat, dust, storms 
and toil, but that which leaves is no longer ready for hardships and is more ready for 
discordia.1090  Therefore it can be neither poverty nor wealth that are themselves the cause 
of discordia, instead it must be the collapse in discipline to which both these circumstances 
lead.1091  
This lack of discipline leading to discordia within an army is also commented on several 
times in relation to the damage it has on the effectiveness of an army.  When Otho wants 
to calm the dissent in the ranks, he reminds them that the enemy would want to find them 
in a state of discordia.1092  Antonius Primus makes an almost identical plea when he stops a 
mutiny by openly praying to  “the standards and the gods of war (signa et bellorum deos) 
that madness and discordia would rather inflict the enemǇ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ.1093  tŚĞŶ ŶƚŽŶŝƵƐ ?
prayers were answered, he hastened his attack, wanting to strike while the enemy was 
weak.1094  So ill-discipline not only increases the chances of discordia within an army, but 
this discord in turn improves the chances of enemy success. 
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There is one particularly interesting passage in the Historiae, which clearly highlights 
several different usages for con/dis-cord:  the reconciliation of Vespasian and Mucianus at 
2.5.  Here we see two generals who begin in a state of personal discord1095 who are united 
in concord by Titus, who acts as a go-between.1096  This concord then allows them to 
succeed in the discord of civil war, after which Vespasian will go on to create a new 
concord at Rome.1097 
'ŝǀĞŶdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶƵƐŝŶŐquietus rather than pax in the sections of the Dialogus 
that praises the stability of empire1098, it is surprising how often pax is used in this way in 
the Historiae.  In total pax is used to indicate stability 59 times1099 compared to the use of 
quietus for this purpose only six times1100, further highlighting dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽƵƐĞquietus 
not pax in the Dialogus.  Therefore, the Historiae unsurprisingly shares more in common 
with the negative presentation of pax seen in the Agricola and Germania.  For example, 
when Cerialis addresses the Treviri and Lingones he reminds them that they must bear the 
cost of pax1101, while Civilis tells the Gauls that this pax is nothing more than servitude.1102   
Whereas the monographs focused on the negative impact of pax on the inhabitants of the 
provinces, in the Historiae even peace in Rome can have a negative and violent element.  In 
the prologue to book 1 Tacitus says that  “The work I am embarking on is that of a period 
rich in disasters, terrible with battles, torn by civil struggles, horrible even in peace ? (Opus 
adgredior opimum casibus, atrox proeliis, discors seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace saevum)1103 
ĂŶĚ ĂĨƚĞƌ 'ĂůďĂ ?Ɛ ĚĞĂƚŚ, ƚĂůŬ ƚƵƌŶƐ ƚŽ Đŝǀŝů ǁĂƌƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ  “ƌecent horrors of cruel ƉĞĂĐĞ ? 
(recentia saevae pacis exempla).1104 
DŽƐƚ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ƵƐĞŽĨpax in the Historiae is the way that he plays with the 
concept of peace.  We have already seen examples of this in the negative and violent 
effects of pax on the provincials and in Rome, but just as peace can be as violent as war, 
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the boundaries between war and peace can also be blurred in other ways.  For example, 
after the massacre at Divodurum had taken the Gauls by surprise, they came to meet the 
advancing army with pleas and prostrations  “all else that might appease an enemy's fury 
was offered, though there was no war, to secure peace ? (quaeque alia placamenta hostilis 
irae, non quidem in bello sed pro pace tendebantur).1105  tŚĞŶ KƚŚŽ ?Ɛ ĂƌŵǇ ŵĂƌĐŚĞĚ
through Italy, the Italians were met with much the same aggression as when the owners of 
estates went to met the army securitate pacis et belli malo circumveniebantur (in the 
security of peace, [they] were overwhelmed by war)1106 and we are told at the death of 
Vitellius that it was the end of war not the beginning of peace (interfecto Vitellio bellum 
magis desierat quam pax coeperat).1107  This last example is repeated in the many images of 
the urbs capta we have seen earlier, where the worst of the violence is saved for after the 
war is over, rather than carried out for its success.  So Tacitus blurs the lines between war 
and peace by allowing for the brutality to continue into pax and also for Gauls to act as if 
they were at war in a time of peace and for Italians to be greeted by war when they expect 
a peaceful welcome.   
The Annals 
 
dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ƵƐĞŽĨconcordia and discordia in the Annals show the same tendencies as in the 
Historiae.  For example, the uses of discordia heavily outweigh those of concordia: by fifty-
one1108 to thirteen.1109  Further, Tacitus often uses concordia in relation to personal 
relationships, between politically powerful individuals1110, or even husband and wife1111 or 
mother and child.1112  Further, the same relationship can still be seen between the loss of 
discipline within an army and the increase in discordia.  For example, at the death of 
Augustus, Junius Blaesus allows his troops to cease their usual duties to allow time for the 
ƉƌŽƉĞƌŵŽƵƌŶŝŶŐĂŶĚĨĞƐƚŝǀĂůƐ ?  “dŚĞƌĂŶŬƐŐƌĞǁŝŶƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĂŶĚƋƵĂƌƌĞůƐŽŵĞ  W gave a 
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hearing to any glib agitator  W became eager, in short, for luxury and ease, disdainful of 
discipline ĂŶĚǁŽƌŬ ?  ?eo principio lascivire miles, discordare, pessimi cuiusque sermonibus 
praebere auris, denique luxum et otium cupere, disciplinam et laborem aspernari).1113  This 
is a particularly clear example of dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ůŽƐƐŽĨĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĂŶĚdiscordia.  
The general has no intention to rouse his troops to rebel; he is not relaxing their duties 
because of any pressure from weary soldiers, or any personal shortcoming.  Rather, the 
pause occurs for the mourning of Augustus and the celebration of his successor.  There is 
no force acting on this army pushing it to revolt except inertia itself. 
In the opening chapter of the Annals Tacitus also makes explicit what has been implicit in 
the horrors of the urbs capta and the inversions of the civil wars.  He explains that Augustus 
ǁĂƐ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ŚŝƐ ƌƵůĞ ŽŶůǇ  “when all were wearied by civil discords ?  ?cuncta 
discordiis civilibus fessa).1114  An idea that is repeated more fully when he says: 
 “dŚĞŶ ĐĂŵĞ WŽŵƉĞǇ ?Ɛ ƚŚŝƌĚ ĐŽŶƐƵůĂƚĞ ?  Ƶƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚŽƐĞŶ ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?
operating with remedies more disastrous than the abuses, this maker and 
breaker of his own enactments, lost by the sword what he was holding by the 
sword.  There followed twenty crowded years of discord, during which law and 
custom ceased to exist: villainy was immune, decency not rarely a sentence of 
death.  At last, in his sixth consulate, Augustus Caesar, feeling his power 
secure, cancelled the behests of his triumvirate, and presented us with the 
laws to serve out needs in peace and under a princeps. ?1115 
Tum Cn. Pompeius, tertium consul corrigendis moribus delectus et gravior 
remediis quam delicta erant suarumque legum auctor idem ac subversor, quae 
armis tuebatur armis amisit. exim continua per viginti annos discordia, non 
mos, non ius; deterrima quaeque impune ac multa honesta exitio fuere. sexto 
demum consulatu Caesar Augustus, potentiae securus, quae triumviratu 
iusserat abolevit deditque iura quis pace et principe uteremur. 
dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶŚĞĂǀŝůǇĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƐƚŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚƐŽĨĚŝƐĐŽƌĚǁŝƚŚƵŐƵƐƚƵƐ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨ
the principate.  However, the movement from discord to peace is not lauded.  Instead 
Tacitus immediately connects the pax ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂƚĞǁŝƚŚƐĞƌǀŝůŝƚǇ P “dŚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƚŚĞ
fetters were tighter ? ?acriora ex eo vincla),1116 which instantly undermines the benefits of 
concord implied in the claim that Augustus provided laws fit for this new period of peace.  
This connection between servility and pax are seen elsewhere in the Annals.  For example, 
Tacitus says that  “Nobody had any present worries, so long as Augustus retained his 
physical powers, could maintain his own position, that of his house, and the peace ? (nulla 
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in praesens formidine, dum Augustus aetate validus seque et domum in pacem sustentavit) 
but that this meant  “equality is lost and all follow the princeps ? ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƐ ? ?omnes exuta 
aequalitate iussa principis aspectare).1117  This comparison brings to mind a passage of the 
Agricola where the Britons willingly accept aspects of the Roman peace, which are a 
disguised element of their slavery.1118  Thus, Tacitus presents both the Senate and a 
barbarian race as shackled by peace. 
The similarity between the servility of Rome and Britain is further seen in the rebellion of 
Caratacus; the tyrannies pollute the oppressed, long servility cause the loss of noble spirit, 
which causes government to deteriorate, if opposition is attempted it is crushed and if 
there is no opposition the exploitation worsens.1119  Moreover, this slavery is again 
connected with pax as once Caratacus was  “joined by all who feared peace with [Rome], he 
resolved on a final struggle ? ?additisque qui pacem nostram metuebant, novissimum casum 
experitur).1120  Laruccia notes that a rebelling army can also be subdued if they are made 
accustomed with pax.  However, this is not merely peace, but a peace that is clearly 
associated with the servility at Rome. 1121  Tacitus tells us:  “ample provisions had been 
made for the servitude of Rome: It was time to administer some sedative to the passions of 
the soldiers, so that they might wish peace ? ?satis prospectum urbanae servituti: militaribus 
animis adhibenda fomenta ut ferre pacem velint).1122 
Laruccia also highlights the connections between peace and fear in Tacitus.1123  We have 
already seen that Sallust believed the fear of an external enemy helped maintain peace at 
Rome1124, an idea that was also followed by Velleius.1125  Also, we have seen that Livy noted 
metus hostilis as something helpful to internal peace and he added to that the idea of 
metus deorum.1126  Tacitus elaborates still further on the connection between peace and 
fear.  Added to the this list of  ‘ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŐŽĚƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞĞŵƉĞƌŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĨĞĂƌƐŽĨ
losing his dominance P ƚŚĞ  “ƚǇƌĂŶƚ ŝƐ ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ĨĞĂƌĨƵů ŽĨ ŵĞŶ ǁŚŽ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĐĂƉĂďůĞ ŽĨ
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leading a rebellion, and so he is slow to entrust armies to men of ability and displeased by 
ĂŶǇ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ĞǆĐĞƉƚ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ ? ?1127  Augustus advised the restriction of the empire 
 “ĚƵĞƚŽĨĞĂƌŽƌũĞĂůŽƵƐǇ ? ?incertum metu an per invidiam)1128, ŽƌďƵůŽ ?ƐŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ
are a threat to peace because they provoke the jealousy of Claudius1129 and by 55AD 
generals expect more praise from peace than from conquest because the triumphal 
honours have been diluted.1130 
Turning to concordia, Tacitus particularly admires of two examples of concordia between 
two powerful individuals.  The first of these is the relationship between the brothers 
Germanicus and Drusus; ǁĞĂƌĞƚŽůĚ ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞďƌŽƚŚĞƌƐmaintained a singular unanimity, 
ƵŶƐŚĂŬĞŶ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŬŝƚŚ ĂŶĚ ŬŝŶ ?  ?fratres egregie concordes et 
proximorum certaminibus inconcussi).1131  This is in stark contrast to the reaction to Nero 
after the murder of Britannicus;  “which many were even to forgive when they remembered 
the ancient discord between brothers and the throne not to be bound in friendship ?(cui 
plerique etiam hominum ignoscebant, antiquas fratrum discordias et insociabile regnum 
aestimantes).1132  However, Tacitus has already told his reader that shared rule was not 
impossible; firstly with the brotherly example of Drusus and Germanicus, and again with 
^ĞŶĞĐĂ ĂŶĚ ƵƌƌƵƐ ?  “These two men guided the emperor's youth, in concord, a rare 
occurrence when power is shared ? ?hi rectores imperatoriae iuventae et, rarum in societate 
potentiae, concordes).1133  Although this harmony is rare it is not impossible, so the logic of 
those who excused Nero is shown to be patently false.1134 
Turning to pax, Syme notes that longa pax is used in Tacitus to allude to negative impact of 
imperial peace.1135  Laruccia, however, correctly observes that of the seven uses of longa 
pax in Tacitus not all are detrimental.1136  Of those, two observe that long peace has 
allowed for small towns to prosper, towns that are subsequently destroyed by civil war; 
therefore the longa pax appears even more beneficial when contrasted with the 
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destruction that follows.1137  Another positive aspect of longa pax is that Agricola knows 
which British troops are loyal to Rome because of their actions during the long peace.1138  
At Historiae 5.16.3 there is a very neutral use of longa pax.  WĞĂƌĞƚŽůĚƚŚĂƚ “A joyful shout 
arose from all, some after their long peace were eager for battle, others weary of war 
desired peace; all hoped for rewards and rest thereafter ? ?Alacrior omnium clamor, quis vel 
ex longa pace proelii cupido vel fessis bello pacis amor, praemiaque et quies in posterum 
sperabatur.).1139  Therefore there are only three examples of Tacitus using longa pax in a 
negative way; in the Germania when he says that German tribes can become dulled 
(torpeo) by inaction1140, in the Historiae when the Senate and equites have become 
indolent and weak due to the long peace so cannot defend Rome from the coming 
attacks1141 and finally the lack of discipline in the camp caused by longa pax.1142  However, 
it should be noted that although these examples do problems with sustained peace, that 
does not mean that longa pax ŝƐĂĚĞƚƌŝŵĞŶƚĂůĨŽƌĐĞŝŶĂŶĚŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶ>ŝǀǇ ?Ɛ
account of Numa we have seen a successful, although legendary, attempt to control 
discipline through a long peace.  Further, in this last example from Tacitus it is clear that 
the peace is not the problem, but the ill discipline that is permitted to develop as a result.  
Once these troops are under the control of Corbulo he is able to return the troops to 
discipline while still at peace.1143 
The destructive nature of peace in some of the passages discussed above has caused a 
number of scholars to conclude that Tacitus must therefore be an expansionist, who 
regrets the time Rome spent away from war (a conclusion this study also made when 
examining the monographs in isolation).1144  There is further evidence for this also, most 
tellingly at Historiae 3.46: 
 “The Dacians also, never trustworthy, became uneasy and now had no fear, for 
our army had been withdrawn from Moesia.  They watched the first events 
without stirring; but when they heard that Italy was aflame with war and that 
the whole empire was divided into hostile camps, they stormed the winter 
quarters of our auxiliary foot and horse... They were already preparing to 
destroy the camps of the legions and would have succeeded in their purpose if 
Mucianus had not placed the Sixth legion across their path.  He took this step 
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because he had learned of the victory at Cremona, and he also feared that two 
hordes of foreigners might come down upon the empire... Fronteius Agrippa 
was transferred from Asia, where as proconsul, he had governed the province 
for a year, and put in charge of Moesia; there he was given additional troops 
from the army of Vitellius, which it was wise from the point of view of both 
policy and peace to distribute in the provinces and to involve in war a foreign 
ĨŽĞ ? ?
mota et Dacorum gens numquam fida, tunc sine metu, abducto e Moesia 
exercitu. sed prima rerum quieti speculabantur: ubi flagrare Italiam bello, 
cuncta in vicem hostilia accepere, expugnatis cohortium alarumque hibernis... 
iamque castra legionum excindere parabant, ni Mucianus sextam legionem 
opposuisset, Cremonensis victoriae gnarus, ac ne externa moles utrimque 
ingrueret...  Fonteius Agrippa ex Asia (pro consule eam provinciam annuo 
imperio tenuerat) Moesiae praepositus est, additis copiis e Vitelliano exercitu, 
quem spargi per provincias et externo bello inligari pars consilii pacisque erat. 
This brief ĞǀĞŶƚƐŚŽǁƐŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨdĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĂŶĚƉĞĂĐĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇ
discussed, and adds one more to the list.  Firstly the Dacians consider hostilities when fear 
ǁĂƐƌĞŵŽǀĞĚďǇƚŚĞǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂůŽĨZŽŵĞ ?ƐĂƌŵǇ ?ĨĞĂƌĐĂƵƐŝng peace), then they act on this 
idea when they hear of the civil conflict in Italy (discordia ĂŝĚŝŶŐĂŶĞŶĞŵǇ ? )ĂŶĚDƵĐŝĂŶƵƐ
returns troops when he hears news of the victory at Cremona (as the civil conflict is ending, 
it empowers Rome in foreign wars).  Next comes a new idea; Tacitus says that redistributing 
sŝƚĞůůŝƵƐ ?ƚƌŽŽƉƐŝŶƚŚĞĞĂƐƚŝƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞas it involves them in a foreign war.  Although 
parts of this are familiar, foreign wars helping domestic peace and fear of foreign enemy, 
parts are alsŽ ŶĞǁ ?  dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƐĂŝĚ ƚŽ ďĞ  ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ĂŶĚ ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ Ă ZŽŵĂŶ ĂƌŵǇ ďĞŝŶŐ
deliberately scattered in the provinces in order to maintain concord.   
dŚŝƐ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞ ? ŝƚ ƐĞĞŵƐ ? ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ DĞŚů ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ  “Tacitus represented himself as an 
expansionist in terms of foreign policy, which accorded well with Rome's elite senatorial 
tradition, and for this reason did not assign great value to peace, because peace levelled 
what was unequal ? ?1145  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ǁĞ ŚĂǀĞ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ƐĞĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ǀŝĞǁ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŽŶĞ
sided.  ^ǇŵĞ ŶŽƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƐŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “Annals that convey the argument for 
ĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨǁĂƌĂŶĚďĂƚƚůĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞZŚŝŶĞĂŶĚƵƉŚƌĂƚĞƐ ? ?1146  This is plainly 
seen in the letter of Tiberius to Germanicus; he provides a compelling argument for 
GermaŶŝĐƵƐ ? ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ? Ăůů ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŝŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝŶ dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ? ŽǁŶ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?1147  They have 
suffered great losses, both in the field and by natural cause, and if left to their own devises 
the German tribes may turn to discord, leaving own presence unnecessary and the Cherusci 
                                                          
1145
 Mehl 2011, 142. 
1146
 Syme 1958, 496. 
1147
 Tac. Ann. 2.26. 
Andrew Crane  175 
 
and Suebi do indeed ƚƵƌŶƚŽĚŝƐĐŽƌĚŽŶĐĞƚŚĞZŽŵĂŶ ?ƐŚĂǀĞůĞĨƚ ?1148  Further, in this passage 
ĂŶĚĂŐĂŝŶĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁĞĐĂŶƐĞĞdŝďĞƌŝƵƐ ?ũŽǇĂŶĚƉƌŝĚĞĂƚĞƐƚ ďůŝƐŚŝŶŐƉĞĂĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŝƐĚŽŵ
ŶŽƚ ĨŽƌĐĞ  “ǁŝƚŚ ŶŽ ĚŝƐƉĂƌĂŐŝŶŐ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ? ?1149  The Parthians are even convinced to 
withdraw from Armenia by Tiberius without the need for battles.1150 
Historians and Peace ± Conclusion 
 
The vast majority of modern scholars have emphasised the military and aggressive nature 
of Roman peace.  According to Woolf, ZŽŵĂŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ŝƐ  “simply a component of wider 
ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ŽĨ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? Ă ĐŽŶĐŽŵŝƚĂŶƚ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?1151  Syme notes 
that  “dŚĞǁŽƌĚpax ĐĂŶƐĞůĚŽŵďĞĚŝǀŽƌĐĞĚ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚ Q/ƚǁĂƐZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĚĞƐƚŝŶǇƚŽĐŽŵƉĞů ƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ ůŝǀĞ ŝŶƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?1152  Mellor, too, notes that  “dŚĞ
Roman Peace is an imposed peace.  Peace is not the goal; it is merely the by-product of 
ƐƵďũƵŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?1153  Linderski states that,  “Zepublican Latin is rich in words pertaining to war, 
poor in praise of peace.  Its equivalent of peaceful is pacatus, subdued.  In Rome even 
ƉĞĂĐĞǁĂƐĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ? ?1154  Barton not only agrees that peace was an aggressive force in 
Roman history but claims that,  “WĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇ ůĞĚ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƚŽ Đŝǀŝů ƐƚƌŝĨĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ? ?1155  Further, individual Latin historians are believed to 
be equally suspicious of peace.  Kapust asserts, that, iŶ^ĂůůƵƐƚ “ƉĞĂĐĞďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƉƌŽďůĞŵ
not a blessing, beĐĂƵƐĞŽĨĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŶĚƐĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?1156 and Mehl states that  “ ?dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚ
assign great value ƚŽƉĞĂĐĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƉĞĂĐĞůĞǀĞůůĞĚǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƵŶĞƋƵĂů ? ?1157 
However, this study of Latin historiography has found that the situation is not as one-sided 
as these quotes suggest.  Sallust rejected a political and military career because of the 
violence inherent in such an office1158, he viewed his own undertaking to write history as a 
peaceful task1159, he can encourage others to endure wrongs rather than react violently1160, 
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he associated advancing age and wisdom with a growing distaste for war1161 and states that 
wars are caused by a defect in human nature.1162  In his retelling of the founding of the city 
he emphasises the importance of concordia, while downplaying ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ
military strength, while recalling the equality of the peace of early Rome1163 and describing 
a golden age free from war. Furthermore, he praises the art of peace1164 and encourages 
respect for pacatus territory.1165 
ƋƵĂůůǇ ?ŝŶ>ŝǀǇ ?ĞŶĞĂƐ ?ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞĂĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬƐŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶŚĞŝƐƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ
to escape the sacking of the city.1166  Once Aeneas arrives in Italy Livy, favours the tradition 
that minimises the violence of this myth.1167  >ŝǀǇ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞZĂƉĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĂďŝŶĞƐĂůƐŽ
emphasises the role of concord more than any other account.1168  Even the reign of Numa  W 
always a peaceful period in Roman history  W is altered to emphasise the importance of 
ƉĞĂĐĞ P >ŝǀǇ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨĞƚŝĂůƉƌŝĞƐƚŚŽŽĚ ǁŝƚŚ EƵŵĂ ?Ɛ ƌĞŝŐŶ
because this would imply the possibility of war.1169  Numa is able to maintain peace without 
any hint of military threats but only through respect from his neighbours1170 and views war 
itself as degrading.1171  Moreover, Livy shows the normative state of the gods to be 
peaceful and benign1172 and shows further evidence for the possibility that pacatus can 
have a non-military meaning.1173 
Even the more militaristic historians can at times present a more positive peace.  Caesar is 
frequently at pains to emphasise that he desired an equal peace during the civil war, even 
at the detriment to his military preparation.1174  Tacitus is not averse to peace in and of 
itself; rather, he shows that peace without virtue is often destructive.  The Chauci are able 
to maintain peace and renown through discipline and just dealings1175, and if discipline is 
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maintained in a Roman army then they too will not disturb the peace.1176  Furthermore, 
dĂĐŝƚƵƐŝƐŶŽƚǁŚŽůůǇĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŝŶŚŝƐŽƵƚůŽŽŬ ?ĂƐŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƐƚĂƚĞĚ ?ďƵƚŚĞĂůůŽǁƐdŝďĞƌŝƵƐ ?
joy and pride at his diplomatic successes to go unchallenged and seems to support the 
removal of troops from Germany.1177  Remarkably, Velleius Paterculus, the most militaristic 
of the Latin historians, ends his history with a prayer for the preservation of peace.1178  
Despite the violence implied in elements of this prayer, it is still significant that it seems 
wholly genuine in this least cynical of historians.1179 
However, it is not the intention of this study to suggest that the Latin historians were 
pacifistic or utopian in their presentation of peace, nor to claim, like Gibbon, ƚŚĂƚ  “ƚŚĞ
tranquil and prosperous state of the empire was warmly felt and honestly confessed by the 
ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůƐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ZŽŵĂŶƐ ? ?1180  Nevertheless, it is apparent that peace was not the 
enemy of the Latin historians, not one presents a militaristic narrative without at least 
some concession to the benefits of peace, even if these benefits are only for the residents 
of the empire. 
Furthermore, it should not be surprising that war takes a prominent position over peace in 
Latin history.  Rome was almost constantly at war1181 and the surviving histories are often 
ƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐŽĨǁĂƌƐĂŶĚƐĞĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƚŚŽĨ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐĞǆƚĂŶƚǁŽƌŬƐĂƌĞŵŽŶŽŐƌĂƉŚƐŽŶǁĂƌƐ ?
ĂƐĂƌĞďŽƚŚŽĨĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ?dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?Agricola, although nominally a biography, is in essence a 
record of the conquest of Britain, far more time is used describing the events in Britain that 
occur before Agricola arrives, or that do not involve him, than on recounting his life before 
his posting there.  The Historiae ?ĂƐŝƚƐƵƌǀŝǀĞƐ ?ŝƐĂƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐEĞƌŽ ?Ɛ
death.  In the Annals Tacitus laments that his topic will not be as exciting as the histories of 
great wars and the killings of kings (Ann. 4.37), yet, despite his protests wars and killings 
are plentiful in his work, and his lamentation further highlights the connection between the 
Roman historical tradition and the recording of wars.  It may have been difficult to include 
any exhortation to peace in a tradition so heavily committed to recording the great deeds 
of war, yet, to one degree or another, we have seen that this is indeed what each of the 
Latin historians does.   
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This study has traced the attitudes towards peace of the major ancient philosophical 
schools and the prominent extant late republican and early imperial Latin historians.  
Despite the differences in aims, intentions and genre of these two groups the similarities of 
the conclusions reached in the work above show a consistent trend through this study.  Not 
only do all the major schools studied show an increased acceptance of pacifistic arguments 
and a growing rejection of violent conflict throughout the period studied, but the work of 
each individual historian contains examples that illustrate different aspects of the 
importance of peace.  However, despite these two aspects of philosophy and 
historiography having been considered separately there are significant areas of similarity in 
places. 
For example, this study has noted that Dio Chrysostom praised those who rejected war as a 
means to gain glory, and although Seneca is happy to praise those who fought for the 
Republic, he also lauded those who rejected the gaining of gloria through military and 
political careers in his philosophical works and used this trait to emphasise the virtues of 
Thyestes in his tragedies.  This theoretical praise of the quiet life is taken to a higher level 
by Sallust who boasted that he had rejected violent public life as part of his apologia.  
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐĂŐĞŚĂƐŐŝǀĞŶŚŝŵƚŚĞǁŝƐĚŽŵŚĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽŵŽǀĞĂǁĂǇ
from the life of a general, the connection between aging, wisdom and longing for peace is 
ĂůƐŽ ƐŚŽǁŶ ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƚƵĚǇ ?  &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ŝŶ ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ Isaurian 
campaigns of Servilius, these include two examples of the elders of a town petitioning the 
war-hungry youths to put down their wĞĂƉŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ŝŶ ^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?ƐTroades where 
Agamemnon tells Pyrrhus that his desire for violent revenge is a youthful fault.   
If the myths of the golden age are considered then, again, some similarities appear.  
^ĞŶĞĐĂ ?Ɛ ,ŝƉƉŽůǇƚƵƐ ĚŝǀĞƌŐĞƐ ĨƌŽŵ ŚŝƐ Ƶripidean model and emphasises the peaceful 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŚŝƐůŝĨĞƐƚǇůĞƐŚĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐŽůĚĞŶĂŐĞ ?ǁŚŝůĞDĂǆŝŵƵƐŽĨdǇƌĞ ?ƐƚǁĞŶƚǇĨŽurth 
oration also follows the Hesiodic golden age as a period of peace, before the forging of 
weapons.  Like these philosophical and literary authors, Sallust and Livy both emphasise the 
importance of concordia in an idealised golden age.  However, unlike the more 
chronologically vague notion of the golden age in the other examples cited, the two 
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historians both place this peaceful age more firmly in the myths of the settling of Italy by 
the Trojan survivors.  Also, just as the philosophers used the accusation of being a war-
lover as an insult towards the other schools, Caesar repeatedly emphasises his own longing 
for peace ŝŶƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůǁĂƌƐǁŚŝůĞŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞWŽŵƉĞŝĂŶƐ ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌǁĂƌ ?/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚŚŝƐ>ŝǀǇƐĞĞŵƐƚŽƐŚĂƌĞ>ƵĐƌĞƚŝƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ^ĞǆƚƵƐŵƉŝƌŝĐƵƐ ?ďĞůŝĞĨŝŶƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ
gods. 
However, this study has also shown that peace could be presented as a negative force in 
ƚŚŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?dĂĐŝƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĚĞůŝƵƐƌŝƐƚŝĚĞƐ ?ǁŽƌŬƐďŽƚŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ
of rhetoric in long periods of peace.  While Tacitus, Caesar and Velleius all emphasised the 
one sided nature of peace with Rome in their works through their choice of verbs used with 
pax, which showed that the peace was made only when Rome decided and often only once 
ƚŚĞĞŶĞŵǇŚĂĚůĂŝĚĚŽǁŶƚŚĞŝƌĂƌŵƐ ?ĂĞƐĂƌ ?sĞůůĞŝƵƐĂŶĚ,ŽƌĂĐĞ ?ƐEpistles all suggest that 
long periods of peace can cause a weakening of a population deemed detrimental to 
society, an idea which even Sallust, the most pacifistic historian, emphasises in the notion 
of the metus hostilis.  However, counter arguments can also be found within the works of 
these authors; Maternus, in TaĐŝƚƵƐ ?Dialogue on Oratory, seems to conclude that peace is 
ultimately worth the loss of eloquence, Livy and Sallust both allow for peace to be praised 
ǁŚĞŶǁŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚƌĞĂƚǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?>ŝǀǇƵƐĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨEƵŵĂ ?ƐƌĞŝŐŶƚŽ
demonstrate that morality and discipline can be maintained in the longa pax ?ĂŶĚ^ĂůůƵƐƚ ?Ɛ
contrast of the period of peace in Numidia with the decline of Rome after 146BC suggests 
that an external enemy is not always necessary for concord. 
Finally, there is one last point that must be addressed; this is the fact that just because 
these ideas have been found in the works of the historians and philosophers, it does not 
mean that they always represent the personal views of the authors.  Whether this refers to 
the words of Thyestes in Seneca, Maternus in Tacitus, Adherbal in Sallust or in some cases 
even the first person philosophical treatises of Maximus of Tyre, whose readiness to 
present arguments both for and against proposals, shows that not all his written opinions 
were actually truly held.  However, even though this is the case, for the purpose of this 
thesis it is significant enough that differing attitudes to peace have been found in such 
quantity.  Moreover, peace is frequently used in a more nuanced way than previous 
scholarship has noted, as this scholarship often emphasised the aggressive nature of the 
language and policy of pax.  Therefore, even if the examples presented in this thesis do not 
represent the beliefs of the authors studied, the pacifistic arguments they contain were 
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clearly a part of the literary, historiographical, philosophical and rhetorical traditions.  The 
weight of examples examined here could even possibly suggest that peace would be a 
standard topic for rhetorical training.  The similarities in the praises of the empire found in 
Pliny, Aulius Aristides and Velleius Paterculus could act as evidence of this, as could the 
similarities between the appeals to concordia in the Greek cities in both Dio Chrystostom 
and Aulius Aristides.   
Further evidence of this could be the way that peace is often presented in the form of a 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ?  ŝŽ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŽŶ ƉĞĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ǁĂƌ ? ĂƐ ŝƚ ƐƵƌǀŝǀĞƐ ? ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƐƉĞŶĚƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŝŵĞ
discussing the different ways that orators and philosophers approach the subject of peace, 
thereby creating a dichotomy of positions which would perhaps have been continued 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁŽƌŬ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƐŚŽǁŶŵŽƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇŝŶDĂǆŝŵƵƐŽĨdǇƌĞ ?ƐƉĂŝƌŽĨŽƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ
the farmer and the soldier, which follow a traditional rhetorical pattern of claim and 
counter-claim.  Finally, in his tragedies Seneca chooses the debate scenes to house the bulk 
of the contents pertaining to peace.  Therefore, in each of these three authors the most 
sustained focus on peace is found in the form of debate. 
The Roman Empire, like all empires, was built and sustained on the backs of the army, and 
ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ŽĨ ZŽŵĞ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ĂƌĞ Ă ĐŚƌŽŶŝĐle of wars.  However, this study has 
shown that despite this, the thinkers of the period that witnessed the establishment and 
consolidation of an empire could be equally troubled by the brutality of their kinsmen and 
awed by the magnificence of their achievement.  At a time when the ideas of oikeiosis and 
cosmopolitanism were spreading through the philosophical schools and Stoicism was 
becoming the dominant philosophy of the elite, it should perhaps be unsurprising that as 
the empire welcomed more people into its citizenship, her philosophers and historians 
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